The removal of top commanders in wartime is rare, and has raised concerns about continuity and readiness in the campaign. The decision has faced particular criticism due to Hegseth’s own almost total lack of experience, having himself been a political appointee with an activist agenda inside the Pentagon, rather than a traditional defence bureaucrat. There has been no single official explanation for the purges, and the removal of multiple other senior military leaders have been reported but not confirmed. Multiple sources describe a broader pattern of dismissals and replacements across senior ranks, raising concerns regarding the politicisation of the military and a shift toward loyalist leadership.

War-game style simulations conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces and various U.S. think tanks have not only cautioned against launching a war against Iran, but also pointed to a potential ground invasion as having particularly disastrous outcomes. The Iranian Armed Forces’ ability to sustain missile and drone attacks, as demonstrated since February 28, are likely to leave landing ships and U.S. ground units highly vulnerable to targeting, providing more ludicrous targets than U.S. forces based in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. With multiple sources indicating that the U.S. has already suffered major casualties in its campaign due to the targeting of bases, hotels and compounds hosting them, this is likely to have further increased the controversy of escalating to deploy ground forces on Iranian soil.

Following Poland’s donation of its Soviet-supplied S-200 long range air defence systems to Ukraine, as well as shorter ranged systems such as the S-125, the country’s armed forces have become heavily reliant on the Patriot. This is likely to remain the case until its now obsolete F-16s are modernised to the F-16V standard, and until F-35A fighters are delivered and brought up to the Block 4 standard. Air defences across the majority of the Patriot’s European operators have been severely depleted by mass donations to Ukraine, with German officials in March having warned that the country has been left poorly protected against potential air or missile attacks as a result. The limitations of air defences in Poland were highlighted both during drone incursions attributed to Russia in September, and in late November after the Polish Air Force placed its Patriot systems on high alert to respond to a flight of four Russian MiG-31 tactical combat jetsover the Baltic Sea.

The rapid destruction of Patriot systems by Russian forces in Ukraine has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high. Further supplies to Ukraine or other European states are expected to be slow, with the U.S. Armed Forces having confirmed in July 2025 that their own supplies had fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. This was the result of both large scale donations to Ukraine, and combat use against Iran in June 2025. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army has expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces.

After U.S. and Israeli forces launched a full scale assault on Iran on February 28, with the aim of forcefully toppling its government, footage from the Middle East has repeatedly raised questions regarding the Patriot system’s effectiveness. Systems deployed in the Gulf including in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have repeatedly been seen firing three interceptors against each target, rather than the standard two, indicating an awareness of a low probability of kill. The systems have consistently been seen failing to hit their targets, and at times caused civilian casualties as a result. To reinforce its positions in the Middle East, the U.S. has withdrawn both interceptors and complete air defence systems from bases across much of the world, most notably from South Korea, with this occurring both in the months preceding attacks on Iran, and in the following weeks.

Entering service from 1992, the Leclerc is one of just two post-Cold War Western tanks designs alongside the often problematic British Challenger 2, and is the only Western-produced tank with an autoloader and reduced crew requirement from four to three personnel. The Leclerc is notably considerably lighter than other Western tank designs of its generation at approximately 56 tonnes, compared to 70-80 tonnes form the U.S. Abrams and German Leopard 2. Despite its limited armour protection and its age, the Leclerc is among the most expensive tanks ever built at closet $20 million per vehicle, with its lack of significant exports meaning it has a very small spare parts ecosystem and has not benefitted from significant incremental upgrades seen on rival tank types. Its capabilities have increasingly been left behind by new fourth generation tank types, most notably the Chinese Type 100 operationalised in 2025, but also the U.S. M1E3 which is scheduled to enter service in the early 2030s, and the Russian T-14 which has for years been delayed at advanced prototype stages.

French officials have been among the most vocal regarding the possibility of a major escalation in the country’s operations against Russia in the Ukrainian theatre, with French Land Forces Commander General Pierre Schill having in October pledged that the country would be ready to do so in 2026 if required. This follows a statement by French chief of the General Staff Fabien Mandon that forces troops should be ready for a combat engagements in three to four years to face an emerging “Russian threat.” Although European states have been divided over the possible large scale deployment of ground forces in Ukraine, this option gained growing support from countries across the continent from early 2024 as Ukraine’s military position deteriorated. The possibility of a mass diversion of U.S. armaments to the Middle East for operations against Iran and its strategic partners, and of a major collapse in European economies, all further undermining the Ukrainian war effort, may lead European states to further support possible escalation.

Western advisors, logisticians, combatants, and other personnel operating newly delivered NATO-standard hardware have played a central and growing role in the Ukrainian war effort, with French contractor personnel widely reported to be heavily involved in operations. These operations gained particularly high attention after a missile strike on January 16, 2024, targeted the headquarters of predominantly French European contractors, causing at least 80 casualties 60 or more of which were killed. These personnel were reported by Russian state source to be “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts,” which “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them. While France’s air and ground forces are highly constrained in their ability to escalate the war effort against Russia, the French nuclear umbrella could prove to be a pivotal factor should flag-bearing NATO forces enter the war in force.

Footage of the exercises showed the Anqing operating alongside several other vessel types, and firing on simulated targets. Crew interviews highlighted both gunnery correction and early-warning drills in a complex electromagnetic environment, indicating that its first training cycle is already focused on the essentials of modern fleet combat: early detection, maintaining fire control under stress, and integrating crews and equipment into a theatre-level warfighting system. The capabilities of the Type 055’s sensors are near unrivalled, with each integrating a dual band radar system similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer, providing a particularly high degree of situational awareness including over-the-horizon detection capabilities.

Displacing close to 13,000 tons, and at approximately 180 meters long, about 20 meters in beam, Type 055 class destroyers are among the largest and most heavily armed surface combat ships in the world. While the United States has yet to bring a post-Cold War destroyer or cruiser class fully into service, with the three Zumwalt class ships built suffering from considerable performance issues and delays, the Type 055 is the latest of multiple generations of Chinese destroyers operationalised over the past 30 years. U.S. officials and analysts have increasingly pointed to the challenges posed by the Type 055 and its lighter counterpart the Type 052D as necessitating the development of an entirely new clean sheet destroyer type in the U.S. to avoid falling further behind, as the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers’ room to incorporate further upgrades becomes increasingly limited.

Type 055 class destroyers use an integrated mast carrying a four-panel Type 346B active electronically scanned array radar and additional X-band arrays, supported by hull-mounted and towed-array or variable-depth sonar. This provides an ability to search, track, classify, and assign engagements across air, surface, and subsurface domains, allowing a single destroyer to hold together a layered escort screen, which makes the ships particularly complementary to the capabilities of China’s new aircraft carriers. The ships are well suited to extending the defended battlespace through long-range area air defence, allowing naval forces to push further from shore while retaining a mobile missile shield.

The types of aircraft deployed are consistent with a high-priority personnel recovery mission, during which HC-130J typically serves as an airborne command-and-support platform, while the HH-60W helicopters are used to recover personnel. Iranian media outlets are reported to have broadcast a message offering a reward for the capture of U.S. pilots, indicating that a search for the downed airmen was underway. The capture of U.S. airmen would provide a considerable public relations victory to the Iranian Armed Forces, while potentially negatively affecting the U.S. and its partners’ morale. The costs of training F-15 pilots and weapons systems officers also amount to several million dollars each, with the loss occurring at a time when the Air Force is facing a persistent shortage of such personnel.

The United States Central Command previously confirmed that three F-15E fighters were shot down over Kuwait on March 1, following multiple unconfirmed repots of shootdowns, and the subsequent release of footage showing one of the aircraft falling in flames in an uncontrolled spiral over Kuwaiti skies. While subsequent reports attributed these losses to friendly fire from a Kuwaiti F-18C fighter, this has been seriously questioned for multiple reasons, with analysts widely speculating that shootdowns by infrared guided missiles launched by Iraqi paramilitary groups are more likely. The disabling of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air bases across much of the Middle East, and growing strain on the KC-135 tanker fleet which has itself suffered significant losses, both in the air and on the ground, has limited the Air Force’s ability to use shorter ranged fighters such as the F-16C/D and F-35A to strike Iranian targets, leaving it more heavily reliant on the F-15 as its sole long range fighter type in service.

The confirmed shoot down of the seventeenth Reaper drone closely coincides with the release of footage confirming the shootdown of an F-15 and an F-16 fighter on April 2-3, as Iranian forces have persistently made effective use of infrared guided short and medium range air defence systems to asymmetrically challenge U.S. and Israeli air power. Israeli Heron drones and United Arab Emirates Wing Loong II drones, which are both relied on for comparable roles, have also been lost, the former in considerable numbers. The destruction of multiple MQ-9 drones during attacks on Iran are reported by Republic of China sources to be likely to seriously delay plans to deliver four of the aircraft to the Republic of China Air Force, with the aircraft having been ordered for over $171 million each. The U.S. Armed Forces are expected to prioritise replenishing their own losses rather than equipping defence clients. The extent of losses are expected to strengthen calls to develop a successor to the MQ-9 with superior survivability including a much reduced radar cross section and infrared signature.

The rapid depletion of U.S. and Israeli beyond visual range missile arsenals has reportedly increasingly forced the services of both countries to operate closer to or within Iranian territory to use lower cost and more abundant gravity bombs. This poses significantly greater risks, however, particularly for fighters that lack advanced stealth capabilities such as the F-16. Israeli F-16s in particular use obsolete mechanically scanned array radars that are not only vulnerable to jamming, but also emit large signatures allowing them to be detected and located. The F-16 shootdown on April 2 reportedly resulted in the pilot ejecting over Iranian territory, with their fate remaining unknown.

In the final week of March the U.S. Armed Forces and the Israeli Air Force were reported to have significantly reduced deep penetration strikes over Iranian territory following the confirmed successful surface-to-air attack on an F-35 fifth generation fighter on March 19. The attack damaged the F-35 sufficiently to cause shrapnel wounds to the pilot, as was later confirmed by the U.S. Air Force. U.S. and Israeli losses to Iranian air defences have reportedly also included multiple F-16, F-15 and F-18 fighters, as well as large numbers of unmanned aircraft including at least 17 MQ-9 Reaper drones. According to a “highly-placed intelligence source” in Iran, these losses “have led to a significant reduction in military operations by American and Israeli fighter jets in the central regions of the country.” "After striking the F-35, the pace of military operations has decreased, although aircraft and drones are still being used for reconnaissance purposes," the source added.

Canada’s interest in the GCAP program follows the initiation of a review of the country’s planned procurement of 88F-35A fifth generation fighters in 2025 under Prime Minister Mark Carney, following trade and security tensions with the United States. Carney in January 2026 stressed that forceful U.S. threats to annex Greenland and Canada itself signalled end of the rules-based international order, indicting a willingness to protect Greenland against a possible U.S. invasion. Although the Swedish Gripen E/F ‘4+ generation’ lightweight fighter was considered as a potential alternative to complement the F-35, its capabilities are considered too limited, with the F-35 having been assessed to be overwhelmingly superior in its combat potential. This mirrors similar assessments that have been made across countries procuring the F-35, which has consistently been strongly favoured over European fighter types and over the U.S. F-18E/F.

Although the Global Combat Air Programme has been marketed as being intended to develop a sixth generation fighter, analysts have widely raised questions regarding the viability of this, with the limitations of the technological bases of the countries involved and the availability of funding making it highly unlikely that the fighter will perform on a remotely comparable level to U.S. and Chinese sixth generation fighter types. The program is expected to produce a fifth or ‘5+ generation’ fighter type, although whether it will be able to fly rival the performance of the F-35 Block 4 or newer variants of the Chinese J-20 remains in serious question. The program nevertheless has the potential to provide a NATO standard alternative to the F-35 within the fifth generation.

The F-35 was developed with a primary role of launching penetration missions into well defended hostile airspace, and is less well suited for air superiority or interceptor roles which it will be required to perform in Canadian service. Fielding the aircraft nevertheless has significant interoperability benefits with the U.S. Air Force, which has heavily concentrated its own F-35 fleet in Alaska. Commenting on the perceived need for the aircraft operational commander for the Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Region Major General Chris McKenna observed particularly noted that adversaries were also fielding fifth generation fighters which other NATO-capable fighter types would not be able to match. “I have a fifth-generation threat that I need to defeat. And so that’s the challenge right now. I need to be able to defeat the adversary, and I need to have overmatch,” McKenna observed, adding: “I will say, I need my pilots to have overmatch against high-end threats with their adversaries. And I think we can both agree that the threats are accruing by the day, it’s getting worse and worse by the day.”

Canada’s interest in the GCAP program indicates possible plans to split fighter procurements between the F-35 and the new aircraft to reduce reliance on the United States, much has had previously reportedly been considered for the Gripen. This is unlikely to be the result of any shortcomings with the F-35’s performance, and may lead to an overall less capable combat fleet, with political factors being the primary driver of a perceived need to diversify procurements. As the Canadian Defence Ministry has already begun payments for 30 F-35s, and there are no near term post-fourth generation alternatives, procurement of the F-35 is a certainty, with only the numbers that will be procured remaining uncertain. The high possibility of both a significant improvement in U.S.-Canadian relations after the Trump administration, and of major delays and shortcomings affecting the GCAP, means a return to plans for a fleet fully comprised of F-35s is highly possible.

The decision to deploy both Apache attack helicopters and Abrams tanks signals that the U.S. Armed Forces are prioritising combat power in the country, possibly to increase the lethality of personnel in the theatre to compensate for planned reductions to personnel numbers. The Apaches have participated in exercises in Romania, although it is unknown whether they were equipped for armed reconnaissance, escort, air defence, or another mission profile. The aircraft are increasingly heavily relied on for defence against drone strikes, as single use attack drones have played increasingly central roles in operations across multiple theatres. The Apache’s radars, and targeting systems, weaponry, loitering capabilities, and relatively low operational costs, between them make they optimal assets to engage large numbers of low cost attack drones.

The Apache’s 30mm M230 chain gun, and Hydra 70 rockets with Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System guidance kits, are relatively low cost armaments well suited to engaging lower cost drones. Engaging such targets has posed challenges for fighters due to the costs of their air-to-air missiles, which are more than an order of magnitude greater than the costs of the drones they are required to target, as well as the limited number of gun rounds they carry. The deployment of Apaches has occurred as the helicopter type is actively being used for counter-drone operations over Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and shortly following the initiation of anti-drone warfare exercises involving U.S. Army Apache units in Germany. These exercises in late March represented the first time the Apache had been validated as a viable air-to-air counter-drone platform in the European theatre in U.S. Army service.

The strengthening of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe occurs in the context of ongoing war in neighbouring Ukraine, in which U.S. and European NATO forces are heavily involved. This has included the deployment of contractor personnel organisations such as the U.S. Forward Observation Group and the Polish Volunteer Corps for frontline combat operations, as well as active duty personnel serving in roles ranging from intelligence to logistics. The very limited capabilities of European ground forces, which has been further depleted due to mass donations of equipment to Ukraine, has led to greater value being attributed to the presence of U.S. forces on the ground. Nevertheless, significant questions have been raised regarding the Apache’s utility in a high intensity conflict, with engagements in the Ukrainian theatre indicating that high value attack helicopters on both sides are vulnerable to being directly attacked by low cost drones.

Palmachim Airbase is a major Israeli military installation located on the Mediterranean coast, south of Tel Aviv. It is one of the most strategically sensitive bases operated by the Israel Defence Forces. The facility serves multiple high-value roles, which makes it very different from a typical airbase. This includes serving as the primary test site for both ballistic missiles such as the Jericho, as well as missile defence systems such as the Arrow. It is also the heart of Israel’s space program and its sole site for independent satellite launches, while hosting elite air force intelligence operations and a number of unmanned combat, reconnaissance and surveillance air units. As a core node in Israel’s strategic infrastructure, although it would usually be heavily defended, local sources have reported that the extreme depletion of Israel’s missile defences due to Iranian missile strikes has left targets across the country highly vulnerable. The possible destruction of parts of Arrow missile defence systems may serve to further weaken Israeli defences against Iranian attacks.

Hezbollah is reported to have procured its ballistic missile arsenal through its strategic partnership with Ba’athist Syria, before the overthrow of the Syrian government by Western, Turkish and Israeli backed paramiltiary groups in December 2024. Syria license produced derivatives of the Scud design in considerable numbers throughout the 1990s and 2000s with North Korean support, with their capabilities having been incrementally improved as new technologies were made available. A example operationalised in the late 1990s the integration of “a bespoke canard system, will enable the MaRV [manoeuvring reentry vehicle] of the Scud to alter its original planned trajectory when it re-enters the atmosphere, significantly improving its accuracy and increasing warhead survivability by making its flight path problematical to assess for missile-defence interceptors,” as was reported by the British information group IHS Jane’s. This upgrade was provided by engineers from North Korea’s Tangun Trading Corporation.

While the original Soviet designed Scud-D integrates a 700 kilogram warhead, the missile reported to have been fired on Palmachim Airbase is reported by Israeli sources to have had a one ton warhead, possibly reflecting the fact that Hezbollah is thought to operate modernised North Korean variants of the missiles with different specifications. Both the Scud-D and newer North Korean variants missiles have considerably superior precision than prior Scud variants due to their use of terminal guidance systems, allowing them to strike specific facilities rather than serving as area bombardment weapons against cities. The most advanced known variant of the Scud design, the Hwasong-9, was license produced in Syria, and may have also been transferred to Hezbollah.

Although the threat from North Korean missiles to the interests of Israel and its strategic partners such as Turkey and the Untied States diminished significantly after Syria’s defeat in December 2024, the proliferation of a significant part of the Syrian arsenal to Hezbollah means this challenge persists to a more limited extent. The use of ballistic missiles by Hezbollah is highly complementary to both the paramilitary group’s rocket artillery and anti-tank guided missile bombardment of Israeli targets, as well as the ongoing ballistic missile and drone strikes being launched from Iran. Reflecting the much higher intensity of hostilities compared to prior engagements between Israeli and Hezbollah forces, the paramiltiary group has deployed its elite Radwan Force to engage Israeli forces on the ground for the first time, inflicting unprecedented losses on ground units, and reportedly launching ground operations beyond Lebanon’s borders.

The first destroyer of the class, the USS Zumwalt, in mid-January became the first to conduct sea trials while configured to be equipped with Conventional Prompt Strike missiles. This followed a protracted refit from August 2023, during which its two 155mm Advanced Gun System turrets were removed and replaced with 12 launch tubes for the CPS. The destroyer completed its first operational deployment in November 2022 with the Pacific Fleet, which lasted three months, with the lack of further deployments, and the initiation of refurbishment shortly after the sole deployment that was made, indicating that its performance was considered far from optimal. The integration of ballistic missiles onto destroyers has become increasingly common, with North Korea having done so on its Choi Hyon class ships, which are being built at a rapid rate, while China has repeatedly tested YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles from its Type 055 class destroyers and will likely bring them into service in 2026.

The Department of War’s notice indicates that the CPS program is moving from a focus validating the concept, to building the industrial and technical foundation needed for deployment. This indicates that the Pentagon is no longer treating the program as a developing capability, but as a system it is preparing to begin fielding and sustaining. Official Navy reports have described CPS as the foundation of the United States’ first sea-based hypersonic weapons, an area in which it has been left increasingly far behind potential adversaries. The value of hypersonic weapons has recently been highlighted both by Russian use of the Oreshnnik ballistic missile with hypersonic glide vehicles against targets in Ukraine, and more significantly by Iran’s use of Fattah 2 missiles with similar glide vehicles to penetrate dense U.S. and Israeli missile defences during engagements that began on February 28.

The CPS missile is based on the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program developed by Lockheed Martin for the U.S. Army, and uses the same propulsion rocket and the same Common Hypersonic Glide Body warhead. The aircraft combines ranges usually associated with strategic ballistic missiles carrying megaton level warheads, with a conventional warhead and high precision, providing naval units with the ability to quickly react and lend fire support in a wide range of contingencies.After vertical launch, the missile releases a glide vehicle, which accelerates to hypersonic speeds. A significant risk in employing the missile, however, is that its flight characteristics will alert the strategic early warning radar systems of China and Russia, meaning the United States will likely need to notify both if making a launch, much like Russia has notified Washington and Beijing when launching its Oreshnik missile.

Although the possibility of the F-47 falling over half a decade behind has been raised repeatedly, these estimates have been conservative when considering the U.S. defence sector’s record for extreme delays in the post-Cold War era. China’s ability to bring its first fifth generation fighter, the J-20, from its first demonstrator flight to service entry in just six years drew a highly unfavourable precedent when compared to the F-35 and F-22, which both took 15 years. This provided an indication of the discrepancies between the two countries’ defence sectors, indicating that China could begin fielding sixth generation fighters close to a decade before the United States. In September 2022, head of the U.S. Air Combat Command General Mark Kelly warned that China was well positioned to lead the world in bringing sixth generation fighters into service, with other officials having widely made similar warnings.

Providing insight into the emerging consensus on the issue of the F-47’s development timeline, Veteran U.S. Air Force fighter pilot Chris Lemoine observed: “Did anybody ever believe that it wasn’t going to be the 2030s? I would be surprised if it IS the 2030s.” “I love the idea, its very ambitious that we could have had it in the 2030s, but I don’t think anybody whose been around any length of time thinks that that’s possible, because there’s so much red tape that they have to get through, even on their best days,” he added. His associate, Navy fighter pilot Dave Gonzalez, similarly observed: “If in a year from now its like: ‘could slide to 2040s,’ I would think: ‘There were are, there’s some honesty, finally.”

Commenting on the U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX program, which until 2025 had appeared poised to receive much greater funding and enter service much earlier than the F-47, only to be defunded and deprioritised at the expense of the Air Force program, Gonzalez observed:

“The F/A-XX, that thing hasn’t been announced yet. That thing is like years and years [away]. We’ve talked about it before, the procurement process for weapons, especially fighter airplanes, something needs to change…. You know China is just pumping out new designs. I get it maybe we’re doing the same but it’s much more secret, but I think it’s crazy. I mean the F-35, that airplane is not fully mature, and there just seems to be this huge push to go: ‘we need sixth gen., sixth gen., sixth gen., when I would argue the fifth gen. stuff is not, we haven’t reached the limits of those capabilities.”

While the United States remains in a league of its own with China in fifth and sixth generation fighter development, with European and Russian sixth generation programs being constrained by far smaller defence budgets, much poorer technological standings, and in the former case major defence sector efficiency issues, the possibility of the U.S. falling far behind China while remaining well ahead of other actors remains significant. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David Allvin was among those to raise this possibility, observing: “The adversary is not taking a knee. They’re not stopping and saying, ‘well, maybe the U.S. slows down, we’ll slow down too.’ Maybe we can take a knee, and that’s not what they’re doing.”

Although the United States and Australia have for decades integrated Tomahawk missiles onto their Aegis destroyers, with South Korea having integrated indigenous cruise missile types onto its own, Japanese doctrine has emphasised the use of destroyers for anti-submarine warfare and air and missile defence duties, rather than land attack roles. This has rapidly changed from the late 2010s, however, as Japan has procured assets optimised for launching deep strikes into hostile territory. These have included a wide range of land-based and air-launched cruise missiles, such as the JASSM-ER, as well as F-35 Joint Strike Fighters optimised for offensive penetration operations. Despite the intention to transition its destroyer fleet to use cruise missiles, however, the very serious depletion of the U.S. Navy’s inventory of Tomahawk missiles during hostilities with Iran from February 28, 2026, has raised the possibility of deliveries to Japan facing very serious delays.

Japan’s transition towards fielding assets better optimised for offensive operations has fuelled considerable controversy domestically due to the country’s pacifist constitution. This shift has nevertheless received considerable support in the Western world due to Tokyo’s support for sustaining a Western dominated order in East Asia and containing the rise of China. The modification of the Chokai follows orders 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 2024, with including 200 Block IV and 200 Block V missiles. Block IV missiles feature a data link, allowing for changes in the flight pattern or target selection mid-flight, while the more costly Block V missiles improves on the Block IV’s framework with updated communications and guidance capabilities. The missiles have 1,000 kilometre ranges, and have the potential to revolutionise Japan’s reconnaissance strike complex, although their subsonic speeds and lack of stealth capabilities do leave them vulnerable to interception.

After suffering sustained development delays, the first public requests for funds for procurement of the AIM-260 by the U.S. Navy and Air Force were made in mid-2025. Development and procurement of the missile have been considered particularly urgent due to Chinese frontline fighter units’ growing advantage in their capabilities of their air-to-air missiles, with increasingly capable variants of the PL-15 having been introduced since 2014, while the new PL-16 has provided further capability improvements. Australia and Japan were long expected to be among the first clients for the AIM-260 due to their proximity to China, and the orientation of their air forces primarily to support the United States in a potential war with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

The AIM-260 was initially intended to enter service around 2022, with multiple delays thought to have pushed this back by at least four to five years to 2026-2027. While progress towards development remained uncertain, requests for funding for serial production and procurements in 2025 indicated that the program had already approached or reached an end to development testing. It has been widely speculated that the AIM-260 will be far too costly to fully replace the AIM-120 in service, and that production of the AIM-120D will continue in parallel to AIM-260 production. The missiles are expected to be prioritised to equip fighter units in the Pacific due to the challenges posed by Chinese air power in the region.

The AIM-260 was designed to widen the first-shot opportunity in beyond-visual-range combat, provide countermeasures against increasingly capable electronic warfare, and engage targets at much longer ranges than the older AIM-120 can. The missile is also speculated to integrate a much more powerful active electronically scanned array radar in its nose cone, much as the PL-15 and PL-16 have, to be able to better lock on to stealth targets such as Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighters. The Royal Australian Air Force currently fields 72 F-35A fighters split between three operational squadrons, alongside the No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit. The procurement will equip the Air Force with 6.25 AIM-260 missiles per fighter, allowing previously procured AIM-120 missiles to be used as a reserve stockpile.

Although Lockheed Martin is holding “very active” talks with the Pentagon about enhancing the F-35 to a ‘5+ generation’ standard, these upgrades are expected to more than double the cost of the aircraft, while still leaving it well below parity with the capabilities of China’s sixth generation fighters currently under development. China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighters in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages directly caused a drop in Lockheed Martin’s stock value, and resulted in the Pentagon allocating a higher priority to the F-47 program and deprioritising orders for the F-35. Growing signs of rapid progress being made in China developing these aircraft means they may well enter service before the F-35 is brought to a fully Block 4 standard, let alone a ‘5+ generation’ standard, and over to half a decade before the F-47 can be brought into service.

The U.S., Israel and the United Arab Emirates have widely deployed Apache attack helicopters for counter-drone operations, with the U.S. Army having over the past few years significantly changed its doctrine and training for attack helicopter operations to emphasise air defence against unmanned targets. France and the United Kingdom have been heavily involved in regional counter-drone operations from the outset of the conflict on February 28, with the French Air Force reported in mid-March to be suffering from an acute shortage of air-to-air missiles, due to extensive operations against Iranian drones in the Gulf region. According to the French paper La Tribune, the rapid depletion of ammunition has raised serious concerns regarding the further combat capability of the air force. The growing strain on the fighter fleet may have influenced the decision to deploy Tiger attack helicopters for the same roles.

Despite its much more conservative intended performance specifications than the Apache or rival Chinese and Russian heavyweight helicopter types, the Tiger’s performance has long caused considerable controversy. The aircraft’s availability rates have remained poor, with operators widely reporting difficulties maintaining rates of even 50 percent. Although it is a relatively small aircraft, maintenance needs have also far exceeded intended specifications, comparing poorly to rivals such as the Apache and Russian Mi-35. Operational costs have also far exceeded expectations. These were among the factors limiting its ability to gain export orders, and leading the Australian Armed Forces and German Armed Forces to retire the aircraft years ahead of schedule, with the former to procuring U.S. Apaches to replace them. The issues with the Tiger reflect broader trends affecting European defence products, which has limited their ability to compete with their U.S., Russian and Chinese counterparts across a wide range of areas.

The Air Force first deployed F-15EX fighters to Kadena Air Base in July 2025, albeit onlyto “conduct integration and familiarisation training with local units,” with the aircraft deployed under the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron from Eglin Air Force Base. The facility previously hosted 48 F-15C/D air superiority fighters on permanent deployment, which served far longer than expected due to the shortcomings of the F-22 program which prevented it from providing a viable replacement. After it was announced in October 2022 that the F-15C/D fighters would be withdrawn after 44 years stationed there, it was confirmed in July 2024 that 36 F-15EX fighters would be permanently deployed to replace them. The Air Force has struggled with serious shortages of the new F-15s, due to significant delays to production, with the aircraft remaining in high demand both for deployments to the Pacific, and to serve in the Air National Guard.

The Air Force significantly increased procurements of F-15EX fighter aircraft under the Fiscal Year 2026 budget, laying out plans to increase the intended fleet size from 98 to 129 of the aircraft. Alongside a halving of procurements of F-35A fifth generation fighters, and a surge in funding for developing the sixth generation F-47, the budget proposed setting aside $3 billion for the F-15EX. Despite the F-15EX’s priority status, supply chain issues have contributed to delays in bringing more of the aircraft into service. The importance attributed to the F-15 fleet has grown significantly in March 2026, as the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran highlighted the vulnerability of shorter ranged fighters to the destruction of air bases near hostile territory within the first hours and days of hostilities breaking out, leading F-15E fighters to be relied on particularly heavily for operations.

Senior Air Force officers have long advocated expanded F-15EX orders, with commander of the Air National Guard Lieutenant General Michael Loh having observed in 2022 that although “some people are still looking at this as a 1970s-technology aircraft,” incremental modernisation had made itcutting edge. Notable examples he highlighted among its avionics systems included its open mission system architecture, electronic warfare suite and the AN/APG-82 radar. The F-15 is the only fighter in production in the Western world from a comparable weight range to larger Russian and Chinese aircraft such as the Su-30, J-16 and J-20, with its endurance, weapons carrying capacity, and radar size, all being in a league entirely of their own in the Western world.

In October 2026 defence contractor Raytheon confirmed it had developed a new primary radar, the APG-82(V)X, which uses “cutting-edge gallium nitride (GaN) technology” to further bolster the capabilities of the F-15 fleet. Procurement of the new radar for later F-15EX variants is expected. The U.S. Armed Forces’ continued reliance on the F-15 as its sole heavyweight and long range fighter type is largely a result of post-Cold War decline of the country’s defence sector, which prevented the F-22 from being developed into a viable successor, or other similarly heavy high endurance fighters from being developed with fifth generation capabilities. The F-15EX is considered far outmatched by new Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighters, which are similarly large but benefit from much longer ranges and cutting edge stealth capabilities, and already integrate gallium nitride radars. China is set to introduce its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, meaning they could begin operating in the region not long after the last ‘4+ generation’ F-15EX fighters arrive at Kadena Air Base.

Although the Soviet Union had led the world by two decades in operationalising tactical combat jets with electronically scanned array radars, post-Soviet decline in the Russian defence sector meant the transition from PESA to AESA radars was highly protracted, with only European fighter programs remaining behind Russia. AESA radars have the advantage of being able to scan more precisely and send out radio waves at different frequencies in multiple directions simultaneously, which has major advantages for electronic warfare. Their radar signatures are also significantly lower, making it more difficult for potential adversaries to use their emissions to home in on their locations.

The Su-35’s lack of an AESA radar has long been a leading disadvantage compared to rival heavyweight fighter types such as the U.S. F-15SA/QA/EX and the Chinese J-11BG, J-15B, J-16. These fighter types all integrate outstandingly large and powerful radars. The situational awareness provided by the Irbis-E has been considered insufficient to guide R-37M long range air-to-air missiles to their targets at maximum ranges, raising the possibility that the new AESA radar will be capable of doing so. These missiles have been relied on heavily in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, with the missile’s 350 kilometre range having been considered a game changer for the Su-35’s combat potential.

The Irbis-E X-waveband multi role radar is considered one of the most capable PESA radars ever integrated onto a fighter, with the maximum deflection angle of its beam remaining totally unrivalled at 120 degrees, while it retains a 350-400 kilometre detection range against larger fighter-sized targets, and can track 30 and fire on on eight aircraftsimultaneously. Chinese evaluations of the Su-35 indicate that the radar is approximately 20 percent less powerful than the similarly sized AESA radar integrated onto J-16 fighters. The capabilities of the Su-35’s newer AESA radar remain highly uncertain, as does whether it is intended to modernise fighters in Russian Aerospace Forces service, or whether it is instead intended primarily to improve the fighter’s competitiveness on export markets. The development of an AESA radar exclusively for export would be far from unprecedented, with the Zhuk-AE radar having been developed for export variants of the lighter MiG-35 fighter, but never being procured by the Russian Defence Ministry.

The Su-35 achieved unprecedented export successes in 2025, with deliveries to Algeria confirmed to have begun in February, and totalling 18 fighters. Leaked Russian government documents subsequently showed that the delivery of 48 Su-35 fighters was scheduled to re-equip the Iranian Air Force, with the delivery six more Su-35s to Ethiopia also scheduled, marking a major breakthrough for the program that would bring total exports to 96 fighters. The fighter is expected to be pitched to North Korea to help cover the costs of Russia’s tens of billions of dollars of defence procurements from the country, although whether the East Asian state’s defence ministry will be interested in the aircraft, or will instead prioritise procuring the more advanced Su-57 fifth generation fighter, remains uncertain.

In February multiple reports indicated that the Republic of China Armed Forces, which remain in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China, will deploy HIMARS to the islands of Penghu and Dongyin. Dongyin, the northernmost island of the Matsu archipelago in the East China Sea, is located less than 10 kilometres from the mainland coast of China. The systems deployed to these locations are reportedly intended to integrate ATACMS ballistic missiles, placing key strategic targets in the firing line. Reports by Taipei-based media outlets have indicated that the Defence Ministry’s decision to increase its procurements of HIMARS systems, which can integrate ATACMS, to a total of 111 units, was taken specifically with the decision to deploy them to forward islands in mind.

The Republic of China’s lack of international recognition or UN membership has made sales of high impact armaments like HIMARS and associated ATACMS by the United States appear highly controversial. These sales have gained greater geopolitical significance due to the U.S. Armed Forces’ obtaining of new authority to coordinate the Republic of China Army’s arsenals, following the establishment of a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre b in late January. U.S. personnel permanently stationed at the facility in Taipei oversee planning and potential use of local missile forces, including target selection, allowing the United States to effectively strike mainland Chinese targets by proxy.

Highlighting the significance of HIMARS procurements, Vice Chairman of the Forward Auxiliary Association Li Wenzhong on March 5 criticised procurements of MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems, M1A2 Abrams tanks, and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, as far from optimal for the Republic of China’s defence needs. By contrast, he praised the decision to procure HIMARS due to their combined high sophistication and the fact that their capabilities had been verified in actual combat. He singled out the system’s ability to launch ATACMS ballistic missiles with 300 kilometre ranges as being of particular high value due to its ability to strike high value targets across the Taiwan Strait. When deployed in the Ukrainian theatre, ATACMS have been used to neutralise multiple Russian targets, with examples including the destruction of parts of S-400 air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers, and the destruction of high value combat aircraft on their runways. The are highly valued as low cost high impact asymmetric assets.

The Su-35 in the early 2020s began to integrate the R-37, an oversized missile type developed for the much larger MiG-31 interceptor which combines a long range, a large 61 kilogram warhead, and a very high Mach 6 speed. The fighter’s radar, however is less powerful than that of the MiG-31, meaning it requires support from MiG-31s, ground-based radars, or AEW&C systems like the A-50U, to be able to fire the missile at its full range. Russian Su-35s were in late July confirmed to have integrated the new R-77M air-to-air missile, revolutionising their beyond visual range combat capabilities and bridged the gap with the latest AIM-120D missiles integrated onto U.S. Air Force F-35s. The R-77M is estimated to be much more costly than the older R-77-1, and has not been seen in widespread use.

The Su-35 has been more intensively combat tested in air-to-air engagements than any post-Cold War era fighter type, with reports from November 2025 having indicated that fighters had forced the Ukrainian Air Force’s newly delivered F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters to operate exclusively at low altitudes and far behind the frontlines. Ukrainian sources have consistently warned that new F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters supplied by the country’s European supporters are wholly incapable of matching the Su-35’s capabilities. The Russian defence sector has significantly increased the scale of Su-35 production from 2025, in part due to the unprecedented export successes that were achieved that year. Deliveries in 2025 were reported in December,early November, late September, mid-August, late June, mid-May, and late March. The ‘4+ generation’ fighter’s capabilities have nevertheless fallen increasingly behind the cutting edge, as China and the United States bring their fifth generation fighters closer to ‘5+ generation’ standards, and are poised to begin operationalising sixth generation fighters in the early and mid 2030s.

Commenting on the test, state media reported that the Chonma 2 can intercept “almost all existing anti-tank weapons.” Alongside missiles and rockets, the system was also tested against multiple types of drone-like loitering munitions and airborne attack profiles . This appears to be in recognition of the primary role which such systems have played in anti-tank operations on both sides in the Russian-Ukrainian War. The development is notable not only for its implications for the revolutionising of North Korea armoured warfare capabilities, but also because the Chonma 20, and possibly its individual subsystems including active protection systems, are expected to be marketed to Russia.

Russia has already procured tens of billions of dollars worth of North Korean armaments for its war effort in the Ukrainian theatre, and has suffered from growing shortages of main battle tanks as its Soviet era reserves are increasingly depleted, while its production is far from sufficient to replace frontline losses across a long and high intensity frontier. This has led analysts to speculate that procurements of North Korean main battle tanks appears likely. It is possible, however, the Russia will favour procuring older T-62 tanks from North Korea, which can be more easily integrated into its forces and will be significantly less costly, potentially after local modernisation integrates new subsystems such as thermal imaging systems and active protection systems.

North Korea’s active protection system was first seen in use in footage released in July 2023, and uses radars to continuously monitor their surrounding environments for incoming threats, and when detecting incoming projectiles track them automatically, calculate their trajectories, and deploy protective munitions to intercept and destroy them. Although still ahead of the Western world, Russia fell behind China, Israel, and the two Koreas in developing modern active protection systems for its tanks. North Korean anti-tank missile capabilities have also increasingly eclipsed those of the Russian defence sector, with the Bulsae-4 electro-optical guided long-range anti-tank missile system having been employed in the Ukrainian theatre and boasting advanced long range top attack capabilities that Russian equivalentslack.

The Chonma 20 gained greater publicity following its involvement in exercises on March 19, when it was revealed that the Korean People’s Army tank brigade at the Pyongyang Training Base No. 60 serving under the elite Capital City Defence Corps had been re-equipped with vehicles. The exercises indicated that major advances in network centric and combined arms warfare capabilities had been made, potentially significantly enhancing the armed forces’ ability to conduct offensives against advanced South Korean and U.S. defences. In May 2025, North Korean state media unveiled a large scale new tank factory, at which time chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un stressed that replacing the Korean People’s Army’s armoured vehicles of the last century with the latest models had become a primary task of building the armed forces. It was projected at the time that the service entry rates of next generation main battle tanks would accelerate considerably. The technological gap of over four decades separating the Chonma 20 from preceding North Korean main battle tanks makes large scale production and procurements a likely game changer for the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.

Although Iranian strikes have destroyed higher value targets, including the $1.1 billion AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars valued at between $500 million and $1 billion each, the E-3 remains the most high value U.S. Armed Forces aircraft to have been destroyed so far in the war. Its destruction on March 28 marks one month since the beginning of a U.S. and Israeli air assault on Iran on February 28, with the capabilities of the U.S. and its strategic partners to intercept Iranian strikes having rapidly diminished due to both the raid destruction of their radar networks, and the depletion of their inventories of anti-missile interceptors. The E-3 will be particularly challenging to replace, with funding to produce the Air Force’s first post-Cold War airborne early warning systems, E-7 Wedgetails, having only been approved in early March, while a long queue remains to receive the aircraft.

Alongside the E-3, Iranian attacks on Prince Sultan Air Base are reported to have destroyed at last three KC-135 Stratotanker airborne refuelling aircraft, which cost approximately $53 million each. The attack is reported to have caused at least ten casualties. This follows a prior Iranian missile strike on Prince Sultan Air Base which damaged at least five KC-135s in the second week of March, and the destruction of one KC-135 and damage of another over Iraq which were reportedly the results of air defence operations by local militias. The U.S. Air Force’s aerial refuelling fleet has faced growing strain, as Iranian strikes on military bases across the Middle East have limited the service’s ability to conduct fighter operations, forcing attacks to be launched from air bases further afield that require much greater support from tankers. The age of the KC-135 fleet and its resulting higher maintenance needs, combined with major issues with the limited numbers of new KC-46 tankers, have left the Air Force vulnerable in this regard.

Commenting on the engagement, Chinese defence expert Fu Qianshao observed that the J-10’s ability to successfully counter radar illumination and regain tactical initiative reflects the benefits of years of incremental modernisation of the fighter’s capabilities. He noted that compared with earlier J-10 variants, the J-10C has achieved key technological breakthroughs in radar systems and detection methods, providing important advantages in electromagnetic confrontation and aerial tactical engagements, and providing pilots with strong technical confidence in responding to foreign provocations. The pilot highlighted that the replacement of the original J-10’s pulse-Doppler radar system with a modern active electronically scanned array radar, and the integration of an infrared search and track system, has significantly enhanced its detection capabilities and the means in which it can be operated.

Fu further pointed to the J-10C’s optimised aerodynamic design, which plays a critical role in enabling it to execute effective countermeasures. A fighter's radar signature varies with its orientation, and sometimes a single manoeuvre can sharply reduce its radar cross-section, he noted. He added that not all aircraft or pilots are capable of executing such manoeuvres due to their complexity. Through coordinated manoeuvring and countermeasures, the pilot is reported to have achieved reverse radar illumination and secured a dominant tactical position, placing the foreign aircraft in a difficult position to respond. Fu attributed this capability to the Air Force's intensive daily training and realistic combat drills.

The growing discrepancies in both the sophistication of average fighter aircraft, and in pilot training levels, between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force and the U.S. Air Force, has been pointed to with growing concern by Western analysts and defence officials. Former U.S. Pacific Air Forces Vice Commander Lieutenant General (ret.) David Deptula, for one, was among the figures to highlight that Chinese pilots were flying fighters which were on average several decades newer, andgetting more flying hours than their U.S. counterparts. Additional training “makes a difference,” he warned, with this giving the Chinese fleet an important edge in better preparing itself for warfare at a fifth generation level. The J-10C was developed as a lighter counterpart to the J-16 ‘4+ generation’ and J-20 fifth generation fighters integrating many of the same technologies and weaponry, but with much lower maintenance needs and operational costs. The U.S. Air Force has not procured any similarly maintenance friendly fighters for over 20 years, with negative consequences for availability rates and training hours.

The report on the latest engagement closely follows the deployment of multiple J-10C fighter units to conduct high-intensity drills under complex electromagnetic conditions, which highlighted their ability to integrate operations closely with KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems. Compensating for the small size of the J-10’s radar, the KJ-500 can detect aerial targets, including aircraft and missiles, hundreds of kilometres away, and relay their position, speed, and altitude to fighters via data links, allowing for more effective intercept manoeuvres without J-10s emitting their own radar signatures. In early August 2025, the J-10C demonstrated the capability to engage targets with cutting edge stealth capabilities when operating with KJ-500 support, relying on the AEW&C system to guide missiles to its targets using its much more powerful sensors.

The successful strike on an E-3 AWACS complements major successes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has achieved in destroying critical ground-based radars that are key to maintaining the U.S. and its strategic partners’ situational awareness. Seventeen U.S. military facilities were attacked by Iran in the two weeks following the U.S. and Israeli’s launching of an assault against the country on February 28, with these strikes having frequently targeted radar systems vital for ballistic missile defence. Notable achievements in the initial days of the war included the destruction of $2.7 billion worth of high value radar systems, including the $1.1 billion AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates valued at between $500 million and $1 billion each. The destruction of an E-3 will limit the Air Force’s ability to compensate or these losses with airborne radar support.

Preceding the initiation of attacks against Iran, the U.S. Air Force deployed the bulk of its global operational E-3 fleet to the Middle East and Europe. In mid-March the Air Force surged the operational tempo ofthe E-3 fleet over the Middle East, particularly over Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean, to provide a persistent detection capability against Iranian drones and missiles being fired at targets in Jordan and Israel. Despite air defence systems being particularly heavily concentrated in Israel, Iranian missile attacks have achieved an 80 percent and growing success rate in striking key targets, with Israeli sources attributing this in part to the destruction of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ vast regional network of radar systems. The destruction of the E-3 may thus further improve the success rates of Iranian strikes.

Iranian missile strikes have destroyed multiple types of high value aircraft fielded by the U.S. and its strategic partners, with a prior attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in the second week of March having damaged at least five U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker refuelling aircraft, placing pressure on the already highly strained tanker fleet. Days later a ballistic missile attack was widely reported to have destroyed a Untied Arab Emirates Air Force Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system, which has a similar role to the E-3. The aircraft is much smaller and carries a weaker radar, but is also much more modern. The viability of the decades old E-3 fleet has increasingly been called to question, with their radars and other avionics having also increasingly been left obsolete, limiting situational awareness particularly against low observable targets. The destruction of one of the aircraft represents one of Iran’s most significant successes against U.S. aviation, and may result in an increased reliance on operating high value aircraft from air bases further beyond the Middle East such as those in Eastern Europe, placing further strain on the fleet.

With the F-16CJ being heavily specialised for air defence suppression operations, Lieutenant Colonel Widmer assessed how the F-35 would improve on these capabilities. Referring to operations aimed at the suppression or destruction of adversary air defences as ‘Wild Weasel’ operations, he observed that the F-35 “was tailor made to be a weasel platform.” “Where legacy platforms performed the Wild Weasel mission with bolted-on sensors or weapons, the F-35 was built from the ground up as a sensor platform with the sensor fusion and quarterback capability we bring to the fight,” he added. “The sensor package we bring to the fight allows us to sense the threat and manage the entire spectrum of what the enemy is fielding at us right now. It’s constantly updating, constantly getting upgraded, and as we continue forward, it’s the place I want to be if I need to go to war,” he concluded.

Further commenting on how the transition to the F-35 would bolster U.S. Air Force combat capabilities in Northeast Asia, commander of the 35th Operations Group Colonel Jeromy Guinther observed:“The Wild Weasels stand ready to defeat any threat in our area of responsibility and beyond. As you lay the foundation for Misawa’s upgrade to a fighter integration wing, remember your Wild Weasel legacy, stay ready and lethal, and continue to contribute to the Panther’ many generations of excellence.” Misawa Air Base already hosts two Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A squadrons, with the transition of the U.S. Air Force’s fighter air wing at the facility to the same fighter type expected to increase interoperability between the two fleets.

Japan is the only country that hosts permanent deployments of U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps F-35s, with the F-35B and F-35C variants already based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. This largely reflects the particularly serious challenges posed to the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air dominance in the region, primarily by China’s increasingly large and sophisticated fifth generation fighter fleet, but also by the advanced surface-to-air capabilities deployed by North Korean and Russian forces. In mid-February the Russian Aerospace Forces concentrated deployments of new Su-57 fifth generation fighters at Dzyomgi Air Base in the Khabarovsk region near neighbouring Japan, while Su-57 exports to North Korea are widely speculated to be planned as part of the fast strengthening defence ties between the two countries. Although Su-57s lack similarly advanced stealth capabilities or avionics to the F-35 or Chinese fighters like the J-20, the type’s scale of production has grown significantly, while incremental modernisation has fulled expectations that it will be able to comfortably outperform advanced ‘4+ generation’ fighters.

The F-35 is the only fifth generation fighter in production in the Western world, with no single fighter type having been relied on as heavily in the history of the U.S. Armed Forces. Nevertheless, with China expected become the world’s first country to field sixth generation fighters in the early 2030s, there have been significant calls in the U.S. to divert investment away from the F-35 program to prioritise accelerating the F-47 sixth generation program. Major development issues have meant that the F-35 is not expected to be brought up to the Block 4 standard considered necessary for high intensity combat until the early 2030s, while availability rates have remained outstandingly poor. It is nevertheless the only NATO-standard fighter capable of going head-to-head with China’s J-20 and J-35 fifth generation fighters without facing a very significant disadvantage.

Preceding the U.S. and Israel’s initiation of a full scale assault against Iran on February 28, the U.S. Army and Navy deployed ballistic missile defence systems in and around Israel to support local missile defences. These included a reported three U.S. Army THAAD systems in Israel and Jordan, which have been allocated anti-ballistic missiles from across the world including the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Guam, and South Korea, as well as Navy AEGIS destroyers which can fire SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles. The depletion of missile defences has nevertheless been severe, particularly when considering that the U.S. and Israeli anti-missile inventories were still far from recovering from their severe depletion during twelve days of hostilities with Iran in June 2025.

Iran has employed a number of ballistic missile types with improved penetrative capabilities, including the Fattah 2 which has demonstrated the capabilities of its advanced hypersonic glide vehicle to neutralise high value targets, and the older and less complex Fattah which uses an advanced manoeuvring reentry vehicle. Footage has show Iranian ballistic missiles repeatedly evading multiple rounds of anti-ballistic missiles over Israel before hitting their targets. Other Iranian missile types have made use of multiple warheads to complicate interception efforts. Complementing these advances in missile technologies, the Israeli Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps quickly achieved the destruction of $2.7 billion worth of high value radar systems, including the AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. This has left U.S. and Israeli defences heavily reliant on ship-based radars and on the AN/TPY-2 radar station in Turkey.

The Indian Defence Ministry previously ordered ten battalions of S-400 systems in October 2018 under a a $5.43 billion contract, with the last of these battalions expected to be delivered in 2026. During clashes with Pakistani forces in May 2025, the system credited with having shot down least five hostile fighters and one large aircraft, which was reportedly either an ELINT or an AEW&C system. The downing of the large high value aircraft was achieved at a 300 kilometre range, highlighting the particularly long reach of the S-400’s unique 40N6 missiles which can engage targets at almost all altitudes and at up to 400 kilometre ranges. The missile’s Mach 14 speed allows the S-400s to shoot down hypersonic targets, with shootdowns of Mach 8 ballistic missiles having been demonstrated during testing.

The Defence Ministry has been reported by local sources, including multiple officials, to be planning procurements of multiple very high value Russian aerial warfare systems to revolutionise its capabilities. Following confirmation in February 2025 that a license production deal for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter was being considered, the Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. The Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the source code, placing Indian Su-57s entirely in a league of their own among fighters of their generation in their levels of customisability and the degree to which they can integrate indigenous technologies. The two countries are also holding talks to deeply modernise India’s Su-30MKI fighters, supply hundreds of R-37M very long range air-to-air missiles for the aircraft, and supply S-500 air defence systems capable of shooting downs satellites and space targets. The possibility of Su-57 procurements and customisation reaching the stage of a fully joint program has also been raised.

Expenditures of close to 1,000 Tomahawk missiles in under a month of hostilities, or around one third to one quarter of the arsenal built up over more than a decade, raises the possibility of more serious depletion should hostilities continue and Iranian air defence capabilities persist. The issue appears particularly serious when considering that analysts have projected that the war effort could continue for over six months. Production rates for 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles are planned to reach close to 150 per year by the end of the decade, with a significant portion of production being allocated for export, most notably to Japan which has ordered 400. Just 57 Tomahawks were included in the United States’ defence budget in 2025, despite depletion of the arsenal from strikes on targets in Iran and Yemen.

Modern variants of the Tomahawk cost $3.6 million, approximately the cost of a modern main battle tank, meaning that replacing the missiles already expended will cost close to $3.6 billion. One official informed The Washington Post that the number of Tomahawk missiles left in the Middle East was “alarmingly low,” while another said that without intervention the Pentagon may be left out of ammunition. “The Pentagon has tracked the number of Tomahawks used with an increasing focus on what the burn rate will mean for not only a sustained campaign against Iran but for future military operations as well,” the paper concluded after consulting with informed sources. The depletion of the arsenal is particularly significant when considering that the Tomahawk is the only long range offensive weapon deployed by U.S. Navy destroyers.

The depletion of the U.S. Navy’s cruise missile arsenal has very considerable implications for the U.S. Armed Forces capabilities to wage war in multiple theatres, from the Arctic facing Russia, to the Taiwan Strait facing China, and the Korean Peninsula. The arsenal’s depletion reflects broader trends in the severe depletion of U.S. warfighting capabilities through mass expenditures of high value weaponry, which even if hostilities were to end in early April, would take several years and tens of billions dollars in investment to recover from. The Tomahawk arsenal is notably far from the most severely depleted, with inventories of anti-ballistic missiles and GBU-57 bunker buster bombs estimated to have been almost totally spent, while being significantly more costly to replace.

The bulk of Israeli armour losses occurred in a single engagement between the towns of Taybeh and Qantara, after Israeli units reportedly “advanced to carry out a manoeuvre aiming to seize control of the area.” Hezbollah’s official statement observed that its personnel “monitored them and prepared to lure the enemy into a well-planned ambush,” with the result that its forces “succeeded in thwarting the enemy’s manoeuvre, inflicting losses including 10 Merkava tanks and D9 bulldozers.” The results of the successes reported to have been achieved by Hezbollah units represent the most extreme losses Israeli armour has suffered in over 40 years since the early stages of the Lebanon War when Merkavas and older U.S.-supplied tanks engaged newly operationalised Syrian Army T-72 tanks and anti-tank guided weapons.

After Israel and the United States initiated a full scale military assault against Iran on February 28, Hezbollah the following day opened a second front against Israel, to which Israel responded by launching a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon on March 2. Footage has from early March shown multiple strikes on Israeli tanks by Hezbollah units. While Israel armour has taken significant losses during engagements with Hezbollah in the past, most notably during a failed attempt to invade Southern Lebanon and forcefully disarm the paramilitary group in 2006, the intensity of current hostilities and losses remains wholly unprecedented. The fact that this is the first time Israel has launched an invasion while being at war with Iran, which raises the stakes for Hezbollah as it relies on Iranian support, may have been a factor ensuring it does not hold back from full counter-escalation.

The latest setbacks to Israeli operations follow reports that Hezbollah had deployed its Radwan special forces for counteroffensives against Israeli units. These forces were not previously deployed for engagements with Israeli forces, but observations of their counterinsurgency operations in Syria have led analysts to conclude that they are very considerably more capable than Hezbollah’s regular units. The presence of Radwan forces on the frontlines may be a primary contributor to the more intensive losses which Israeli armour has taken from mid-March. Merkava tanks notably previously took a number of losses during Israeli Army operations against Palestinian paramiltiary groups in the Gaza Strip from late 2023, although the much lower quantities of equipment, poorer fortifications, and inferior training standards in the theatre meant that losses were negligible by comparison to those seen during engagements with Hezbollah.

A BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle, listed at a price of approximately $1.04 million, costs an equivalent amount to 870 drones, while a BMD-4M airborne combat vehicle costs $1.4 million, equivalent to approximately 1,170 drones. The T-90M main battle tank, which costs $3.84 million, is equivalent in cost to 3,200 heavy FPV drones. The T-14 next generation tank designed for far superior firepower and survivability is estimated to cost cost approximately twice as much should it ever enter large scale serial production. Although the figures highlight the disparity between the cost of traditional armoured and very low cost new unmanned strike systems, the assessment notably does not mention the fact that the drones in question are not fully autonomous, and thus cannot be fielded in the quantities indicated in proportion to armoured vehicles. While three personnel can man a T-90M tank, for example, it would require at least 6,400 personnel to operate 3,200 FPV drones simultaneously, and likely considerably more given the complexities of modern reconnaissance strike complexes.

The recent Russian assessment raises questions regarding how advances in artificial intelligence facilitating fully autonomous single use attack drones can potentially sharply shift the calculus behind procurement decisions. The unprecedentedly central role which such unmanned aircraft have played in the Ukrainian theatre, even with limited autonomy, has highlighted a likely future where unjammable AI-piloted drone swarms are at the heart of all major war efforts. Russia has itself significantly expanded production of unmanned attack aircraft such as the Forpost and Geran much more successfully than its has production of main battle tanks, and while the USSR had produced 3,500-4,000 tanks per year in its final decade, Russian production is today far form sufficient to keep up with the rates of attrition on the frontlines.

Iranian forces have also claimed successful shootdowns of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighter in the country's southern airspace on March 22, and of an Israeli Air Force F-16 the previous day. On March 20 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command announced that it had hit an Israeli F-16 Fighting Falcon in the country's central airspace. This followed the confirmed successful surface-to-air attack on a U.S. Air Force F-35 fifth generation fighter on March 19, which inflicted sufficient damage to cause shrapnel wounds to the pilot. Iranian sources have reported that U.S. Armed Forces and the Israeli Air Force significantly reduced deep penetration strikes over Iranian territory after the strike on the F-35, which is by far the most survivable fighter type in either countries’ fleets. It has been speculated that increasingly extreme shortages of air-launched cruise and ballistic missiles will force U.S. and Israeli fighters to operate within Iranian airspace to strike targets using glide bombs, leaving them at greater risk of being shot down.

Iranian sources have also assessed that the number of U.S. and Israeli unmanned aircraft shot down has reached nearly 200. These have varied widely in their values, from single use attack drones costing under $100,000, to higher value attack and reconnaissance platforms such as the MQ-9 Reaper which costs over $150 million, of which over a dozen have been lost in combat. These much higher losses reflect not only the lower survivability of most unmanned aircraft compared to manned fighters, but also the fact that they have been employed for higher risk deep penetration missions, while manned fighters have been employed with greater caution. The successes achieved by Iran’s air defences have remained relatively limited against manned targets, although the U.S., Israel and their strategic partners’ own defences against Iranian missile attacks have if anything been more underwhelming, allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to strike high value targets across the Middle East with impunity.

The F-18E/F has formed the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s fighter fleet for close to two decades, and is an enhanced fourth generation fighter that was initially procured to serve as a stopgap between the Cold War era F-14, F-18C/D, A-6 and A-7 combat jets, and the F-35C fifth generation fighter and F/A-XX long range sixth generation fighter. Major delays to the development of the F-35C resulted in the extension of F-18E/F production by 12 years from 2015, with the Navy now fielding over 700 Super Hornets and their close derivatives the E/A-18G. Other than a small number of aircraft which have been brought up to the much more costly F-18E/F Block 3 standard with a modern electronically scanned array radar and ‘4+ generation’ avionics, the large majority of F-18E/F fighters are considered out of date and poorly suited to high intensity engagements with advanced fighters or air defence systems. The aircraft’s low maintenance needs and operational costs, however, made it appear a suitable workhorse for the fleet in the post-Cold War era.

Citing Zhang, the state run Global Times observed regarding the benefits of integrating J-10 operations with AEW&Cs that systems like the KJ-500 “can significantly enhance combat effectiveness. Operating at high altitude, the early warning aircraft can detect aerial targets, including enemy aircraft and missiles, hundreds of kilometres away, and relay their position, speed, and altitude to the fighter via data links.” “With this information, the J-10C can conduct intercept manoeuvres while keeping its radar off or in a low-emission state. Only when approaching the target would it activate its radar to confirm and engage. This model combines the wide-area sensing capability of the early warning aircraft with the fighter's manoeuvrability,” it observed.

In early August 2025, the J-10C demonstrated the capability to engage targets with cutting edge stealth capabilities when operating with KJ-500 support, with one J-10C pilot credited with achieving a simulated shootdown of a J-20 fifth generation fighter during air-to-air combat exercises, according to reports from multiple Chinese state media outlets. Integrating one of thelargest and most powerful airborne radars in the world, the KJ-500 vastly increases situational awareness against stealth targets, and can thus even the odds against targets like the J-20 and U.S. F-35. The J-10C pilot is reported to have simulated an air-to-air missile launch against the J-20, but afterwards could no longer detect the target, leading him to request support from the KJ-500 which allowed the missiles to reach its target.

It remains in question how realistic the scenario that saw the J-10C shoot down a J-20 may have been, with aircraft like KJ-500s expected to be made priority targets for J-20 units, and being vulnerable at long ranges due to their large sizes and lack of manoeuvrability. This raises the possibility that a scripted engagement may not have allowed the J-20 to neutralise the KJ-500 before engaging its target, and that conditions had been intended to handicap the newer stealth fighter, which is not being marketed for export, to further increase the J-10C’s appeal to foreign clients. The J-10C has achieved impressive results in multiple exercises in the past, and was reported in 2020 to have consistently outperformed Russian-supplied Su-35 fighters during mock combat engagements in China, while also having reportedly proven capable of going head to head with the J-16,. It is nevertheless considered to be overwhelmingly outmatched by the J-20, which has widely been assessed to be the world’s premier air superiority fighter type.

The recent simulated engagements carried out in mid-March, 2026, reportedly saw J-10Cs transition from tracking and lock-on, to high-G manoeuvring, and from beyond-visual-range to mid-range and close-range combat, while also continuously shifting between offence and defence. Beyond support for AEW&C systems, Zhang Junshe noted that coordinated operations between the J-10C and ground-based air defence systems could see ground-based radars assigned to detect low-altitude targets and guide fighters for interception. The J-10C can also share targeting data with ground-based air systems. This data sharing and coordination significantly improves the combat potentials of both J-10s and of ground-based air defence systems.

Chinese fighter types are generally far less reliant on support from AEW&Cs, ground radars, and tankers than Western fighter aircraft, as they are on average far larger, longer ranged, and carry much larger sensor suites. The J-16, for example, carries a radar over quadruple the size of of NATO’s two primary fighter type the F-16, and and close to triple the size the new F-35’s radar. The J-10C was developed in parallel to the twin engine heavyweight J-16 and J-20 as a similarly sophisticated, but much smaller, less costly and less maintenance intensive counterpart. The aircraft is much closer in its weight, range, radar size, and engine power to Western fighter types such as the F-16 and F-35, while the Western world has no fighters of comparable size to the J-16 which forms the backbone of the Chinese fleet.

In the initial hours of hostilities footage showed Patriot systems in Qatar consistently failing to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, with footage showing three interceptors launched, rather than the standard two, indicating an awareness of the lower than advertised probability of kill. In mid-March a crew member from a civilian ship sailing through the Gulf of Oman filmed two Iranian ballistic missiles striking oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, and failed efforts by local forces to use a Patriot system to intercept them also using three interceptors against each target. PAC-3 interceptors cost approximately $4-6 million dollars, with export clients in Arab world typically paying closer to $6 million, bringing the cost of each interception attempt against Iranian short range missiles costing under $400,000 to around $18 million.

The capabilities of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ regional air defence network has been severely diminished since the outbreak of hostilities, with Iranian precision strikes having destroyed the sole AN/FPS-132 radar based outside the U.S., which was located in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars from THAAD systems in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as multiple lower value radar systems. The U.S. Army’s stockpiles of interceptors for the Patriot system were already severely depleted when the country initiated attacks on Iran, and were confirmed in mid-2025 to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. To reinforce its positions in the Middle East, the U.S. has withdrawn both interceptors and complete air defence systems from bases across much of the world, most notably from South Korea, with this occurring both in the months preceding attacks on Iran, and in the following weeks.

Further elaborating on the exercises, Muraveyko observed: “Over the course of seven days, formations, military units, and subunits of the Western Command troops carried out active manoeuvring operations, employed various artillery and missile systems, conducted live fire exercises with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, employed anti-aircraft missile systems, and actively used FPV drones and electronic warfare systems.” In mid-February Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned that his country had no option but to further strengthen its defence capabilities, as it NATO had over the past three years been establishing new units and boosting its forces near Belarusian territory. “Whether we like it or not… we will have to strengthen our defence capabilities,” he noted, adding NATO members “are not spending money on tanks and munitions for no reason,” indicating that this buildup was seen to have aggressive intent.

In January U.S. and Lithuanian Army artillery units conducted advanced interoperability training centred on employment of the M142 HIMARS rocket artillery and ballistic missile systems near Belarusian territory. Preceding this, the U.S. Army in September 2025 deployed AH-64 Apache attack helicopters for deep strike live-fire exercises in Lithuania near the border with Belarus. These exercises were part of a broader trend towards a significant increase in U.S. Armydeployments and exercises in the Baltic region. Neighbouring Poland has invested particularly heavily it rapidly modernising its air and ground forces, including procuring large numbers of South Korean K2 and U.S. Abrams tanks, as well as Korean Chunmoo rocket artillery and K9 howitzers, U.S. HIMARS and F-35 stealth fighters, among other assets that are rapidly expanding Warsaw’s offensive options. The German Army has also established a presence near Belarus, and on May 22, 2025, inaugurated the 45th Armoured Brigade in Vilnius, Lithuania, providing an elite forward deployed mechanised warfare capability within hours’ drive of the Belarusian capital.

Belarus has recently made unprecedented investments in rapidly modernising its military capabilities with large scale procurements predominantly from Russia. The Air Force has significantly enhanced its operational capabilities primarily by procuring S-400 long range systems from Russia from 2022, Mi-35 helicopter gunships, and the longest ranged fighter type in Europe the Su-30SM2. Exercises earlier in March tested the ability of older S-300 air defence units to rapidly respond to new combat situations. The Defence Ministry has also invested in obtaining both strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems through a nuclear sharing agreement with Russia from 2023, and in December 2025 operationalised Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic ballistic missile systems capable of delivering nuclear attacks against targets across Europe. .

According to a “highly-placed intelligence source” in Iran, U.S. and Israeli losses to Iranian air defences, which have reportedly also included F-16 and F-15 fighters, “have led to a significant reduction in military operations by American and Israeli fighter jets in the central regions of the country.” "After striking the F-35, the pace of military operations has decreased, although aircraft and drones are still being used for reconnaissance purposes," the source added. The source also assessed that the number of drones shot down has reached nearly 200, although these have varied in value from single use attack drones costing under $100,000, to higher value attack and reconnaissance platform such as the MQ-9 Reaper which costs over $150 million.

Regarding the future of air defence operations, the Iranian intelligence source predicted: “Given the defensive innovations against enemy aircraft, it appears that in the coming days, the rate of strikes against enemy warplanes will increase.” The source’s statement closely follows the publication of footage by the Iranian Armed Forces showing large quantities of surface-to-air missiles for systems of various ranges in storage in deeply fortified underground bases, which appeared intended to signal a sustained air defence capability. While the conservative use of manned aircraft inside Iran has reduced U.S. losses, U.S. forces have suffered greater losses over Iraq, where local militias aligned with Iran have employed a wide range of infrared guided short ranged surface-to-air missile systems.

The Type 100 was notably not the first Chinese tank that was designed with its own integrated drone controls, with the Type 15 light tank that entered service in 2019 also having this key feature. Other next generation tank designs are expected to also be modified to accommodate drone controls, including the South Korean K3, and the U.S. M1E3 Abrams which are scheduled to enter service in the mid-late 2030s. It remains uncertain whether the Type 99 is still in production, and if so how long this will continue, or whether the tanks are seen to continue to have any meaningful advantages over the Type 100 as the fleet is expected to rapidly transition to fielding the newer tank design.

China’s defence sector has continued to gradually enhance the Type 99 design, with new modifications seen in late 2025 including the integration of two GL-6 active protection system launchers and four radars for improved survivability, as well as upgraded information technology and data sharing subsystems to improve network-centric warfare capabilities. Other new improvements have included the integration of a 360-degree vision system for the crew, a new generation of thermal imaging systems, new photoelectric and sensor systems, and improved explosive reactive armour modules. These upgrades, and the more recent integration of new drone control units, appear intended to narrow the performance gap with the newer Type 100 tank.

While China and the two Koreas have invested in bringing new clean sheet main battle tank designs into service, Russia and NATO tank industries continue to rely on the production of improved variants of Cold War era designs. The Soviet Object 195 main battle tank program was initially intended to provide the country’s forces with the world first fourth generation design, although the program’s collapse after the state disintegrated, followed by major delays to Russia’s more conservative T-14 program, allowed China to take the lead in development. After observing the performance of Western tank designs in the Ukrainian theatre, their perceived inadequacy and demonstrated high vulnerability, which resulted in widespread complaints by Ukrainian personnel and rapid combat losses, were considered primary factors leading the U.S. to end plans to further modernise the M1A2 Abrams design, and instead initiate the revolutionary M1E3 program. This program is intended to provide a fourth generation tank with many similar features to the Type 100, although it is still in its early development stages.

The current exercises mark the first time the Apache has been validated as a viable air-to-air counter-drone platform in the European theatre in U.S. Army service. Exercises have been conducted under the framework of the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative, and were highlighted by analysts to have demonstrated how rotary-wing assets can play significant roles in closing gaps in integrated air defence networks. This new mission set has required the rapid development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures to adapt to doctrinal changes. Apache attack helicopters have a superior capability to loiter, and have far lower sustainment costs and maintenance needs than manned fighter aircraft. Their 30mm M230 chain gun, and Hydra 70 rockets with Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System guidance kits, together provide two primary armaments that are well suited to counter-drone duties.

Significant concerns have been raised by analysts in both Russia and the Western world regarding the continued viability of attack helicopters, as even highly sophisticated Russian helicopter types with advanced sensors and high levels of armour protection have proven highly vulnerable to attacks by low cost single use drones. In mid-March, for example, a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter was hit and destroyed by a first-person-view (FPV) drone on the Pokrovsk region. The demonstrated vulnerability of attack helicopters has been speculated to be a primary factor leading the South KoreanDefence Ministry to recently reduce its own orders for the Apache.

U.S. Army Apache units in Europe have been highly active in recent months, with the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Germany having in February conducted aviation manoeuvre and sustainment training focused on the use the aircraft and CH-47F Chinook heavily lift helicopters for high-tempo air mobility. The CH-47F Chinook’s sling load validation allows for heavy equipment to be moved when road infrastructure is unusable, with each able to transport 155 mm artillery pieces, engineer bridging sections, components of long range air defence systems, and a wide range of other asset types. The Apaches were relied on for far armed reconnaissance and escort roles to support these logistics operations.

In September the U.S. Army 1st Armoured Division deployed Apaches for deep strike live-fire exercises in Lithuania near the Belarusian border, during which the aircraft flew coordinated strike missions and destroyed simulated enemy positions. This coincided with the modernisation of Belarus’ own attack helicopter fleet with the procurement of new Mi-35s from Russia. Although the Apache is relied on heavily as the Western world’s only heavyweight attack helicopter type, concerns have at times been raised regarding its reliability, particularly after four of the aircraft crashed in just 44 days in early 2024, including two within just three days in March that year.

Ambassador Plug cited the growing capabilities of Chinese and North Korean forces, which are the leading two regional militaries of countries outside the Western sphere of influence, as a leading cause for concern, stating that his country would deploy new warships and F-35s to the region in 2026. A key goal would be to increase training with regional counterparts including the Japan Air Self Defence Force, as security issues affecting Europe and East Asia became increasingly intertwined, he observed. The Netherlands is one of multiple European states to have prioritised for deployments to Northeast Asia as part of broader alliance efforts to counter China. Italy deployed F-35A and F-35B fighters to the country in 2023 and 2024 respectively, while British F-35Bs operated in Japan in 2025.

The Dutch contingent includes five F-35s and a supporting tanker, with high levels of interoperability with U.S. and Japanese systems allowing the fighters to seamlessly ‘plug in’ to local U.S.-led combat networks. Misawa Air Base a central major hub for U.S. and Japanese air operations, and is located particularly close to the Russian Far East. The Royal Netherlands Air Force was notably the first NATO member air force to achieve an air-to-air kill using the F-35, with a drone alleged to be of Russian originality having been shot down over Polish airspace on September 9-10, 2025. Dutch F-35 units are also trained to launch both tactical and strategic level nuclear attacks as part of a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States. The country was the second after the United States to operationalise the F-35 for nuclear attack roles.

Japan is the only country to host overseas F-35 deployments under the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, with the presence of U.S. F-35s continuing to grow. The launching of trilateral exercises involving F-35s near the Russian Far East closely follows the Russian Aerospace Forces’ deployment of large numbers of their own fifth generation fighter type, the Su-57, at Dzyomgi Air Base in the Khabarovsk region near Japan. Despite deploying only a limited number of Su-57s, the Aerospace Forces have employed them extensively for air-to-air combat in the Ukrainian theatre, alongside their use for precision strike and air defence suppression missions. The deployment closely coincides with the delivery of a new batch of Su-57 fighters to the Aerospace Forces, which reportedly benefit from improved weaponry and avionics over those from prior batches, with this marking the first confirmed delivery in over six moths. The rapid expansion of the Su-57 fleet may pose new challenges to Western Bloc and allied air units in East Asia, although it is overshadowed far larger and more sophisticated Chinese fifth generation fleets which remain the primary challenge to Western air dominance.

According to the report, development teams spent fiscal year 2025 working on two separate software lines tied to different hardware baselines. Most of the fleet rely on older TR-2 software, which used one baseline, while some newer aircraft with a second baseline were built to better support TR-3 software. The upgraded TR-3 avionics are intended to enable future Block 4 mission systems capabilities, the development of which is considered strategically vital, but has been delayed repeatedly. Although the F-35 was previously scheduled to have long since had most of the capabilities associated with the Block 4 standard, it is now expected to achieve them only in the early 2030s.

The latest report highlights that the latest software builds, 30R07 and 30R08, took longer than planned and required more software iterations than expected to address deficiencies, and that both delivered, or were set to deliver with less capability than originally planned. The result was no meaningful capability, with the 40-series TR-3 software having fallen further behind and accumulated new deficiencies. Those software delays are now affecting the program’s operational test capacity. Compared to the Vietnam War era F-4A, which had 1,000 lines of code, and the early fifth generation F-22, which had 1.7 million lines, the F-35 has 5.7 million lines of code, which has been a leading contributor to its complexity. As the only NATO compatible fifth generation fighter in production in the world, issues with the F-35 program have particularly significant implications for U.S. and allied security interests, particularly as the U.S. faces a peer level challenge from cutting edge Chinese fifth and sixth generation fighter programs.

In February 2025 the annual report from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation highlighted ongoing difficulties faced by the F-35 program in bringing the aircraft up to the much delayed TR-3 standard. This issue previously resulted in a suspension of all fighter deliveries, and continued to prove highly disruptive for the program. With TR-3 software being vital to allowing F-35s to conduct high intensity operations, delays in operationalising it has major repercussions for the combat potentials of stealth fighter fleets across the world. In September that year the Air Force 461st Flight Test Squadron received a unique specially instrumented F-35A fighter designed to enhance the much delayed testing of new software, the procurement of which was intended to help accelerate efforts to bring software fully up to the TR-3 standard. The TR-3 standard was previously expected to be reached around the early 2020, paving the way for F-35s with the Block 4 standard to become operational around 2025.

A Government Accountability Office report based on an audit of the F-35 program in September 2025 revealed that work done to modernise the F-35 to the Block 4 standard faced mounting delays, with two further years needed to develop and install planned improvements despite significant reductions to the scope of upgrades. The report noted that Block 4 would now “have fewer capabilities, will experience schedule delays, and will have unknown costs,” stressing that “Block 4 will now consist of “a subset of the original 66 … capabilities and those added in later years.” The results of a the F-35’s lack of Block 4 software have been clearly observed since the U.S. and Israel initiated an assault on Iran on February 28, as their F-35 fleets have been highly constrained in the kinds of armaments they have had access to, lacking any kinds of air-to-ground missiles, including the AGM-88G which is vital for air defence suppression operations. These capabilities will only be attained in the early 2030s when the Block 4 standard is belatedly reached.

Delays to the AN/APG-85’s development are expected to have significant negative impacts for the combat potentials of the fighter fleets of U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and over a dozen foreign services that currently have F-35s on order. The sheer size of the fighter program as by far the largest in the world makes the lack of deliveries of fighters with radars particularly devastating. A number of reports indicate that deliveries of AN/APG-85 radars will only commence from 2028, which will in over 300 F-35s being delivered without radars. Lots 17, 18, and 18 each consist of over 150 fighters, which has led analysts to assess that the delivery of up 400 fighters without radars is highly possible. It remains possible that the program office will find a means to integrate the AN/APG-81 onto newer production variants of the F-35, with reports contrasting regarding the viability of this. The F-35 program’s primary contractor Lockheed Martin has responded to the controversy by stating that it is building the fighters “according to contract specifications,” with the radar being produced separately by Northrop Grumman.

The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Pentagon have argued that transitioning from the AN/APG-81 to the AN/APG-85, and redesigning the F-35 accordingly, is a "calculated risk" to prepare to bring the aircraft up to the much improved Block 4 standard. Rather than continuing to produce the old configuration, and spending several years on major overhauls, it was decided to equip the new aircraft with the upgrade architecture so that the radar can be installed immediately upon arrival. As a direct result of this, within the next two years hundreds of unfinished fighters will be delivered. The potential implications for combat readiness are considerable, and it remains uncertain to what extent the radarless fighters will be active in service or relied on for combat duties.

Operators of the F-35 have the potential to mitigate the effects of the aircraft’s lack of a radar by operating them alongside older fighters with the AN/APG-81, with the seamless sharing of data ensuring that pilots can maintain high situational awareness using offboard sensors. F-35s also integrate infrared search and track systems and advanced passive electronic sensor arrays, although these were designed to complement radars and cannot come close to compensating for a lack of them. While the U.S. has struggled to complete the AN/APG-85’s development, China has transitioned its own primary fifth generation fighter, the J-20, to integrate a next generation radar which is reported based on similar Gallium Nitride technologies. These technologies significantly ease conflict between signal strength and power usage, and can significantly improve fighters’ ability to lock on to stealth targets.

Production of the AN/APG-81 was cut short primarily due to its perceived insufficiency to stay up to date with pacing Chinese challenges to U.S. air dominance, with Northrop Grumman having described it as one which would “help ensure air superiority,” providing an indication as to what primary arguments had been made to justify the program. Analysts widely assessed that the challenge to air superiority posed by the Chinese J-20 program, which is far better optimised to air-to-air operations, was a primary factor stimulating investment in developing the AN/APG-85. With the attainment of Block 4 capabilities having suffered repeated delays, and now scheduled for the early 2030s, it is highly likely that China will field sixth generation fighters before the U.S. can bring its primary fifth generation fighter up to required standards. The major issues caused by delays to the AN/APG-85’s development are but one of multiple major issues with key subsystems that have seriously undermined the combat potential of the F-35 fleet, making the F-35 program a subject of considerable controversy and drawing harsh criticisms from both military and civilian officials.

The Russian Navy currently fields five Yasen-M class and one Yasen class ships, with the seventh ship the Ulyanovsk scheduled to enter service in 2026, while five further ships are planned bringing the fleet size up to twelve.The Navy’s commander-in-chief observed that Yasen class submarines have outstanding search, strike, and defensive capabilities, and are outstandingly well armed. "As for ammunition, they are equipped with all the Navy’s modern missile weapons – Kalibr, Oniks, Zircon, and naval underwater weapons. The subs can operate covertly and for extended periods in virtually any area of the ocean and, of course, pose a great threat to naval groups and land targets of any adversary," he stated.

Commander-in-Chief Moiseyev emphasised that the Yasen class ships are currently successfully carrying out their assigned missions as part of the submarine forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Feedback on the ships’ capabilities from the 2010s fuelled a growing interest in increasing the scale of procurements, with Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed on July 24, 2025, to have given instructions to continue the serial production, emphasising their role as the backbone of the Navy’s general-purpose forces. The Yasen class’ carriage of high-precision weapons and advanced navigation, communication and hydroacoustics capabilities were all highlighted at the time. In contrast to the decline in the standing of the Russian Navy’s surface fleet, the Yasen class’ capabilities have been pointed to with considerable concern by Western analysts, with the head of the British Royal Navy First Sea Lord General Gwyn Jenkins having in December 2025 warned that Western Bloc could soon lose their advantage in the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the significant strengthening of Russian naval capabilities. The capabilities of the Yasen class submarine fleet was considered a primary factor stimulating such concerns.

It remains uncertain to what extent the Iranian strikes have affected the Israeli nuclear weapons program, with the possibility having been raised by analysts that the missiles targeted personnel in nearby housing that worked on developing and producing nuclear warheads. It has also been speculated that the strike was intended as a warning to highlight Iran’s ability to strike nuclear facilities should Israel and the United States further escalate their own campaign. With the Dimona facility having been considered among the most heavily protected sites in Israel, the failure of local air defences has presented a considerable show of force.

Footage from Israel has shown Iranian ballistic missiles, including missiles integrating hypersonic glide vehicles, impacted fortified and heavily defended targets in the past, often evading multiple anti-ballistic missile salvos when doing so. During hostilities in June 2025 Iran used the Fattah ballistic missile integrating an advanced manoeuvring reentry vehicle, and in early March escalated attacks to launch its first hypersonic glide vehicle strike using the more sophisticated Fattah-2 missile. The demonstration of hypersonic strike capabilities that can destroy even well fortified targets with high precision, while evading even very dense hostile air defences, from an early stage fuelled speculation that the Negev Nuclear Research Centre could be a primary target in future.

While Iran has relied on less advanced missile types to deplete Israel’s ballistic missile interceptor arsenal, the ability of hypersonic glide vehicles to bypass them entirely has posed an entirely different kind of threat. Vice President of the leading Israeli missile defence system developer Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, Yuval Baseski, in August 2025 highlighted that this had forced the firm and the Israel Defence Forces to develop an entirely new approach to missile defence. “Hypersonic missiles open a new era in air defence,” he stated, observing: “Every air defence system today is based on flying faster than the target. But this principle does not apply to hypersonic missiles. To intercept an object moving at Mach 10, one would need a defence moving at Mach 30, which is impossible in the atmosphere due to friction.” Such a defence is expected to take close to half a decade to implement.

Israel’s reactor at the Negev Nuclear Research Centre was constructed from 1957–1963, with Israeli government sources havingclaimed at the time that it was a textile plant to conceal its purpose. The thermal reactor is estimated to have a 24–70 megawatt capacity, although it is relied on solely to produce plutonium and not electricity. Weapons-grade plutonium is extracted from spent fuel there. The underground reprocessing plant is key to making the centre a weapons facility, a not just a research reactor. Israel’s early development of nuclear weapons was heavily facilitated by French support, with France having supplied the design for the Dimona reactor design based on its own Marcoule plutonium production reactors, while also providing heavy water needed for plutonium production, as well as technical expertise. Israel’s fielding of a nuclear arsenal from has provided it with an advantage when seeking escalation dominance over adversaries such as Iran, and formerly Syria.

Commenting on how T-72B3 crews engage their targets, Kazan observed: “We engage one, hit it with the fourth or fifth shell, and then move on to the other. We destroy at least two targets.” He added that support from drones provides important assistance during combat operations, and allow crews to more accurately adjust fire. The T-72B3 formed the backbone of the Russian Army’s armoured units at the time of the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022, and while suffering very significant losses in the initial weeks of the conflict, they have since seen both the capabilities and the means by which they are operated modernised considerably. The result has been a considerable improvement in combat effectiveness and rapid decline in loss rates.

Approximately 200 modifications have been made to the T-72’s design since the outbreak of hostilities, which have improvedits firepower, protection levels, and mobility. In late 2022 an up-armoured variant with a similar armour configuration to the newer T-90M main battle tank began to be observed, which some sources have informally referred to this as the T-72B4. Two years later from late 2024 T-72s also began to integrate hard kill active protection systems in parallel to the integration of such systems onto the T-90M fleet. With the Russian Army having lost tanks in the conflict far faster than its production lines can replace them with new T-90s, its defence sector has relied on enhancing T-72s tanks inherited from the Soviet Union, primarily by bringing them up to the T-72B3M standard.

The firepower of the T-72B3 gained particular attention in the Ukrainian theatre when, shortly after U.S.-supplied M1 Abrams tanks were first deployed for combat operations, one of the enhanced Russian tanks became the first in the world to frontally penetrate one of the in a tank-on-tank engagement in early 2024. The T-72B3 integrates the new 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun and is compatible with a wide range of post-Soviet munitions types that have improved penetrative capabilities, with its firepower being a particularly outstanding feature of the vehicle. Russia’s continued reliance on the T-72 is largely a result of difficulties the defence sector has had in developing a clean sheet successor, the T-14, which has seen its service entry repeatedly delayed.

In early March the Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec stated that the T-72 has very significant potential for further modernisation. “The higher the upgrading potential, the better the combat equipment. The T-72B3M tank, produced by our Uralvagonzavod Group, is a platform with almost endless capabilities. This combat vehicle is significantly superior to earlier T-72 models thanks to a modern sighting system, new protective equipment, and a more powerful engine,” it observed. The firm particularly highlighted the tank’s modular design which can be quickly reconfigured to respond to specific threats and challenges. Although the T-72B was considered one of the world’s foremost tank types in the mid-1980s, it is capabilities have fallen increasingly behind, particularly as China unveiled the world’s first operational fourth generation tank in 2025 the Type 100, which is far better optimised for operations in an era of drone warfare. While incremental modernisation can prevent the T-72’s obsolescence, continued reliance on the type will still leave the Russian Army increasingly behind the cutting edge as China and South Korea lead the world in developing new generations of tanks.

Iranian air defences have had continued successes against U.S. aircraft, and have shot down over a dozen MQ-9 Reaper drones and multiple Israeli unmanned aircraft. The extent of successes against manned aircraft remains disputed, with Iranian sources publishing footage of multiple shootdowns of U.S. and Israeli F-15 and F-16 fourth generation fighters. The U.S. and Israel have refrained from launching large scale deep penetration operations into Iranian airspace using manned aircraft, with only the F-35 and the B-2 bomber appearing to have been used for such operations due to their advanced stealth capabilities. Delays developing the F-35’s critical Block 4 software means it cannot carry air-to-ground missiles, and thus needs to fly near Iranian targets to be able to strike them.

Alongside losses over Iran, the U.S. has lost multiple aircraft over Iraq, including a KC-135 tanker which crashed on March 12, which local paramilitary groups claimed to have shot down, and three F-15E fighters which crashed near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border on March 2, which Iraqi paramilitary groups are also claimed responsibility for. The U.S. Army has responded by deploying AH-64 Apache attack helicopters against these Iranian-aligned militias. The loss of an F-35 is a particularly high profile incident, with the assault on Iran launched on February 28 marking the first war effort in which the aircraft has seen high intensity combat. The aircraft was developed under by far the largest and most costly weapons program in world history, and is on production on a larger scale than all other NATO-compatible fighter types in the world combined, meaning its effectiveness has very significant implications for the U.S. and its strategic partners’ capabilities.

The British Royal Navy’s surface and attack submarine fleets have both suffered from outstandingly poor availability rates, which has limited their ability to provide support, and resulted in only two large combat vessels being deployed to the Middle East. The international standing of Astute class submarines, however, is significantly superior to that of Type 45 class destroyers, with the latter having a long record of outstandingly poor reliability, and being among the least well armed and least versatile destroyer types in the world, which seriously limits their utility. Six Astute class attack submarines are currently in active service, with the class having had a very protracted production run. The first ship of the class HMS Astute was laid down in January 2001, and entered service almost ten years later in August 2010. The eighth and final ship, HMS Achilles, is still under construction.

HMS Anson is the newest Astute class submarine in active service, and was commissioned in August 2022. The 7,000 ton ships each integrate up to 38 of a combination of Spearfish torpedoes and BGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV cruise missiles. This is a very limited payload compared to other submarine types, most notably the U.S. Navy Ohio class ships which integrate 154 Tomahawk missiles, equivalent to more than four Astute class ships. The ships’limited missile carriage is particularly significant when considering that British destroyers and frigates have no cruise missile strike capabilities whatsoever. Costing approximately $2 billion each, British attack submarines use 39,000 anti-acoustic tiles to reduce their acoustic signatures, and can operate at depths of up to 390 meters.

Raising serious questions regarding the capabilities of the British submarine fleet, former director of nuclear policy at the Ministry of Defence Rear Admiral Philip Mathias in December highlighted that the fleet suffered from “shockingly low availability” rates, with budget cuts and a “huge failure” in the management of key personnel having exacerbated the problem. He observed: “The UK is no longer capable of managing a nuclear submarine program… Performance across all aspects of the program continues to get worse in every dimension. This is an unprecedented situation in the nuclear submarine age. It is a catastrophic failure of succession and leadership planning.” Highlighting ongoing delays to both the delivery of Astute class attack submarines and to the development of Dreadnought class ballistic submarines, he advocated a focus on more “cost-effective” systems such as smaller unmanned submarines.

The United Kingdom appears poised to play a more significant role in the U.S.-led war effort against Iran, although the severe limitations of its navy and ground forces have raised questions regarding the scope of the contributions the country can make. The possibility of Eurofighters being deployed from bases in Eastern Europe, possibly in Turkey, to launch Storm Shadow cruise missile attacks, alongside Tomahawk strikes by submarines, remains significant, particularly as the U.S. Armed Forces have faced increasingly critical munitions shortages. The British Royal Air Force has nevertheless seriously depleted its own cruise missile stockpiles through very large scale donations to Ukraine for use against targets in Russia, while the Navy’s stockpiles are themselves highly limited.

Iran intentionally constrained its missile arsenal to ranges below 2,500 kilometres specifically to reduce political opposition from European states to its missile program. It has nevertheless come under sustained pressure from across the Western world to disarm, with its missile arsenal being the primary asset allowing it to retaliate against Western and Israeli attacks. Iran’s fielding of an intermediate range strike capability remains plausible, with the country having for decades procured a wide range of missile types, components and technologies from North Korea, which has fielded intermediate range ballistic missiles with 4,000 kilometre ranges for close to a decade. Earlier variants of the North Korean Hwasong-10 are reported to have been transferred to Iran in the mid-2000s, with later variants of this missile developed the following decade having 4,000 kilometre ranges.

The ability to strike targets up to 4,000 kilometres away would allow the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to retaliate against U.S. strategic bombers at their primary base of operations, namely Royal Air Force Fairford in the United Kingdom, where the number of B-1B and B-52H bombers has surged over the past month. These bombers are relied on particularly heavily due to the severe damage caused to U.S. air bases across the Middle East, as well as the associated missile defence network. There remains a significant possibility that should Iran expand strikes to engage targets in Europe, it could receive greater support from Russia including targeting data, with the destruction of strategic targets on the continent potentially having highly beneficial implications for the ongoing Russian war effort in the Ukrainian theatre. It remains highly uncertain whether Iran does indeed have an intermediate range strike capability, with Israeli sources having strong incentives to fabricate such claims. If such capabilities have been developed, it is also unknown on what scale such missiles are fielded, and how advanced they may be.

The Russian defence sector has developed multiple specialised variants of the Pantsir, with a new variant, the Pantsir-SMD, being heavily optimised to neutralise large swarms of hostile drones. This variant completed development in June 2025. The Pantsir-SMD integrates lighter shorter ranged surface-to-air missiles that are reportedly significantly cheaper to produce, while quadrupling its missile carriage. This appears intended to avoid one of the primary issues faced by air defence systems when engaging large numbers of hostile drones, namely the risks of becoming overwhelmed, and the limited cost effectiveness of using guided missiles to target very low cost aircraft. Each vehicle carries 48 surface-to-air missiles, compared to just 12 carried by the original Pantsir-S.

While the large majority of Russian air defence systems were developed by heavily enhancing Soviet era designs, the Patnsir is one of the few clean sheet new systems that has been brought into service since the USSR disintegrated. The system first entered service in 2012, and was designed to employ a combination of 57E6M surface-to-air missiles and twin 2A38M 30mm anti-aircraft autocannon. These armaments have both proven highly effective against low value drones. The vehicles are prized for their high mobility and versatility, and have been intensively combat tested in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. By the beginning of the 2020s the system had already shot down over 100 drones and at least one fighter, with their ability to provide a defence against Western radar evading cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow reported to have been enhanced significantly based on combat experience in the Ukrainian theatre.

The Pantsir’s capabilities have continued to be incrementally enhanced, with the new Pantsir-SM operationalised in 2019 integrating the new 57E6M surface-to-air missile as its primary armament, increasing its engagement range from 20 to 30 kilometres, and providing an ability to engage at 31 percent higher speeds. Regarding how customisation has reflected the needs of the Armed Forces, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov in June 2025 observed: “We maintain direct contact with servicemen who engage our products. Our repair shops are located close to the frontline and maintain contacts. We take into account all the remarks and constantly upgrade our hardware.” The Russian Armed Forces have complemented the Pantsir’s capabilities by procuring multiple laser weapons systems from China to further strengthen defences against drones, with the possibility having been raised of a laser weapon being developed with Chinese support for integration onto the Pantsir’s chassis.

The Ural region hosts key defence production, energy facilities, and chemical industry, facilities, as well as major oil and gas fields that are vital to Russian security interests. Its extensive transport infrastructure, including key railway corridors, major road networks, and logistics hubs are also of vital strategic importance. With countries across NATO, and in particular the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland, having invested heavily in bolstering Ukraine’s ability to destroy targets deep inside Russia, it is likely that the causing of severe setbacks to Russia’s industrial capacity by striking the Ural region is a medium term goal to advance broader Western Bloc objectives. Ukraine’s drone strike capabilities are heavily reliant on components, technologies, targeting data, intelligence, and industrial and operational advisors from multiple NATO member states.

Ukrainian attacks on key strategic targets in Russia have been openly supported by military and political leaders across the Western world. In July 2025, for example, German Army Major General Christian Freuding advocated for further Ukrainian attacks targeting Russian airfields and defence related production facilities. “Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used. Also, target weapons production facilities,” he stated at the time. Russian sources have accused multiple NATO member states of playing a central role in Ukraine’s attacks on key strategic targets. An example was Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s assertion in March 2205 that British personnel’s involvement in rocket artillery attacks on the Sudzha pipeline infrastructure in Russia’s Kursk Region had extended to inputting target coordinates, while both the UK and France provided satellite targeting support.

Supporting the expansion of Ukrainian attacks on Russia represents part of a broader campaign by countries across NATO to maximise pressure on the country, with Western Bloc states having more recently begun to deploy forces to board and forcefully take overcivilian cargo ships trading Russian goods in international waters. These boarding operations have been widely criticised as illegal, and lack justification in international law, but have the potential to be highly effective and to complement the effects of Western economic sanctions. Following the major rise in oil prices as a result of the U.S.-led military assault on Iran from February 28, it is also highly possible that Ukraine and its partners in the Western world will seek to target infrastructure related to Russian energy exports to clients in East and South Asia, most notably China and India, to deny Moscow a major increase in revenues from these exports.

The successful Iranian strike on Riffa Air Base closely follows the publication of footage showing two Iranian ballistic missiles striking oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, and failed efforts by the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces to use a Patriot system to intercept them. Less clear footage from Qatar has similarly shown a Patriot system consistently failing to intercept targets. Preceding the current hostilities, very limited Iranian strikes on June 23, 2025, proved capable of striking the U.S. Air Force’s largest overseas facility, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This was achieved despite the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps using lower end Fateh-313 missiles, and giving prior warning of the attacks, and in spite of the very high concentration of both U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force Patriot facilities protecting the facility.

The capabilities of the Patriot system have been cause for considerable controversy long before the U.S. and Israel initiated a war against Iran on February 28. In Ukrainian service the effectiveness of the Patriot system against Russian missile attacks has been widely questioned, with Ukrainian and Western sources having for months warned that its ability to intercept attacks has been limited. Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Igor Ignat on May 26 highlighted the system’s shortcomings in this regard, , while chief of communications for Ukrainian Air Force Command Yuri Ignat in early October confirmed that the service was facing growing challenges in intercepting Russian ballistic missile attacks.

The Patriot was first employed in combat to intercept very basic Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War in 1991, where they were assessed to have achieved a negligible success rate close to zero percent. The systems were a primary cause of friendly fire during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, firing on multiple U.S. fighter aircraft, leading them to being disabled. Despite claims of success by U.S. and Saudi sources in intercepting Yemeni ballistic missile attacks in late 2017, an investigation quickly proved that they had totally failed. When deployed to guard Saudi oil fields, they were also totally unsuccessful in intercepting drone strikes launched by either Yemeni paramilitary units or by Iran in 2019. The United States has nevertheless exercised its unrivalled clout on global arms markets to press clients across the world to procure the Patriot system, with a notable example being its exertion of considerable political and economic pressure on South Korea in the 1990s to acquire it rather than the initially favoured Russian S-300.

The demonstrated vulnerability of some of the world’s most capable attack helicopters in the Ukrainian theatre has been speculated to be a primary factor leading the U.S. Army to reduce its AH-64 Apache attack helicopter deployments in South Korea, and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Defence to reduce its own orders for the same aircraft. The Ka-52 was widely considered to have the highest combat potential of any attack helicopter type in service worldwide, with the Russian defence sector reported to have surged production since the outbreak of full scale hostilities with Ukraine in February 2022. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have relied on much older Soviet Mi-24 attack helicopters, many of which were donated by Poland, with these lacking similarly modern avionics or weaponry.

To maximise the Ka-52’s effectiveness in anti-armour roles a new missile, the Vikhr-1, was developed for the aircraft, allowing them to engage targets from safer distances where any possible accompanying Ukrainian air defence assets would be less effective. The much longer reaches of single use attack drones, however, leaves helicopters vulnerable even at longer ranges. Footage has repeatedly shown Ka-52s using guided missiles to destroy a Ukrainian armoured vehicles or convoys, with the aircraft proving to be highly effective. The Ka-52 has a number of unique capabilities, and is the only attack helicopter that is able to use long range high speed anti ship missiles, with it is Kh-31 able to engage warships over 300 kilometres away at Mach 3 speeds. The helicopters can carry a considerably larger payloads than their most capable Western rival the AH-64 Apache as well as much longer ranged weapons types.

The Talon Reach exercises follow a considerable rise in the the attention attributed to U.S. Army rotary wing assets, after a successful insertion using advanced electronic warfare systems on January 3 allowed helicopters to penetrate Venezuelan airspace and insert special forces to abduct the country’s president, Nicholas Maduro. Commenting on the exercises, commander of the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade Colonel Jason Raub observed that the combination of the ranges over which the helicopters operated, and the integration of every battalion to support both brigade and division operations, was particularly rare. “If we are capable of this, it signals that every other combat aviation brigade is capable of this as well. I would think twice before testing America’s resolve and the capability of the U.S. Army,” he noted.

Talon Reach exercises integrated small unmanned aircraft to provide reconnaissance and targeting support, with Colonel Raub observing: “We used our drone company throughout the entirety of our missions performing reconnaissance for the division and later supporting the long-range maritime interdiction we completed at the end of our flight.” The final stages of the exercises saw AH-64 Apache attack helicopters conduct precision strikes to facilitate the seizure of an island. Lieutenant Colonel William Carrion concluded regarding this operation: “This mission confirmed that 4-2 Attack Battalion is ready to execute anywhere, anytime. We can extend combat power and mass forces wherever they are needed.” Apache helicopters integrated targeting data from drones to enhance battlefield awareness and strike coordination.

Long-range aviation operations require sustained logistics support, command and control integration, and the ability to refuel and rearm in dispersed locations, with Forward Arming and Refuelling Points having been established across South Korea during Talon Reach to enable continuous operations. Commenting on these operations, 2nd Lieutenant Nicholas Meadows observed: “A Forward Arming and Refuelling Point extends the operational reach of a battalion… Our teams can rapidly establish refuelling operations in austere locations, allowing aviation crews to sustain missions across extended distances. These operations require a tremendous amount of coordination and teamwork.”

The demonstration of long range helicopter assault capability from bases in South Korea is expected to primarily affect Chinese security interests, since much shorter ranged flights would be sufficient to reach any location in North Korea. The density of North Korea’s fast modernising air defence network would also make such operations against the country highly challenging, with the Korean People’s Army Air Force having been quick to shoot down intruding U.S. Armed Forces helicopters multiple times in the past. Bases in South Korea are well within range to launch assaults against targets in and around major Chinese cities such as Shanghai. The growing possibility of Chinese forces having distinct air superiority in a potential conflict, however, is expected to further reduce the viability of launching long range helicopter assaults from bases in South Korea, with China’s defence sector having gained a considerable lead in developing sixth generation fighters.

Commenting on the Nanchang’s air defence exercise, Qiao Peng, a member of the destroyer’s crew, stated at the time that the mission difficulty was equivalent to a world-class air defence challenge. “We had no idea when the target aircraft would come – whether they would attack simultaneously or separately. We also had to monitor the changing trends of more than a dozen data points within seconds. So our greatest enemy was time; we had to be fast and precise,” he observed. “Missiles serve as our warship’s first line of defence. After this live-fire exercise, we had much greater confidence when operating in the far seas,” he elaborated. Type 055 class ships are relied on not only to defend themselves, but also protect accompany ships, functioning as wider air defence networks with other destroyers, escorting supercarriers, and keeping hostile anti-submarine warfare assets at bay. They can also be deployed to defend land targets to complement ground-based air defence networks.

HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles are capable of intercepting both manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, and have ranges estimated at 300 kilometres. They thus allow each destroyer to control an area of airspace over 280,000 square kilometres around it. The air defence capabilities of Type 055 class ships benefits significantly from their outstandingly powerful sensors and advanced data links, allowing both onboard and offboard sensors to provide mid-course guidance against remote faraway targets. On September 3, 2025, the Navy unveiled a newer type of surface-to-air missile, the HHQ-9C, which is reported by local sources to have a greater accuracy, longer range and faster reaction time.

The release of the footage has beens speculated by some sources to mark the conclusion of the first major phase in the Type 055 destroyer program, as the last two of the ships, the Anqing and Dongguan, were earlier in March confirmed to have been brought into service as part of a second batch of the vessels. There have been no significant indications that the construction of further ships of the class is planned. The Type 055 class is widely considered to have the highest combat potential among the world’s surface combat ships, with its closest rivals being the South Korean Sejong the Great class destroyer and Russia’s sole modernised Kirov Class nuclear powered cruiser. Although overall more capable, the Type 055’s anti-ballistic missile capabilities are in many respects more limited than those of U.S. and Japanese Navy Aegis destroyers, which integrate SM-3 and SM-6 missiles that are highly specialised for such roles.

Type 055 class destroyers are among the largest and most heavily armed in the world, with each integrating 112 vertical launch cels which can accommodate a wide range of cruise and surface-to-air missiles, as well as the new YJ-20 anti-ship ballistic missile. The ships’ situational awareness is also near unrivalled, with each integrating a dual band radar system similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer. Such radars provide a particularly high degree of situational awareness, including over-the-horizon detection capabilities. Type Type 055 class gained considerable publicity in 2025 both for its deployment for shows of force near Australia in February 2025, and in December for its deployment alongside two smaller Type 052D class destroyers to escort the aircraft carrier Liaoning for operations near Japanese waters.

With the Type 055 class considered to have significant performance advantages over U.S. Navy destroyers in all areas other than ballistic missile defence, the U.S. Navy in January 2022 released details of a possible configuration for a next generation destroyer, which is currently being developed under the DDG(X) program. Cuts to the Zumwalt class stealth destroyer program from 32 to three ships, due to significant performance issues and cost overruns, has limited the U.S. Navy’s ability to keep up with Chinese advances. The age of the Arleigh Burke class destroyers the Navy currently relies on has limited their ability to continue receiving upgrades and enhancements, with the ship's basic design deficient in space, weight, and power by the standards of the 2020s. The Type 055 class destroyer program has been a primary factor stimulating interest in accelerating the development of the DDG(X).

Type 055 class destroyers have been involved in multiple exercises in the last three months, with footage released in late December providing a rare look at the launch of the type’s new primary anti-ship missile, the YJ-20, which significantly outperforms rival missile types carried by other surface combatants such as the Russian Zircon. In mid-January the Type 055 class destroyer Yan'andeployed as part of a naval task with the Type 075 class amphibious assault ship Hainan, which serves as a helicopter carrier, for multi-subject maritime training in the South China Sea. The exercises saw amphibious landings carried out from the Hainan under the cover of the Yan’an’s multi-layered air defences.

Later in January the Type 055 class destroyer the Zunyi was deployed for free-form confrontational exercises targeting simulated adversaries in the South China Sea, which drew particular attention to the design’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Footage released by Chinese state media in mid-February showed the Type 055 class destroyerLhasaoperating alongside the older Type 051C class destroyerShijiazhuang. This highlighted how the Type 055 could complement the capabilities of older destroyers using its more advanced destroyers, and how older ships optimised for air defence could in turn provide greater protection against saturation attacks. Chinese shipyards have sustained a destroyer production rate exceeding those of the next several countries combined, with the Navy commissioning seven new destroyers in 2025 alone, and at times commissioning as many as ten in a year. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, has commissioned destroyers at rates of around 1.6 per year. The combination of sophistication and scale in production has continued to rapidly shift the balance of power at sea.

The latest setbacks to Israeli operations follow reports that Hezbollah had deployed its Radwan special forces for counteroffensives against Israeli Army units in Southern Lebanon. These elite units were notably not previously deployed for engagements with Israeli forces, and after having honed their capabilities for years to support counterinsurgency operations in Syria, they have been widely assessed to be highly capable. Hezbollah units have made extensive use of ambush tactics to launch coordinated attacks against Israeli armour, and on March 19 reported the disabling or destruction of six Merkava tanks between 12:05am and 1:30am during a series of engagements. Israel and the United States have both lobbied their strategic partner Syria to open a second front against Hezbollah, with a military buildup by Syrian Islamist militias having been staged on the Lebanese border to take pressure off Israeli forces.

The Republic of China Defence Ministry has repeatedly raised concerns over major delays to F-16 deliveries, which were initially intended to be completed deliveries in 2027. Premier Cho Jung-tai in October stated that the government did not rule out “taking legal action against the manufacturer,” although cautioning that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales process didnot provide for direct compensation claims. Production and systems integration issues in the United States have been a primary cause for delays. Only one fighter, F-16D number 6831, has been delivered so far. Data from the Taiwan Arms Sales Backlog Tracker in provided an indication ofmajor delays the supplies of a wide range of armaments, with outstanding backlogs having reached over $21.45 billion.

Although the F-16 is widely considered obsolete, having first entered service 49 years ago in 1978, the Block 70 variant significantly improves on the original design with new composite materials, a more powerful engine, modern data links and precision guided weaponry, and the AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array radar. Nevertheless, the sophistication of the capabilities fielded by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with which the Republic of China Armed Forces remain in state of civil war, has raised serious concerns that the F-16 Block 70 will already close to two full generations behind before deliveries are complete. The Chinese mainland currently has two of the world’s most advanced fifth generation fighters in production, and is scheduled to lead the world by at least five years in fielding sixth generation fighters, with three separate designs already in flight testing.

Following the U.S. and Israel’s initiation of a full scale assault on Iran on February 28, which has been supported by countries across the Persian Gulf and Europe, Iranian counterattacks have achieved considerable successes in destroying high value aircraft and major military facilities across the Gulf region. Strikes by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were on March 16 reported to have destroyed a United Arab Emirates Air Force Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system valued at approximately $500 million at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, with the destruction of multiple other aircraft including MQ-9s also assessed to be likely during the attack. A closely coinciding attack damaged at least six U.S. Air Force KC-135 tankers at Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia.

Kuwaiti Air Force Eurofighters are some of the most expensive tactical combat aircraft operational anywhere in the world, with a contract signed in 2015 to acquire a single squadron’s worth of 28 aircraft valued at 8 billion euros, or over $9 billion, placing their cost at an exorbitant $321 million each. The destruction of three fighters would thus set the Kuwaiti Defence Ministry back over $900 million. The extreme cost of the aircraft led the Kuwaiti parliamentary committee to investigate a possible large-scale misappropriation of state funds in 2020, although it has been far from uncommon for defence clients in the Arab World to pay outstandingly high prices for Western fighter aircraft. The capabilities of the Eurofighter have consistently been evaluated poorly, with the Qatar Emiri Air Force confirmed in October 2025 to be seeking to retire its 24 Eurofighters from service, just three years after they began deliveries to the country in 2022.

Exercises highlighted the growing ability of Korean People’s Army units to launch combined arms operations as part of a modern reconnaissance-strike complex. Commenting on the exercises, Chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un stated that he had come to clearly recognise that intensifying practical training under the simulated real war exercises had been adhered to in recent training of tactical units, highlighting that all sub-units in the exercises share real-time information to to prevail under “extremely difficult combat situations.” The exercises saw anti-tank missiles of an armoured car sub-unit hit targets in salvoes to provide tactical fire support, while rear strike sub-units destroyed adversary drones and helicopters from ambush positions, before assaulting and taking over the adversary’s defence line and firing positions.

The operations of rear strike sub-units were reportedly key to allowing tanks and infantry to advance, with armoured personnel carriers shown to play a prominent role in the advance. State media referred to a subsequent “demonstration charge by the tank company of the cavalry regiment equipped with new-type main battle tanks.” “Through the drill, its aim was attained to confirm the tankmen's capabilities for an actual war and each sub-unit's combat cooperation and action methods according to different tactical missions,” the state run Korean Central News Agency reported. Chairman Kim reportedly particularly praised the capabilities of the new Chonma 20 main battle tank which made its debut during the exercises, including its firepower, mobility, and armour protection levels. The tank reportedly intercepted 100 percent of anti-tank missiles and drones attacking it from different positions and directions, demonstrating the advanced capabilities of its active protection system.

Chairman Kim was greeted by Defence Minister No Kwang Chol, Chief of General Staff Ri Yong Gil, and other senior figures in the armed forces’ leadership during the exercises, with the attendance of multiple senior leadership figures indicating a considerable degree of importance attributed to the exercises. The Chonma 20’s fire controls are reportedly significantly better suited to combined arms operations than previous types of main battle tank, which relied on Cold War era fire controls and had far more limited combat potentials. Korean People’s Army units have gained experience in frontline operations during deployments to repel advances by Ukrainian and supporting NATO members’ forces into the Russian Kursk region, with the Russian Army itself having been slow to retrain and re-equip for modern networked combined armed operations, but adapting quickly following the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022.

Produced by the Iranian Armed Forces Logistics Department's Defence Industry Organization, the Majid made its debut at a military parade on April 18, 2021. The short range system was designed for point defence rather than area defence, and is limited to a 700 kilometre engagement range and 6 kilometre altitude. Although its use of infrared rather than radar guidance limits its range, it also allows the Majid to operate without a radar signature, which considerably increases its survivability. The F-35’s radar cross section reductions are considerably greater than those to its heat signature, which has led infrared guided systems to be identified from the program’s early stages as a potential vulnerability.

A further benefit of using infrared guidance is that systems like the Majid do not trigger targets’ radar warning receivers, while their electronic jamming will have little effect. Iranian footage of the strike indicates that only a single missile was launched against the F-35, possibly due to shortages, or because the launcher’s remaining missiles had already been fired against other targets. Iranian infrared-guided air defence systems have been responsible for destroying multiple U.S. and Israelihigh value unmanned aircraft, most notably MQ-9 and Heron drones. While the F-35 was designed specifically to meet the requirements of launching penetration strikes into well defended hostile airspace, the two countries’ fourth generation fighters which lack similarly advanced avionics or stealth capabilities have not been deployed for similarly high risk operations.

Iran is reported to have made considerable investments in modernising its short range air defence capabilities, with leaked Russian government documents in late February having indicated that the Iranian Defence Ministry had singed an arms deal valued at $580 million to procure 500 9K333 Verba man-portable short range surface-to-air missile launchers and 2,500 associated 9M336 missiles. The Verba is widely considered the world’s most capable man-portable air defence system, and is the only known man-portable system with a three-spectral seeker, giving it a qualitative edge against modern countermeasures. These include ultraviolet, near-infrared and mid-infrared seekers. Deliveries were expected to make Iran’s airspace among the most challenging to penetrate at lower altitudes.

The Verba system was designed to have a high capability to discriminate targets from background heat sources, flares, and Directional Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM). The possibility of the systems being delivered by Russia should hostilities continue remains significant, with requirements for training times being relatively low. The demonstrated ability of infrared-guided systems to threaten the F-35 may increase Iranian interest in accelerating deliveries. A major shortcoming of the F-35 remains that delays to the completion of Block 4 software upgrades has left them unable to launch air-to-surface missiles, which requires them to fly close to their targets to engage them, leaving them more vulnerable to strikes by short range air defence systems like the Majid and Verba.

The March 19 exercises reportedly marked the debut of the new tank type, and involved a range of tests examining the new main battle tank's active protection system. Commenting on the vehicle’s performance, Chairman Kim observed: "We have attained great successes and progress in modernising the tank-building industry.”The Korean People’s Army unveiled its first fully clean sheet main battle tank design, the Chonma 2, in 2020, and has since taken this as a basis for rapid incremental modernisation. The latest variant of the design, the Chonma 20, which was first seen at a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party in October 2025. This followed the unveiling of the previous iteration of the design, the Tianma 2, in November 2024. Reporting on the capabilities of the new vehicle, the state run Korean Central News Agency reported: “mechanised units demonstrated the modern main battle tank Chonma 20, which has powerful strike capability and a reliable protection system.”

One of the most significant advances over the original Chonma 2 achieved by the Tianma 2, and inherited by the Chonma 20, was the integration of an autoloader to facilitate an increased rate of fire and reduced crew requirements from four to three. Notable ways the Chonma 20 improved on the older Chonma 2 and Tianma 2 include a redesigned driver’s hatch, the integration of a new turret-mounted remotely controlled anti-aircraft gun, a modified turret armour layout, and most notably the integration of a new active protectio. North Korea’s active protection system was first seen in use in footage released in July 2023, and uses radars to continuously monitor their surrounding environments for incoming threats, and when detecting incoming projectiles track them automatically, calculate their trajectories, and deploy protective munitions to intercept and destroy them.

In May 2025, North Korean state media unveiled a large scale new tank factory, at which time Chairman Kim stressed that replacing the Korean People’s Army’s armoured vehicles of the last century with the latest models had become a primary task of building the armed forces. It was projected at the time that the service entry rates of variants of the Chonma 2 design would accelerate considerably. Available evidence indicates that the latest North Korean tank designs have much higher standings relative to their foreign rivals than the country’s prior tanks, reflecting broader trends towards the country’s defence sector achieving achieving a standing among the world’s leaders, such as China and the U.S., in multiple key technology areas. This has been clearly demonstrated in the Russian-Ukrainian War, with a notable example being the comfortable superiority which North Korean anti-tank guided missiles have had over their Russian counterparts.

In November the South Korean National Intelligence Service reported that the Korean People’s Army had began transferring thousands of additional personnel to Russia, with nearly 10,000 personnel already stationed near the Russian–Ukrainian border for guard duties. Around 5,000 personnel from North Korean construction units were reported to have been deployed to Russia since September, and were supporting reconstruction in disputed territories claimed by both Moscow and Kiev. The National Intelligence Service further reported that the Korean People’s Army had been maintaining training programs and personnel selection specifically in anticipation of dispatching further personnel to supporting the Russian war effort. It also highlighted the frequent visits being made to Russia by senior North Korean officials responsible for munitions.

Facing Korean People’s Army units, the Ukrainain assault into Kursk was supported by significant contingents of personnel from NATO member states, such as contractors from the American Forward Observation Group organisation and the Polish Volunteer Corps. The conflict is thus one of several where North Korean forces have fought against the United States and its Western allies, mirroring their contributions in the Vietnam War and in multiple Middle Eastern conflicts. The Russian Armed Forces have relied increasingly heavily on North Korean armaments for ongoing operations across the Ukrainian theatre, ranging from 170mm self propelled artillery and ballistic missiles, to mortars and anti-tank guided missiles. These systems have often surpassed the capabilities of Russian-produced equipment.

The F-35’s flight over central Iran for a deep penetration strike operation indicates a degree of confidence that Iranian air defences have been sufficiently weakened that fifth generation aircraft with advanced stealth capabilities can operate safely. The F-35 was conceptualised after the end of the Cold War for an era of warfare in which adversaries would no longer field peer level fighter aircraft, and would instead rely heavily on ground-based air defences as Iran has. Iranian forces have made extensive use of infrared-guided systems to engage targets without emitting radar signatures or alerting targets’ radar warning receivers, with such systems being better optimised to engaging targets like the F-35. Although the F-35 has a reduced heat signature, the reductions made to its radar signature are significantly greater, leaving it relatively more vulnerable to targeting by infrared guided systems.

Iran’s successful targeting of an F-35 is not entirely unprecedented, with the country having supplied advanced infrared-guided air defence systems to strategic partners in Iraq and Yemen, which have used them to target fighter aircraft in the past. This has included multiple confirmed shootdowns of F-15s, F-16s and Eurofighters by Ansuruallh Coalition forces in Yemen using infrared guided air defence systems, as well as the destruction of over a dozen U.S. MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft. Ansuruallh Coalition air defence units were also confirmed to have achieved near misses when targeting F-35s. Iraqi paramilitary groups have also claimed to have achieved multiple successes in shooting down U.S. aircraft, including three F-15 fighters in the opening hours of the war, as well as a KC-135 tanker. The shooting down of an F-35 may result in a serious reevaluation of how the aircraft is operated, including whether it will continue to be used for deep penetration strikes into Iran.

During a 12 day Israeli air assault on Iranian June 2025, Iranian government reported the successful shootdowns of four Israeli Air Force F-35s by ground-based air defence systems. The likely veracity of Iranian claims was previously analysed by Military Watch in detail, including assessments of the strengths and limitations of Iran’s air defences and significant risks faced by F-35s operating on penetration missions deep inside heavily defended airspace. With Israel having maintained very strict censorship of its losses, however, it remains uncertain whether there was any veracity to Iranian claims. Evidence that Iranian air defence systems are cable of successfully targeting F-35s, however, makes the claims made in June appear somewhat more credible. With the F-35 being required to fly near its targets to strike them, as the lack of Block 4 software prevents them from integrating air-to-ground missiles has older fourth generation fighters have, a reduced ability to overfly Iranian airspace could seriously reduce the aircraft’s utility.

The capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’s rocket artillery gained greater attention after the PCL-191 system participated in the Justice Mission 2025 large-scale joint military drills around Taiwan Island in December. The People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China Army are currently in a state of civil war, with both Beijing and Taipei claiming to be the sole legitimate governments of the Chinese nation. The PCL-191 considered to be one of the world’s two longest ranged rocket artillery systems, alongside the North Korean KN-25, with its ability to bombard Republic of China Armed Forces targets across Taiwan Island with high precision and at a very low cost thought to be a game changer for a potential conflict when it was first introduced into service in the late 2010s. Footage from mainland China in December showed the system’s rockets passing over houses to strike simulated targets at sea around Taiwan Island. Although the system can fire short range ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 500 kilometres, the use of 370 mm rockets with ranges of approximately 350 kilometres is considered more significant due to their much lower costs and greater suitability for saturation strikes.

The viability of the Republic of China Armed Forces’ air defence network has repeatedly been brought to question, with their cost effectiveness against the People’s Liberation Army’s vast arsenals of missiles and rockets considered low. On March 5 Vice Chairman of the Forward Auxiliary Association Li Wenzhong warned that much of the equipment the Republic of China Defence Ministry was ordering was designed to "fight yesterday instead of tomorrow's war.” Regarding PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles for Patriot air defence system, he observed that they had limited viability against attacks by cruise missiles, guide rockets, and unmanned aircraft, while being outstandingly expensive, particularly when considering that they were designed to be launched in pairs against targets. Such launches are wholly unaffordable and unsustainable against the Chinese mainland’s vast ballistic missile arsenal. A recent report by Defence Ministry drew strong parallels between Iranian strike capabilities, which have proven highly effective against the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air defences, and the projected "multi-wave, multi-missile" aerial threats which the PLA is expected to employ in the event of a Taiwan Strait war.

Reflecting their expected high utility in a Taiwan Strait conflict, two of the first brigades to deploy the PCL-191 in the late 2010s were located in Huzhou and Xiamen, both of which are within range of targets in Taiwan. The 72nd Group Army’s artillery brigade’s master sergeant, Wang Tanshen, previously commented shortly after the PCL-191 system was operationalised that its range exceeded that of its closest predecessor by “seven times,” elaborating: “The new generation rocket artillery system has extended our firing range to cover everywhere we want to hit.” Despite the significant cost reductions that are expected to be achieved by the new program for the Republic of China Army, new are defence systems will be far from cost-effective to intercept rocket bombardments, with precision guided artillery rockets being significantly less costly than ballistic missiles to launch.

The M41 is by far the worst armoured tank type fielded by the armed forces of an economically developed state, with its steel armour being easily penetrated by autocannons and Vietnam War era anti-tank guided missiles, while and even heavy machine guns can pose serious threats. The vehicle is considered effectively unarmored, with even Chinese People’s Liberation Army Type 59 tanks, the oldest type in service, having overwhelming advantages. The age of the M41’s fire controls and its very limited firepower are further factors seriously limiting its combat potential, which has raised questions regarding why the Republic of China Army has continued to operate them. Their low fuel efficiency and inability to effectively engage targets under nighttime conditions are further major drawbacks.

Commenting on the latest exercises, the Kinmen Defence Command revealed that various types of artillery were used, including 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars, 105mm howitzers, 50mm machine guns, 40mm grenade launchers, and 66mm rocket launchers. Alongside M41 tanks, locally produced CM21 armoured vehicles and CM23 mortars were also deployed. The command pointed out that exercises adhered to the core principle of "combat-oriented training," employing a "real-person, real-equipment, real-time, real-location, real-situation, and real-operation" approach. It highlighted that it continuously adapted forces to new scenarios, responded to grey zone threats, simulated enemy amphibious landing operations, and and conducted exercises at frontline strongholds and positions in the Donggang sea area. This has included including "drone response," "distancing and firing," "near-shore defence beach combat," and "last-ditch defence firing."

M41 tanks have crews of four personnel, compared to just two for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s own new lightweight main battle tank, and three for other PLA tank types. The M41 and the most capable PLA tank, the Type 100, sits at opposite ends of the spectrum of tank types in service in the world, with the Type 100 widely considered the most advanced in the world and the first of its generation, placing it over 70 years ahead of the M41. The M41 itself was far from cutting edge and very much constrained in its capabilities even in the 1950s, particularly when compared to tanks such as the T-54/55 and IS-3 which had far higher combat potentials. The fact that the M41 is still relied on in high priority locations such as Kinmen highlights the major issues that the Republic of China Army has had in procuring modern tanks, contrasting to the People’s Liberation Army deployed across the Taiwan Strait which has increasingly led the world in tank development.

Since launching a full scale assault on Iran on February 28, the U.S. Armed Forces have faced multiple significant setbacks, including considerable losses and serious depletion of its munitions. Part of its response has been to redeploy high value military equipment from across much of the world to take part in hostilities, with the RQ-180’s reconnaissance capabilities potentially being invaluable to supporting the U.S. and Israeli reconnaissance strike complex. This is particularly vital due to Iran’s widespread deployment of highly mobile assets, such as wheeled solid fuelled ballistic missile launchers, which leave only small windows for targeting and require tracking across the country’s vast territory.

It remains uncertain whether the RQ-180 took damage in Iranian airspace, or whether it may have suffered a technical error. The U.S. has lost multiple aircraft inside Iranian airspace, including at least 12 MQ-9 Reaper drones which fulfil reconnaissance and attack roles, with multiple unconfirmed reports having claimed in war’s opening hours that a B-2 bomber was also shot dow during a penetration strike. The U.S. and Israel have generally refrained from flying higher value aircraft for deep penetration strikes into Iran, with most aircraft instead launching cruise and ballistic missiles from across longer distances. This reflects difficulties that the U.S. and its strategic partners have had in neutralising Iran’s multi-layered air defence network.

The RQ-180 was designed and tested in Area 51, and began operations from Beale Air Force Base in 2019, before reportedly making surveillance flights over the Arctic to test its capabilities. The aircraft is assessed to have been a successor to the RQ-170, which was manufactured in limited numbers in the 2000s for surveillance missions over well defended enemy airspace. The RQ-170 gained considerable publicity after it was commandeered over Iran using advanced electronic warfare systems, with its technologies subsequently used to develop a new series of Iranian drones. The newer aircraft is reported to improve on the capabilities of its predecessor with a longer range and superior stealth capabilities.

After U.S. engine supplier General Electric encountered supply chain problems, causing delays in the delivery of the F414, there was considerable speculation that an alternative powerplant could be considered for the program. A primary issue expected to delay the development of the new Tejas variant is the requirement that at least 80 percent of its parts be produced in India, with the strong tendency of domestic programs to face considerable delays, and the limited diversity of the industrial base, expected to make this highly challenging to achieve. The Tejas Mk2 is expected to provide a complementary lightweight counterpart to the Su-30MKI ‘4+ generation’ air superiority fighter that currently forms the backbone of the fleet, and is a much smaller aircraft with less than half the engine power and much lower maintenance needs and operational costs.

The Indian Defence Ministry in September 2025 signed the largest procurement contract in the history of the Tejas program, ordering 97 Tejas Mk1A lightweight fighters for $7 billion. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2027–2028, with the new variant of the Tejas having slightly improved avionics over prior models. Although the Tejas has been under development for close to 40 years, it has yet to enter service in meaningful numbers, with the aircraft having made its much delayed first flight on January 4, 2001, while entering service in limited numbers only 18 years later in February 2019. At approximately $72 million per aircraft, the cost effectiveness of the fighters has repeatedly been brought to serious question.

The Tejas MK2 is one of multiple fighter programs which are currently underway in India, and by far the most conservative in terms of its combat potential. In February 2026 it was confirmed that the Defence Ministry was moving ahead with plans to comprehensively upgrade its Su-30MKI heavyweight fighters with Russian assistance, under a program that will first focus on enhancing 84 of the over 270 fighters by integrating a wide range of new subsystems. The design is seen to have very considerable potential for modernisation with fifth generation technologies. After it was confirmed in February 2025 that a license production deal for the Su-57 fifth generation was being considered, the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage, with the Russian Defence Ministry having made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to its source code as part of a deal. India is also developing its own fifth generation fighter under the AMCA program, although this is not expected to bring an aircraft into service until close to 2040. The difficulties that have sat back domestic programs are expected to further increase interest in advanced Russian fighters that can be supplied much more quickly.

The MiG-31I carries an air launched variant of the 9K720 ballistic missile from the Iskander-M ground-based system, and has been combat tested against a wide variety of high value targets in the Ukrainian theatre. The MiG-31 itself is the world’s fastest and highest flying combat aircraft, allowing it to impart considerable energy onto missiles at the point of launch. Alongside the preceding MiG-25, it is the only combat aircraft with a cruising speed above twice the speed of sound, with the aircraft designed for a sustained cruise at Mach 2.35 to rapidly redeploy over long distances. Although MiG-31s configured as interceptors have been deployed in the Pacific since 1982, those configured as ballistic missile carriers have not previously had a significant presence in the region.

Ballistic missile carrying MiG-31s were credited with the first ever kill against a U.S. produced MIM-104 Patriot air defence system in May 2023, while more recentlyin early October, 2025, Ukrainian and Western officials cited by the Financial Times noted that missile strikes launched by the aircraft had become far more challenging to intercept. The Patriot is relied on heavily by both Japan and South Korea for their defence, although the systems and their interceptors have been withdrawn by U.S. forces from regional bases on a considerable scale to respond to high rates of attrition in the Middle East since February 28. Kinzhal missiles following semi-ballistic trajectories and are able to perform complex manoeuvres during flight, which makes them highly challenging to intercept.

The MiG-31I gained a new inflight regretting capability in 2023, while the aircraft have more recently in October 2025 been confirmed to have launched strikes on Ukrainian targets from bases deep in the Russian interior, operating alongside Il-78 tankers to cover greater distances and loiter for longer periods before firing their missiles. As MiG-31Is are deployed under the Strategic Aviation Command alongside Tu-22M, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160 strategic bombers, they have priority access to tanker support which allows them to strike targets over considerably longer distances. The number of ballistic missile carrying MiG-31s in service is expected to continue to grow rapidly as more of the hundreds of airframes in storage are refurbished and modernised to the new standard, posing a leading challenge to Western Bloc and allied missile defences.

Responding to the destruction of the ground-based radar network, the U.S. Air Force surged the operational tempo of E-3 Sentry airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) over the Middle East, with the aircraft reportedly flying in unprecedented density over Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean. These operations are intended to provide a persistent detection capability against Iranian drones and missiles being fired at targets in Jordan and Israel. The U.S. Air Force deployed the bulk of its global operational E-3 fleet to the Middle East and Europe preceding the initiation of attacks against Iran, with the AWACS carrying the largest airborne radars in the world, and being relied on to control the tactical battlespace using data links to increase the situational awareness of U.S. and allied air defence networks.

The U.S. has further responded to the destruction of ground-based radars by withdrawing air defence systems and their radars, from across the world, including from strategically critical forward positions in South Korea, for redeployment to the Middle East. This has had significant long term implications for the U.S. force posture in East Asia and for the state of its alliances in the region. Iranian drone strikes have achieved growing successes destroying high value targets at military facilities across the Middle East, with a number of Western sources alleging that the Revolutionary Guard Corps has received targeting support from Russia using its satellite network. Iran has also built up an arsenal of higher value ballistic missile types, most notably the Fattah 2 which has demonstrated the capabilities of its advanced hypersonic glide vehicle to neutralise high value targets, with these being among the assets that have allowed it to deny the U.S. escalation dominance.

Il-20M operations provide the Russian Armed Forces with a more detailed understanding of NATO members’ and command capabilities, with the aircraft carrying side-looking radars, long-range surveillance optics and infrared sensors. The aircraft have frequently deployed from the Russian Kaliningrad enclave bordering Poland, or from elsewhere in Northern Russia, for operations near NATO territory. NATO members have themselves deployed a number of electronic intelligence aircraft, including F-35 fighters with outstanding passive sensors, for intelligence gathering operations near Russian territory on a much larger scale. The Polish Air Force is scheduled to operationalise a full strength F-35 squadron before 2030, which will revolutionise intelligence collection capabilities.

While the Russian Navy and a number of the type’s foreign operators such as Algeria and India deploy ‘4+ generation’ variants with advanced combat capabilities, Polish Air Force MiG-29s have long since been considered obsolete. The aircraft have been gradually phased out of service as the Air Force has received South Korean FA-50 lightweight fighters. The retirement of the MiG-29 has significantly reduced operational costs, and while the FA-50 has a much more conservative flight performance and carries a much smaller radar, the approximately 30 year technological gap separating them means the transition still provides a major improvement. MiG-29s withdrawn from service have gradually been delivered to the Ukrainian Air Force as aid across multiple batches.

Poland has taken a leading role in NATO efforts to escalate hostilities against Russia, procuring ground forces equipment on a scale that has not been seen elsewhere in the alliance, while deploying its new rocket artillery systems both to neighbouring countries bordering Russia, and to its own borders with Russia and Belarus for exercises. It has also deployed thousands of contractor personnel to Ukraine to engage Russian forces on the frontlines, while considering revisions to its military doctrine to vastly expand its ground forces, and developing an “active defence,” doctrine to be ready to operate “across the full operational depth of the opponent” by preparing to launch attacks across Russian territory. In February Polish President Karol Navrocki stated that his country should start developing nuclear weapons, specifying that a future nuclear arsenal would be aimed at Russia, following multiple requests by Polish officials to enter into a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States

The MiG-29 is significantly lighter than the MiG-31, the Su-57, and the Su-27 and its derivatives, which between them form the backbone of the Russian fleet, integrating a much smaller radar, carrying less weapons, and having a much shorter range. Although the Su-27 and MiG-29 were designed to serve in a high-low combination, after the Soviet Union’s disintegration Russia prioritised the former, as its performance advantages were seen to compensate for its much higher procurement and sustainment costs. Reports from Russian sources in 2025 have indicated that the Russian Aerospace Forces are scheduled to begin receiving significant numbers of MiG-35 fighters, a very heavily modernised MiG-29 derivative, as a result of greater funding for fighter procurements. The scale of procurements, and the sophistication of the subsystems that will be financed, remain uncertain.

In January the Taipei-based China Academy of Sciences was commissioned to develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for the F-CK, with the fighter’s current mechanically scanned array radars having long been considered obsolete. A prototype AESA radar for the aircraft was reported in January to have already begun testing, and is expected to integrate new Gallium Nitride technologies, making it significantly more modern than the AN/APG-83 radar integrated on F-16 fighters than the Air Force is procuring from the United States. The modernisation of the F-CK fleet closely follows the completion work to bring Republic of China Air Force’s F-16A/B fighters to the F-16V standard under the $4.5 billion ‘Peace Phoenix Rising’ program with U.S. assistance. Experience from this work expected to help support work to upgrade the lighter indigenous fighter fully domestically.

In parallel to investments to modernise the F-CK fleet, of which two squadrons are currently in service, the Republic of China Air Force is scheduled receive 66 F-16 Block 70 fighters, although deliveries have fallen years behind schedule due to industrial issues in the United States. The production of 66 T-5 Brave Eagle fighters, a heavier and more modern derivative of the F-CK design, to form a further squadron, has also fallen far behind schedule. The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence is also reported to be considering initiating the development of a fifth generation fighter to succeed the F-CK in service, with the development of a number of related technologies having already been initiated. A number of unconfirmed reports have also indicated that talks are underway for the sale of French Rafale fighters to equip the Republic of China Air Force. Should all these programs proceed, it would necessitate a significant expansion of the number of fighter units in service.

Although UAE Airspace is protected by a dense multi-layered air defence network including U.S.-supplied THAAD and Patriot anti-ballistic missile systems, South Korean Cheongung-II air defence systems, and supporting air defence artillery, the effectiveness of this network has been highly limited. Iranian forces’ ability to strike Al Dhafra, which is one of the most heavily defended facilities in the country, has provided one of multiple indications that air defence capabilities are rapidly diminishing. The release of images showing damage at Al Dhafra closely coincides with the release of footage showing mass destruction of major infrastructure, including the country’s largest airport, Dubai International Airport, and largest port at Fujairah. Although the UAE Air Force and the French Air Force have deployed fighters from Al Dhafra to intercept drone attacks, their suitability for such operations has been limited, with the French Air Force’s operations over two weeks having led the country’s defence ministry to raise serious questions regarding the severe depletion of its costly air-to-air missile stockpiles.

The GlobalEye was developed to provide advanced situational awareness to the operator’s networks, and integrates two oversized radars and advanced data links, as well as signals and electronic intelligence sensors enable the aircraft to detect and analyse radar emissions and communications signals. The aircraft’s capabilities are nevertheless significantly more constrained than those of larger more advanced AEW&C systems such as the U.S. E-7 Wedgetail and the Chinese KJ-500. The UAE Air Force is currently the type’s only operator, with France and Sweden having also placed orders for two and three respectively. The relatively small radars carried by UAE Air Force F-16, Mirage 2000, and future Rafale fighters makes support from AEW&Cs particularly important, contrasting to the Royal Saudi Air Force which operates much larger F-15 fighters that can function much more independently.

Five GlobalEye systems were delivered from 2020-2024 under a $2.5 billion contract, making them significantly more costly than other aircraft confirmed to have been damaged or destroyed in Iranian attacks, such as the U.S. Air Force KC-135 tankers targeted at Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia in a closely coinciding attack. The destruction of the GlobalEye is expected to further limit the U.S. and its strategic partners’ situational awareness in the region, after the Revolutionary Guard Corps destroyed the sole AN/FPS-132 radar based outside the U.S., which was located in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars from THAAD systems in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as multiple lower value radar systems. The U.S. has been forced to redeploy anti-missile systems and their radars from across the world, most notably from strategic forward locations in South Korea, to compensate for these losses.

While missile defences in Israel can depend on a further AN/TPY-2 system in Turkey to track incoming missiles, states located closer to Iran have remained far more vulnerable, with the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar having been targeted particularly intensively due to their leading roles in supporting the U.S.-led campaign against Iran. Footage showing local Patriot air defence systems repeatedly failing to intercepteven relatively basic Iranian ballistic missile strikes on multiple occasions have followed a long history of the system’s failures during combat, with its underperformance thought to have further exacerbated frontline U.S.-aligned Gulf states’ vulnerability. The U.S. has itself suffered from extreme shortages of surface-to-air missile interceptors, which has reportedly been a primary factor leading it to push for a ceasefire.

Analysts have estimated that the U.S. launched attacks on more than 6,000 Iranian targets in the first 10 days of attacks, almost all using costly beyond visual range weaponry, while also firing at estimated more than 2000 anti-ballistic missiles to intercept Iranian counter strikes.Director of the Missile Defense Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Tom Karako has been among several to warn that while the Pentagon claims its stockpiles are sufficient for current operations, the continued high-rate expenditure is putting pressure on the U.S. Armed Forces’ long-range weapons inventory. He pointed out that the United States' failure to maintain sufficient missile stockpiles over the past few years has now forced massive depletion in the war, putting military planning officials at risk of running out of ammunition.

Karako warned that the U.S. Armed Forces existing stockpile of precision ammunition was originally built to prepare for potential conflicts in the Pacific region, namely against China and North Korea. If a continued conflict in the Middle East depletes these stockpiles, it could seriously undermine the U.S. force posture in the strategically critical Western Pacific. He noted that avoiding ammunition shortages requires swift action from Congress and the Pentagon to replenish the ammunition replenishment budget. The ongoing war effort is further demonstrating a considerable cost asymmetry, with Iran's extensive use of relatively inexpensive drones and missiles forcing the U.S. and its strategic partners to employ highly costly surface-to-air missiles for interception. The asymmetric is also tactical, as Iran’s stockpiles of low cost offensive weapons exceed adversaries’ stocks of interceptors by orders of magnitude.

The depletion of U.S. inventories of anti-ballistic missiles from the AEGIS, THAAD, and Patriot systems, and precision strike missiles such as the Tomahawk and ATACMS, has occurred at a time when the Pentagon is suffering immense strain on its budget, as Cold War era equipment such as E-3 AWACS, KC-135 tankers, and F-15C/D fighters are all urgently in need of replacement. The rapidly advancing capabilities of China’s conventional forces has further made it vital to accelerate the modernisation of U.S. frontline units, particularly in the Pacific, in order to avoid a wide technological disadvantage. Programs such as the F-47 fighter, B-21 bomber, and Block 4 upgrades for the F-35 fighter, have imposed tremendous costs, but are considered vital. The expenditure of tens of billions of dollars worth of munitions, however, may force the Pentagon to choose between replenishing stockpiles, and maintaining funding for modernisation and new weapons programs.

Although French Air Force’s readiness is considered among the foremost in Europe, it has nevertheless long been in well below required levels particularly when compared to the standards of the air forces of other regions. The country’s Rafale fighters integrate the Meteor air-to-air missile as their primary anti-aircraft armaments, which are considered far too costly to be used against single use attack drones. Older MICA radar-guided and Magic II infrared-guided missiles are more likely to have been used, although even these cost 40-60 times as much as Iranian single use attack drones like the Shahed 136, making it highly cost effective for Iran to continue launching strikes using such aircraft. French air units have relatively little experience of air-to-air combat, even for counter drone operations, while French fighters lack the high weapons carrying capacities, long ranges, high speeds, and powerful radars of the U.S. and Israeli F-15s that have been more heavily relied on for such air defence duties.

France is one of multiple NATO members that is directly supporting the U.S.-led offensive against Iran by providing key air defence support, with the United Kingdom and Turkey having also deployed fighter aircraft for this purpose. Iranian drone operations have achieved multiple significant successes, most notably the destruction of $2.7 billion worth of high value radar systems during the first week of engagements, which has severely diminished missile defence capabilities particularly for THAAD systems and for the Israeli anti-missile network in the region. Footage has consistently shown that ballistic missile defence efforts, and particularly those conducted outside Israel, have been highly underwhelming. Single use attack drones such as the Shahed 136 are at the lowest end of the Iranian arsenal of medium range offensive armaments, while ballistic missiles with advanced hypersonic glide vehicles, most notably the Fattah 2 which has been used to strike Israeli targets, are at the top end. Fighter aircraft have no anti-ballistic missile capabilities, and are relied on primarily for attacks on Iran and for air defence against unmanned aircraft.

In December 2025 the Republic of China Army’s 584th Armoured Brigade deployed newly operationalised M1A2 Abrams tanks for battalion-level urban operational readiness and infrastructure protection exercises in the Hsinchu area, a key industrial hub, alongside multiple other armoured vehicle types. Multiple vehicle types formed an armoured column which manoeuvred through roads and urban areas in the city. The Republic of China remains in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China based on the Chinese mainland, with both claiming to be the sole legitimate Chinese governments. The vastly inferior resources of theRepublic of China Armed Forces have resulted in a growing focus on using asymmetric assets including attack drones and mobile ballistic missile and rocket artillery launchers.

The latest training event organised the participating personnel into tactical teams of five, each including a squad leader, deputy squad leader, reconnaissance drone and two operators controlling attack drones.The reconnaissance drone was used first to locate targets before the attack drones were deployed. Reconnaissance drones had longer endurances and more stable flight characteristics, allowing them to be used by each team to conduct an initial search of the operating area to assess the number of adversaries, their positions, and the armaments they fielded. The reconnaissance operator would relay this information to the team leader and higher command authorities to allow attack plans to be made. Attack drones launched both collision strikes and bombing runs.

Although Russian reports regarding how Colombian combatants are recruited remain unconfirmed, it is confirmed that Colombian contractor units have played a significant and growing role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, largely due to severe personnel shortages faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Navarra is reported to have told Russian state media outlet TASS that the document made it clear what official explanations Ukrainian authorities provided to the Colombian government, noting that participation in construction work in Ukraine remained the main pretext for sending combatants to the country. Although providing invaluable and relatively low cost manpower contributions, the large scale use of Colombian combatants has had security risks, with a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) investigation having in July 2025 revealed that drug traffickers in Central and South America were infiltrating Ukrainian Foreign Legion units to gain experience operating first-person view drones.

Large scale Ukrainian casualties have been the primary factor causing the country’s severe personnel shortages, with leaked military files from Ukraine’s Chief of Staff in August 2025 having confirmed that the Armed Forces had lost more than 1.7 million personnel, including both those killed and missing. These included 118,500 personnel killed or missing in 2022, 405,400 in 2023, 595,000 in 2024 and 621,000 by that time in 2025. Commenting on the information, Ukrainian member of parliament Artem Dmytruk reported: “The lists of the missing today contain more than a million people, and of course these people are most likely dead, while their families remain in complete ignorance. The situation is tragic, the situation is frightening.” Casualty rateshave been particularly extreme, at times approaching 80-90 percent, with the Wall Street Journal being among the sources to report that the Ukrainian Army has relied on recruiting poor men from villages and sending them to the frontlines with just two days of training.

Losses among contractor personnel have also been high, with former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov having reported in December 2025 that an estimated 10,000 foreign contractor personnel had been killed in action since February 2022. From 2024 growing numbers of personnel from lower income countries, and particularly from Colombia, Brazil and other Latin American states, have increasingly been relied on on the frontlines. Among NATO member states, contractors from Poland in particular have been deployed in large numbers and played central roles. Warsaw in February took steps to provide further legal protection to the thousands of mercenary contractors who have been deployed to contribute to the war effort. Alongside contractors, NATO member states have also deployed active duty personnel for frontline operations, with the British Royal Marines being among the most notable examples.

North Korean shipyards launched two Choe Hyon class destroyers in 2025, the first in April, with the program revolutionising the ability of the country's surface fleet to conduct far sea operations.The first two Choe Hyon class destroyers each integrate 74 vertical launch cells, compared to 96 on the latest variants of U.S. Navy Alreigh Burke class, although the gap is expected to narrow considerably on subsequent North Korean destroyers, following the recent confirmation of plans to remove their main guns and replace them with more missile launch cells. Chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un earlier in March also confirmed that a larger 8,000 ton destroyer class is currently under development, and represents part of the procurement of 10 more destroyers scheduled over the next five years. These ships are not only 60 percent larger than the Choe Hyon class, but will also lack naval guns, meaning an outstandingly large missile carriage of well over 120 cells is expected.

While diminishing standing of the U.S. shipbuilding industry has been viewed with serious concern, the fact that there were no potential adversary navies other than China procuring advanced destroyers limited the potential risks this posed to U.S. interests in any situation short of a conflict with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. With North Korea and the United States remaining officially in a state of war, however, the prospects of a North Korean blue water naval buildup leading to sustained destroyer operations across much of the Pacific, threatening U.S. warships, supply ships, bases, and possibly even aircraft across the region, could have a serious impact on the regional balance of power. The fact that Choe Hyon class destroyers integrate oversized missile launchers for ballistic missiles, and are confirmed to be intended to deploy nuclear weapons, raises further challenges to the U.S. force posture in the region, with the vessels having demonstrated highly sophisticated capabilities well in advance of Russian and European destroyer designs, and in many respects on par only with U.S., Chinese, Japanese and South Korean destroyers. This reflects a broader trend towards rapid improvements in the standings of North Korean defence products, as evidenced by their often significantly superior capabilities than Russian armaments in the Russian-Ukrainian War.

The Air Force on March 4 issued a sources-sought notice signalling its intention to expand industrial capacity for the SiAW, while specifically identifying the F-47 alongside the F-35, F-16, and the B-21 strategic bomber as a prospective launch platform. The F-47 was conceptualised primarily to be able to counter new generations of Chinese fighter aircraft, most notably the J-20 fifth generation long range air superiority fighter which is currently widely considered by analysts to be the most capable in the world in terms of its air-to-air combat potential. China has since December 2024 unveiled multiple prototypes and flight demonstrators of three entirely separate sixth generation fighter designs, and is expected to begin fielding sixth generation fighters years before the United States can, with conservative assessments indicating a five year lead.

Despite an increase in great power competition, the vast majority of U.S. air operations do not require an advanced air-to-air combat capability, with the integration of the SiAW expected to allow F-47 units to contribute to operations in conflicts other than a major war with an advanced state adversary such as China. The F-47’s expected much longer range, more powerful sensors and electronic warfare systems, and higher weapons carrying capacity than currently operational Western fighter types, may also lead it to be relied on for strike operations in situations where the F-35’s survivability would be insufficient and its endurance too short. The vast distances separating U.S. military facilities from potential targets in the Pacific theatre have raised the possibility of fourth and fifth generation fighters such as the F-35, which have far shorter ranges than their Chinese counterparts such as the J-16 and J-20, struggling to reach their targets.

The introduction of a new Wasp class carrier into the theatre will introduce a number of new capabilities, most notably a significantly improved capability to launch assaults against Iranian territories, most notably Kharg Island, using both MV-22 and landing ships launched from the assault ship’s well deck. While Wasp class ships previously had negligible combat aviation capabilities, with their Harrier attack jets having very short ranges, obsolete sensors, and very limited weaponry, the integration of the F-35B has very considerably improved the air wings’ combat potentials. The aircraft can function as elevated sensors to provide targeting support, contribute to air defence efforts, and launch penetration strikes into Iran. U.S. Marine Corps F-35C fighters are already operating in the theatre against Iran as part of the air wing of the supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln, however, and have significantly longer ranges and higher combat potentials than the F-35B.

Amphibious assault ships are more versatile than traditional aircraft carriers due to their ability to easily switch roles from supporting offensive amphibious landings to performing a defensive anti-submarine warfare mission, or carrying out airstrikes with fixed wing fighters. Their air wings are nevertheless highly constrained in their capabilities compared to the three supercarriers that have already been deployed in the theatre, not only due to the limitations of the F-35B, but also due to the much lower rates at which aircraft can launch and be recovered, and the lack of support aircraft such as EA-18G electronic warfare plans and E-2 AEW&Cs to provide support. The F-35 itself lacks any kind of air-to-ground missiles due to its lack of Block 4 capabilities, which will only be attained in the early 2030s, with the aircraft more likely to be relied on for defensive duties against Iranian missile boats and drones.

A leading potential benefit of amphibious assault ships is that they require considerably less crew and are far less costly, which could allow them to be deployed for higher risk operations close to Iranian territory. Nevertheless, the advanced ballistic missile and drone capabilities which Iran retains are expected to pose challenges that are wholly unprecedented should an amphibious assault be attempted. With Kharg Island serving as the primary avenue for Iranian energy exports,the fact that the U.S. has refrained from destroying key infrastructure there may indicate either an intention to seize it, or an attempt to avoid further escalation of Iranian attacks on high value strategic targets. U.S. attacks on Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal have been somewhat limited in their successes, with Iran having devastated U.S. and allied missile defence radar networks across the Middle East, while critically depleting their anti-ballistic missile stockpiles, and caused unsustainable damage to major bases and to strategic targets in Israel and across the Gulf region.

The United Arab Emirates has imposed strict censorship on the filming, posting, or sharing of footage of Iranian strikes, and has conducted mass arrests of over 50 people for violations. As the footage of the strike on Fujairah was filmed by a sailor on a ship outside the country’s territory, however, it has provided rare insight into the ongoing hostilities from outside Abu Dhabi’s jurisdiction. Although the Patriot was designed to achieve a high probability of kill against ballistic missile attacks by launching just two interceptors, the launch of three interceptors against each incoming Iranian missile despite a major strain on supplies likely indicates an awareness of system’s limited reliability even against relatively basic attacks. The publication of the footage follows the release of less clear footage from Qatar in the initial hours hostilities showing Patriot systems there similarly consistently failing to intercept targets. These attempts similarly saw three interceptors launched against incoming targets.

While the viability of relying on the Patriot system for defence against Iranian short range ballistic missile attacks has long been in question, the trend towards launching three interceptors against each target, even if successful, would further diminish the system’s ability to function for anything more than a very brief conflict. PAC-3 interceptors cost approximately $4-6 million dollars, with export clients in Arab world typically paying closer to $6 million, bringing the cost of each interception attempt against Iranian missiles costing under $400,000 to around $18 million. Iran’s ballistic missile arsenals are also considered orders of magnitude larger than the U.S. and its regional strategic partners’ collective inventories of Patriot interceptors. The U.S. Armed Forces’ own stocks were themselves already severely depleted when the country initiated attacks on Iran on February 28, and were confirmed to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon.

The capabilities of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ region-wide air defence network has been severely diminished, with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps having destroyed the sole AN/FPS-132 radar based outside the U.S., which was located in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars from THAAD systems in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as multiple lower value radar systems. While defences in Israel can depend on a further AN/TPY-2 system in Turkey to track incoming missiles, and have reportedly been bolstered by new U.S. Army THAAD systems redeployed from South Korea, Gulf states located much closer to Iran have had no such protection. The short range ballistic missiles which Iran can use to strike targets in Gulf states are meanwhile significantly more abundant and less costly than those which can be used to strike Israel and U.S. bases in Jordan.

Aside from the depletion of both the radar network and the inventories of interceptors, the capabilities of the Patriot system remain a considerable issue, and have long been cause for controversy. During its sole engagement with Iranian missiles in 2025 to blunt a limited attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Patriot failed to fully protect the facility despite Iranian forces using only lower end Fateh-313 missiles, and in spite of prior warning of the attacks having been provided to the United States to prevent escalation. U.S. officials at first praised the success of U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force Patriot systems, before the release of satellite footage showing the destruction of a radome housing the terminal communications suite forced Pentagon sources to concede that they were not fully successful. Patriot systems were similarly proven to have failed to intercept even relatively basic Yemeni ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2017, and subsequent drone attacks on Saudi oil fields in 2019, among other incidents in a long history of the system’s failures dating back to the early 1990s.

Commenting on and supervising the rocket artillery launch, Chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong-un observed that KN-25 systems will "immediately be used for their second mission as a means of massive, destructive strike" in case deterrents fail to prevent foreign forces from launching an armed provocations against North Korea. The exercises have occurred at a particularly sensitive time as the United States has withdrawn its MIM-104 Patriot and THAAD ballistic missile defence systems from South Korea, leaving U.S. military facilities in the country unprecedentedly exposed. The test occurred less than a month after a new large batch of KN-25 systems including 50 launchers was delivered to the Korean People’s Army in late February. Each of the eight wheeled mobile launch vehicles accommodates five rockets.

Commenting on the KN-25’s capabilities at the time of deliveries in February, Chairman Kim stated that the system “perfectly combines the accuracy and destructive power of tactical ballistic missiles with the firing speed of multiple rocket launchers.” “It uses AI technology and a combined guidance system,” he observed, noting that the system was designed to be able to launch strategic level attacks. The KN-25 is considered by a significant body of analysts to be the world’s longest ranged rocket artillery system, and although the Chinese PCL-191 can engage targets up to 500 kilometres away, it does so using ballistic missiles rather than rockets, with its maximum reported rocket engagement range being 350 kilometres using 370mm rockets. The KN-25, by contrast, has a reported 400 kilometre range.

Months after the KN-25’s introduction into service in 2019, a U.S. Congressional Research Service report highlighted that it “blurs the line between rocket and missile,” and boasted “advanced avionics, inertial and satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures.” The system has highly complementary capabilities to the Korean People’s Army’s short range ballistic missile systems such as the KN-23 and KN-24, which also began flight testing that year. The KN-25 system was previously employed in live fire exercises on January 27, after reportedly having benefitted from significant upgrades. A number of unconfirmed reports have indicated that the KN-25 has been exported to Russia for use in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, with tens of billion of dollars in funding for the North Korean defence sector from arms exports to Russia widely assessed to have been a major facilitator of the considerable expansion of production of key systems like the KN-25.

A report by the Defence Ministry has drawn strong parallels between Iranian strike capabilities, which have proven highly effective against the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air defences, and the projected "multi-wave, multi-missile" aerial threats which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is expected to employ in the event of a new Taiwan Strait war. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China Armed Forces remains officially in a state of civil war, as both Beijing and Taipei claim to be the sole governments of the Chinese nation. The Defence Ministry noted the ongoing development of the “Taiwan Shield,” otherwise known as the T-Dome, to constructed a layered, highly sensitive, and effective interception-based air defence system suitable to counter emerging challenges.

The Defence Ministry has stated that it has established long-range early warning radar and a multi-dimensional surveillance system, and is planning to acquire new mobile radar systems. It is currently planning to procure Tian Kung IV mid-level anti-ballistic missile system developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, alongside U.S. MIM-104 Patriot systems and short range NASAMS system. Regarding low-cost interception methods, the Ministry stated that to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from using large quantities of inexpensive weapons to deplete Republic of China Air Force’s air defence missiles, it will develop and acquire low-cost air defence weapons capable of long-range interception. The Ministry also confirmed plans to introduce high-tech and artificial intelligence battlefield management systems to shorten decisionmaking time and increase system response time.

Further measures announced by the Defence Ministry include simultaneously procurements of passive defences including decoys, false targets, satellite positioning jamming systems, and threat signal generator. The Ministry also outlined plans to pursue international industrial exchanges and cooperation in order to link mature technologies in domestic and foreign commercial markets to improve drone countermeasure capabilities, while adopting small-batch procurement and testing methods to ensure continuous improvements. Despite considerable investments being made in bolstering air and missile defences, the viability of sustaining even a week long defence against the People’s Liberation Army remains in serious question, with the much more limited Iranian missile and drone arsenals having proven highly effective against the combined collective defences of the United States, Israel, and multiple Arab Gulf states. The scale and sophistication of strikes from the Chinese mainland are expected to be very considerably greater, while the Republic of China Armed Forces rely on largely the same U.S.-origin air defence technologies as those deployed in the Middle East.

On March 5 Vice Chairman of the Forward Auxiliary Association Li Wenzhong warned that much of the equipment the Republic of China Defence Ministry is ordering was designed to "fight yesterday instead of tomorrow's war.” RegardingPAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles for Patriot air defence system, he observed that although these were sophisticated and formed the core of the Republic of China’s air defences, theylimited viability against attacks by cruise missiles, guide rockets, and unmanned aircraft, adding that they were outstandingly expensive, particularly when considering that they were designed to be launched in pairs against incoming targets. Such launches were wholly unaffordable and unsustainable against the Chinese mainland’s vast ballistic missile arsenal, with the PAC-3’s cost ensuring that the surface-to-air arsenal would be exhausted quickly.

The ongoing U.S.-led war effort against Iran has drawn further attention to the issue of an expending of anti-ballistic missile stockpiles, with U.S. and Israeli stockpiles having been diminished very rapidly at relatively little cost to Iran, forcing the U.S. to withdraw systems and interceptors from bases across much of the world to replenish its capabilities. The sustainability of this should hostilities continue remains very limited. This has been aside from the issue of the questionable effectiveness of missile defences against even older types of ballistic missiles, with the failures of the Patriot system in the Gulf region having been observed repeatedly, even when large salvos of multiple anti-ballistic missiles are launched. Higher level missile defence systems deployed in Israel have also been filmed repeatedly failing against Iranian strikes launched using hypersonic glide vehicles, a new capability that it did not previously utilise. The People’s Liberation Army’s hypersonic strike capabilities are notably very considerably greater than those of Iran.

Although there have been multiple indications that U.S. forces have been suffering considerable losses, their extent has not being disclosed, losses often only being announced after footage first emerges verifying them. With U.S. military bases in the gulf region having sustained extreme damage from Iranian strikes, U.S. combat aircraft have been forced to operate from bases further afield, increasing reliance on the KC-135 for refuelling support. The relatively short ranges of U.S. and Israeli combat aircraft, with the exception of their relatively small fleets of F-15s the U.S. strategic bomber fleet, further exacerbates this. The U.S. Air Force’s reliance on the KC-135 has remained particularly high due to major issues with the new KC-46 tanker program, including a number of persistent high-level technical deficiencies such as the the malfunctioning of its remote vision system and its refuelling boom, and a history of fuel system leaks. These issues have led the Air Force to suspend procurements in the past. The KC-46’s mission capable rates have also remained outstandingly low.

Although the Air Force’s KC-135 fleet is by far the largest aerial tanker fleet in the world, its age dating back to the Cold War has resulted in low availability rates higher than usual maintenance burden, raising questions regarding whether it could begin to feel serious strain should losses continue. Multiple countries have invested in procuring advanced very long range anti-aircraft targeting capabilities in large part due to the vulnerability of U.S. air operations to the destruction of high value tankers. Examples include the Chinese PL-17 air-to-air missile with a world leading 500 kilometre range, its Russian counterpart the R-37M with a 400 kilometre range, and the Russian 40N6 surface-to-air missile with a 400 kilometre range, which pose asymmetric challenges to U.S. air power. Iran was previously expected to receive the R-37M with its Su-35 fighters later in 2026, although the U.S.-led assault on the country initiated on February 28 may have derailed these plans. This vulnerability has fuelled calls in the United States to develop a successor to the KC-135 and KC-46 with advanced stealth capabilities, although the viability and affordability of this remains in question, particularly when considering the extreme strains on the Air Force’s budget, and the difficulties the defence sector has faced with even the much more conservative KC-46 program.

The carriage of submunitions has multiple benefits, allowing Iranian missiles to overwhelm Israel and the Untied States’ already highly strained missile defences, and engage targets over wider areas. Such missiles were used in only limited numbers when Iran conducted more limited strikes on Israeli targets in June 2025, but have been filmed being used far more frequently during current hostilities which began on February 28. Nevertheless, Iranian missiles carrying hypersonic glide vehicles, namely the Fattah 2, can only carry a single vehicle, with Iran having yet to develop a missile type like the new Russian Oreshnik capable of carrying multiple glide vehicles for launch against multiple separate targets using independently re-targetable warheads. This is likely to be a next step for the country’s defence sector, possibly in cooperation wit North Korea, should current hostilities end in anything other than a total Iranian defeat.

Israel has imposed an extreme censorship regime against filming damage from ballistic missile attacks on the country, with Israeli forces having in the past resorted to jamming commercial satellites from observing its airfields following claims of large scale damage from Iranian strikes. Nevertheless, journalists on the ground have reported that Iranian missile strikes have caused mass damage across major cities, and that missiles with penetrative capabilities, including those with hypersonic glide vehicles, have been able to destroy fortified underground bunkers and shelters which are relied on very heavily both by the armed forces and by the civilian population. Shortages of anti-ballistic missile interceptors, and an inability to cause sufficient damage to the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal on the ground, have been primary challenges for U.S. and Israeli war effort, with the U.S. having withdrawn anti-missile systems from across the world, including strategically located THAAD systems from South Korea, to strengthen defences in Israel.

Beyond Israel, Iranian ballistic missile strikes have reportedly struck at least 17 U.S. military facilities across the Middle East, with an inability to stop damage from missile strikes having reportedly been a primary factor leading the U.S. to attempt to push for a ceasefire. Shortly after the U.S. and Israel initiated hostilities, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps destroyed the sole AN/FPS-132 radar based outside the U.S., which was located in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars from THAAD systems in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as multiple lower value radar systems. This has left Israel and U.S. Army and Navy units protecting Israeli territory heavily reliant on more limited early warning data from radars in Turkey, and from U.S. Air Force E-3 AWACS overflying the region. The destruction of the ground-based radar network outside Turkey and Israel itself was reportedly a force multiplier or Iranian attacks, minimising the time for Israeli personnel and civilians to seek shelter.

Having first been brought into service 12 years ago in March 2014, and six years ago in January 2020, respectively, the Type 052D class and Type 055 class destroyers are already a relatively mature designs, with their overall training procedures being well established. This experience allows ships to rapidly achieve a high combat potential shortly after entering service. As the Xigaze and the Anqing conducted their maiden maritime training together, crews of both ships reportedly trained in operating in formations of several destroyers under the Eastern Theater Command Navy in the East China Sea. The East Sea Fleet recently doubled its fleet of Type 055 class destroyers to four ships, with the vessels widely considered to be the most capable surface combat ships operating anywhere in the world.

The Type 052D is currently being produced on a much larger scale than any other destroyer class in the world, and unlike the Type 055 class, they have been produced near continuously at a high rate since for close to 15 years. Primary weapons for both destroyers classes include the YJ-100 cruise missile with a 1000km ranges, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with Mach 3 terminal speeds and complex sea-skimming trajectories, and YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles. The ships’ multi-layered air defence networks are comprised of HQ-16, HHQ-9, HHQ-10 and DK-10A surface to air missile systems. Each Type 052D and Type 055 class ship integrates 64 and 112 vertical launch cells respectively to accommodate these missiles. Destroyers play a particularly central role in the East China Fleet, which lacks either nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers due to the relatively short distances over which it operates, meaning diesel electronic submarines and land based aircraft have sufficient ranges to support operations.

Seventeen U.S. military facilities are confirmed to have been attacked by Iran since the United States and Israel initiated a military assault against the country on February 28, with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps having quickly achieved the destruction of $2.7 billion worth of high value radar systems. These include the sole AN/FPS-132 radar based outside the U.S., which was located in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars from THAAD systems in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. Air Force deployed the bulk of its global operational E-3 fleet to the Middle East and Europe preceding the initiation of attacks against Iran, with the AWACS carrying the largest airborne radars in the world, and being relied on to control the tactical battlespace using data links to increase the situational awareness of U.S. and allied air defence networks.

The viability of the E-3 fleet has increasingly been called to question, as not only have availability rates fallen sharply after decades of operations, but their radars and other avionics have also increasingly been considered obsolete. This limits situational awareness, particularly against stealth targets such as Iran’s Shahed 191 drones, while also increasing vulnerability to electronic warfare. The Department of War has nevertheless from 2025 sought to cancel plans to procure E-7 systems to replace them, which has been highly controversial as these are considered urgently needed, reflecting extreme strains on the Air Force’s budget. While E-3s were able to maintain a continuous presence around Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, these same aircraft are now much older and fewer in number, with significantly greater efforts required to keep them flyable.

The Royal Australian Air Force was reported on March 11 to have deployed a single E-7 system to the gulf region to help support air defence operations, as a growing number of countries across the Western world have contributed to the war effort against Iran. The U.S. Army has meanwhile withdrawn ground-based air defence systems, including high value radars, from across the world including from strategically critical forward positions in South Korea for redeployment to the Middle East to support air defence operations. U.S. and Israeli forces have also benefitted from considerable early warning data provided by Turkey, which operates a AN/TPY-2 anti-ballistic missile radar at Kurecik Radar Station that was operationalised in 2012 specifically to support NATO and Israeli air defence efforts against Iran and Syria. It is also likely that Turkish S-400 long range air defence systems, which have advanced missile tracking capabilities, have also been used to provide support to U.S. and Israeli air defence efforts.

Successes by Iranian-backed paramiltiary groups in threatening U.S. aircraft are far from unprecedented, with Ansurullah Coalition paramiltiary units in Yemen having demonstrated a considerable capability to adopt innovative tactics when using heat-seeking missiles. This resulted in the losses of multiple modern fighters fielded by the United States’ Arab strategic partners such as Saudi Arabian F-15s and Eurofighters and Moroccan Air Force F-16s, while over ten U.S. Air Force MQ-9 drones were also shot down from late 2023. Multiple near-misses against high value combat jets including F-35s were recorded, with a number of sources crediting Ansurullah Coalition air defence operations with the shootdowns of three U.S. Navy F-18E/F fighters. Some of the missile types reported to have been supplied by Iran to paramilitary groups in both Yemen and Iraq have modern imaging infrared seekers, which integrate microcomputers that can analyse an image of the target to distinguish it from decoys or flares. Infrared-guided systems have no emissions, meaning they cannot be detected and homed in on line radar-guided systems, although they are also restricted to operating over shorter ranges.

A number of unconfirmed reports have attributed the losses of multiple prior U.S. aircraft to Iranian-backed Iraqi paramilitary groups, most notably three F-15E fighters which were filmed crashing just across the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in the initial hours of the the U.S.-led air assault. Although the U.S. Department of War reported that these were shot down by a Kuwaiti F-18 fighter in a friendly fire incident, multiple analysts have highlighted serious inconsistencies, with these claims. The fact that the aircraft showed signs of having been hit by heat seeking missiles has added further credibility to claims by Iraqi paramilitary groups to have been responsible for the shootdowns. For the U.S. and its strategic partners, the destruction of the Iraqi and Syrian governments’ air defence capabilities, and overthrow of the ruling Ba’ath parties in both countries in 2003 and 2024 respectively, were critical to paving the way for the war effort against Iran, ensuring that access to the air spaces of both countries would remain relatively open, with only non-state groups in Iraq contesting U.S. and allied transit over their airspace to attack Iranian targets.

In January 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz confirmed that British special forces on the ground in Ukraine were providing vital support to facilitating launches of Storm Shadow cruise missiles against Russian targets. The United Kingdom approved the use of the missiles to strike targets across Russia in September that year, and that year alongside France played a central role in attempting to lobby the United States to allow U.S.-supplied ATACMS ballistic missiles and other munitions to be used for attacks on internationally recognised Russian territory, rather than solely on targets in disputed regions such as Crimea. The UK and France from October to November that year made major deliveries of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG air launched cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, surging supplies in preparation for renewed strikes on strategic targets deep inside Russia.

The deployment of Western personnel, including both active duty servicemen and contractors, to support the use of complex equipment on the frontlines to target Russian forces in the Ukrainian theatre has been widespread, with the deployment of British personnel to support use of the Storm Shadow being but one example. Russian forces have consistently singled out Western personnel in the theatre due to the disproportionate effects which neutralising them has often had for the war effort. Following the successful targeting the headquarters of predominantly French European contractors in January 2024, for example, which caused at least 80 casualties 60 or more of which were deaths, Russian state media reported that these personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts.” This “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them.

Previously in November 2024, Ambassador Kelin claimed that the first demonstration of Russia’s expanded capability to strike targets across Western Europe using the new Oreshnik hypersonic intermediate range ballistic missile had had a significant impact on British policy, forcing London to take a more cautious approach towards launching joint deep strikes against Russian targets with Ukraine. "Not that they [London's representatives] were scared, but overall they realised that a completely new factor had appeared on the scene - that's the first thing. The second is that we have retaliated for the use of Storm Shadow [long-range cruise missiles] deep inside Russian territory. That's obvious as well. There is a sense that they are being a little more cautious, a little more balanced in their approach to this issue,” he stated.

The British paper The Guardian on March 11 reported that the United States Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Whitkoff had already twice requested a ceasefire from the Iranian state through various channels, with Iran having refused on the basis that the U.S. would likely use the ceasefire to better prepare for a future attack. The United States’ initiation of hostilities on February 28 occurred during negotiations, possibly as part of an effort to lower the Iranian Armed Forces’ guard, while the initiation of twelve days of Israeli attacks with U.S. support on June 13, 2025, were also launched during the middle of negotiations. Senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officer Ali Fadavi himself commented on requests for a ceasefire on March 11, observing: "Since yesterday, Trump has been personally asking to declare a ceasefire. If the enemy were winning the war, he would not be calling on the whole world to mediate to declare a ceasefire." He added: "the Americans should expect new surprises in the coming days."

Commenting on the course of hostilities and Iran’s effective retaliation using its missile arsenal, senior researcher at the Stimson Center Kelly Gricco observed: “This is the first war where the opponent has such capabilities.” The extreme depletion of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ missile defences has been cause for particular concern in the Western world. As observed by analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Mark Cancian: “It's a race - whose ammunition supplies will run out first: ours or Iran’s.” With Iran’s missile arsenals being orders of magnitude larger than what the U.S. and its partners’ interceptor arsenals can provide a defence against, the war effort has depended heavily on the ability to destroy missiles on the ground. According to analysts, in just the first days of the war, the U.S. and its strategic partners are likely to have used more than a thousand PAC-3 interceptors from the MIM-104 Patriot system - a missile type costing $3-4 million which is produced at rates of approximately 500 per year.

The U.S. has withdrawn interceptors and full missile defence systems from across the world, including strategically located Patriot and THAAD systems from South Korea, for redeployment to the Middle East, with these withdrawals escalating following the first days of hostilities. The U.S. began the war with its interceptor arsenals already severely depleted, with approximately 600 interceptors for THAAD systems having been in service in the at the beginning of 2025, of which over 150 were expended during under 12 days of hostilities with Iran in June 2025. Supplies of missiles for Patriot systems were reported in July 2025 to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. Sources cited by CBS News have reported that although the U.S. is aware that several Arab Gulf states are facing severe shortages of anti-ballistic missiles, few steps have been taken to solve this problem. Sources cited by Middle East Eye noted that the U.S. has been refusing requests from some Gulf countries to supply weapons and ammunition to repel Iranian attacks. Considering the importance of U.S. strategic ties with Gulf states, it is likely that this reflects extreme shortages and the prioritisation of existing interceptors for the defence of U.S. and Israeli positions.

Seventeen U.S. military facilities are confirmed to have been attacked by Iran since the beginning of the war, with multiple sites including hotels hosting U.S. personnel having also been targeted, while there have been multiple indications that U.S. force have suffered high casualties. On March 11 the Pentagon estimated the damage from Iranian strikes on the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain cost $200 million, according to officials cited by the New York Times. Following strikes on Ali Al-Salem base in Kuwait, satellite images indicated that at least six buildings or structures related to satellite communications infrastructure have likely been destroyed. A notable success achieved by the Revolutionary Guard Corps was the destruction of $2.7 billion worth of high value radar systems during the first week of engagements with U.S. forces, which has severely diminished missile defence capabilities particularly for THAAD systems and for the Israeli anti-missile network in the region.

While the Choe Hyon is an 5,000 ton destroyer class, an 8,000 ton ship is expected to deploy significantly more firepower, a larger and more powerful sensor suite, and more space onboard to serve as an effective command and control facility, including accommodating larger combat information centres, additional communications centres, and accommodations for staff officers. The ability to carry more fuel, food and other supples also generally allows larger ships to carry out much longer deployments, operating over greater distances with a lower reliance on resupplying at sea. The new larger destroyer may also be able to accommodate a helicopter or launch drones, with the procurement of naval helicopters from Russia, such as the Ka-27, having been widely speculated, improving logistics and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

Larger destroyers generally benefit from greater compartmentalisation, more redundant systems, and more damage control equipment, allowing them to remain operational after absorbing damage in ways that smaller ships cannot. The greater space onboard larger destroyers also provides more room to incorporate new subsystems over time, potentially including additional computing systems, new radars, and directed energy weapons. While Choe Hyon class destroyers each integrate 74 vertical launch cells, it is expected that the new destroyer class will integrate over 110, rivalling the 112 launch cells on Chinese Type 055 class destroyers, which are currently widely considered to be the most capable in the world. The announcement of an 8,000 ton destroyer under development for the Korean People’s Army Navy is particularly significant when considering both the very potent capabilities demonstrated by the lighter Choe Hyon class destroyers, and the near unparalleled scale on which destroyers are to be built.

Chairman Kim earlier in March announced a highly ambitious schedule for destroyer production, under which two destroyers will be launched each year under the next Five Year Plan, allowing the fleet to field 12 destroyers near the beginning of the 2030s. This provided the first indication of plans for larger destroyer class, with all 12 destroyers announced to be either of the Choe Hyon class, or of larger more capable ships. North Korea’s destroyer programs are particularly notable when considering that the country previously fielded no blue water capabilities, with the the Choe Hyon, which was launched in April 2025, being the first which was procured in the Navy’s history. A fleet of 12 destroyers will place the Korean People’s Army Navy ahead of India, which fields 11 destroyers, France which fields ten, Russia which fields nine, and the United Kingdom which fields six, which is particularly notable since even the smaller Choe Hyon class ships integrate more firepower than the vessels of any of these countries.

B-52H and B-1B bombers are not expected to be survivable inside Iranian airspace, but serve as cruise missile carriers to launch strikes from hundreds or even thousands of kilometres beyond the country’s territory. A pair of either type of bomber can delivery the same quantity of firepower as a full fighter squadron. The aircraft have been used extensively for offensive operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, including for strikes on Syrian government targets in 2018, and operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2021. Although Iran has placed orders for Su-35 long range fighters, which integrate R-37M long range air-to-air missiles that were specifically designed to counter strategic bomber attacks, the fact that these fighters have not been delivered limits Iran’s ability to respond to bomber strikes. Iran’s lack of missiles or drones capable of attacking air bases in Western Europe, however, remains the most significant constraint on its ability to respond.

The status of the S-300 system in Belarusian service has for years been uncertain, with the procurement of the new and significantly more capable S-400 system from Russia having raised the possibly that S-300s were retired. Commenting on the S-300’s capabilities, the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade’s commander observed: “This system has proven itself to be very reliable. The equipment is mobile, and its range is sufficient to protect the state border in the airspace.” He added that S-300s will be used in a series of training exercises including for the destruction of aerial targets. Belarus inherited the third largest numbers of S-300 systems after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with only the Russian and Ukrainian arsenals having been larger. Despite their age, Soviet-built S-300PS/PT systems were considered far ahead of their time technologically, and have continued to pose a primary threat to Russian aircraft in the Ukrainian theatre.

The Belarusian Air Force received its first battalion's worth of S-400 systems in 2022, and its second in May 2023, with these significantly increasing the combat potentials of S-300 systems by providing far greater situational awareness to broader ground-based networks. The new systems integrate a wide range of complementary radar systems, including the 30K6E panoramic radar detection system with a 600 kilometre, range and the ability to track up to 300 targets, the 96N6E radar with a 400km range capable of tracking up to 96 targets, and optional additional sensors such as the 96L6 with a 300km detection range and the Protivnik-GE with a 400km range and a specialisation in detecting stealth targets. The delivery of Su-30SM2 fighters, which carry the largest and most powerful radars of any fighter types in Europe, can also serve as elevated sensors. Networking with S-400s and Su-30s can provide invaluable targeting data to S-300 systems, which lack similarly advanced sensors, while reducing vulnerability to jamming.

Following a rise in tensions between Belarus and states across NATO in late 2020, the country emerged as a leading client for Russian air defence equipment, and while procuring multiple battalions of S-400 systems, it also benefitted deployments of the Russian Aerospace Forces own S-400 systems alongside Su-35S air superiority fighters from early 2022. Belarusian S-400 systems have on multiple occasions been deployed for joint exercises with Russian forces, including in May 2022, and more recently in September 2025 as part of the Zapad 2025 joint strategic drills. A major agreement on jointly sustaining the systems was signed in late December. The S-400 was first combat tested in February 2022, and has been assessed by sources in both Russia and the West to have proven highly effective in the Ukrainain theatre. S-400 systems more recently played a central role in the Indian air campaign against Pakistan in May, and was widely credited by figures in the Indian political and military leadership with having neutralised multiple high value assets.

The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence purchased four MQ-9B drones in 2020, and allocated 21.7 billion New Taiwan Dollars ($684 million) from 2022 to 2029 to finance the procurement, averaging over $171 million per aircraft. In its latest budget submission to the legislature, the Air Force stated that the MQ-9B can perform maritime and land target surveillance missions during peacetime, as well as tactical reconnaissance of specific targets. In wartime, its real-time reconnaissance capabilities allow for the immediate transmission of imagery for analysis and use, supporting operations, deterring enemy forces, disrupting operational rhythm and actions, and maximising the effectiveness of defensive operations. The aircraft’s demonstrated very limited survivability against adversaries with far more constrained military capabilities, however, have led to expectations that the aircraft would have very little impact in the event of a new Taiwan Strait war.

The U.S.-led assault on Iran has had significant implications for American defence clients across the world, most notably operators of U.S. air defence systems who have widely been asked to return surface-to-air missiles due to the extreme depletion of U.S. arsenals. South Korea has seen its security particularly seriously affected due to the large scale withdrawals of U.S. guided bomb and Patriot and THAAD air defence systems, with the withdrawal of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in early January also widely speculated to have been related to planned attacks on Iran. Preceding the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Middle East, U.S. arms supplies to multiple clients, most notably Japan and the Republic of China, had faced serious delays, with new data from the Taiwan Arms Sales Backlog Tracker in December revealing that backlogs to the latter had reached over $21.45 billion. In January, the Japanese government Board of Audit revealed that military equipment worth approximately 1.1 trillion yen ($6.9 billion) purchased from the U.S. under the Foreign Military Sales program more than five years ago had yet to be delivered.

Unconfirmed reports from Western sources have indicated that anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the Patriot and THAAD systems had already been withdrawn from South Korea to shore up stocks at Middle Eastern facilities preceding the initiation of attacks on Iran by the United States and Israel on February 28. The decision to make further withdrawal from Korea is an indicator of the extent of losses of key radar and missile defence systems, and the sustained intensity of Iranian counterattacks, which there are multiple indications have significantly exceeded Western expectations. South Korea is the only foreign country that hosts a permanent foreign deployment of U.S. Army THAAD systems, which were initiated in 2016, with the systems’ location so close to Chinese territory having been considered an invaluable strategic asset by the United States.

The THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar has provided the capability to peer almost 3,000 kilometres into Chinese territory, with South Korean security commentator and retired navy captain Yoon Sukjoon referring to it as “part of the U.S.’ global anti-China united front... a strategic tool for containing China from one of the closest countries.” While it appeared likely that the U.S. Army would withdraw only interceptors for THAAD systems to replenish stockpiles in the Middle East, the destruction of two AN/TPY-2 radars in the region have raised the possibly that radars in Korea will also be withdrawn. South Korean sources, including President Lee Jae-myung, have highlighted these withdrawals as an indicator of the necessity of reducing reliance on the United States for security.

The stockpiles of interceptors for THAAD systems are far from sufficient of a sustained conflict with an adversary with advanced ballistic missile capabilities, with only approximately 600 interceptors having been in service in the U.S. Army at the beginning of 2025, of which over 150 were expended during under 12 days of hostilities with Iran from June 13-25, 2025, despite just a single system having been deployed to defend Israel. The deployment of two systems, one in Israel and a second in Jordan, and the far greater intensity of Iranian strikes, has led analysts to estimate that the Army likely has approximately 200 or less interceptors remaining, with a significantly lower figure remaining possible. The withdrawal of almost all remaining interceptors in South Korea thus remains likely. The viability of replenishing these interceptors after hostilities with Iran cease will depend on multiple factors, including the state of the U.S. economy after the war, and the successes the U.S. may or may not have in expanding production of interceptors to replenish wartime expenditures. The consequences for the balance of power in Northeast Asia remain significant, highlighting how the global scale of the U.S. military presence, when combined with significant shortfalls in stockpiles and production capacities, can led to events in one theatre seriously influencing others.

Although cutting edge when first brought into service in 2002, and widely considered the most capable fighters operational anywhere in the world at the time, the capabilities of the Su-30MKI have aged significantly, particularly when compared to the rapid progress made by neighbouring China’s fighter industry, which has allowed even lower end Chinese fighters such as the J-10C to still have highly formidable performances. The R-37M was developed for the Russian MiG-31BM interceptor, but in the early 2020s was integrated on to the Su-35 and Su-57 fighters, with its integration onto the Su-30 subsequently confirmed in 2024. The missile performs most optimally when carried by the MiG-31BM, however, which has by far the highest cruising speed and operational altitude of any tactical combat aircraft in the world, allowing it to impart considerable energy onto the missiles to facilitate a 400 kilometre engagement range.

When integrated onto the Su-30 and Su-35, the R-37M can only be launched from lower speeds and altitudes, and as such has a shorter engagement range estimated at approximately 350 kilometres. This would allow Su-30MKI fighters to shoot down Pakistani targets, in particular high value aircraft such as AEW&Cs, from well beyond the retaliation range of their escorting fighters. Other than the PL-17, which is fielded exclusively by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force, no air force in the world fields a comparably long or longer ranged missile type. Reports of a decision to procure the R-37M have closely coincided with confirmation in late February that the Indian Defence Ministry will proceed with plans to comprehensively upgrade its Su-30MKI fighters with Russian assistance, which will first focus on enhancing 84 of the over 270 fighters that are currently in service.

The decision to procure the R-37M may indicate a perceived greater urgency of increasing the Su-30’s engagement range, as the Indian Air Force was previously expected to acquire a separate type of very long ranged air-to-air missile for the fighter type, which was to be developed by the joint Russian-Indian firm BrahMos that developed the BrahMos cruise missile. This missile was reportedly expected to have particularly long 500 kilometre engagement range, matching the Chinese PL-17. The choice of an older ‘off the shelf’ missile design from Russia could divert funds away from this joint program, but would allow the ranges of Indian fighters to be extended at a much earlier date.

Beyond the Su-30MKI fleet, it is also highly possible that the R-37M missile may be intended for integration onto Indian Air Force Su-57 fifth generation fighters, as talks on the procurement of the aircraft continued to advance. The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks had reached an advanced technical stage, after the Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 reportedly made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the aircraft source code as part of a license production deal. A miniaturised derivative of the R-37M has for years been reported to be under development under the izdeliye 810 program, allowing it to fit in the Su-57’s internal weapons bays, with this potentially set to be marketed to India as a successor to the original missile.

Costing approximately $20,000, the Shahed 136 is prized for its ability to overwhelm hostile air defences, with its cost being under two percent that of UAE Air Force F-16s’ primary air-to-air the AIM-120 missile.The depletion of UAE missile defences, and destruction of key missile defence radars including the THAAD system’s $700 million AN/TPY-2, may have resulted in a greater reliance on fighters to secure the country’s airspace against Iranian strikes. AH-64 Apache attack helicopters have also been deployed for air defence operations against Iranian drone strikes, although their limited speeds restrict their ability to provide an area defence. The apparent attempt by the F-16 over Almamzar Beach to achieve a gun kill may have been a result of orders to conserve supplies of the costly radar guided missiles, with the fighter potentially having already expended its less costly visual range AIM-9 missiles, which cost approximately $800,000 each, to engage other targets.

Attempts to shoot down Shahed 136 drones using guns are far from unprecedented, with Ukrainian Air Force pilots widely reported to have done so, albeit at considerable risk and at times causing fatal accidents, while U.S. Air Force F-15E fighter pilots having done the same after depleting their air-to-air arsenals. The limitations of fighter aircraft in shooting large numbers of low value drones has fuelled a greater interest the integration of new weaponry, included laser guided rocket pods, and possibly eventually directed energy weapons, to provide a more effective means of countering the threat. Although the UAE Air Force fields a very large number of fighters and outstandingly high concentrations of missile defence systems relative to the size of its territory,its struggles to defend its major bases and strategic targets against Iranian strikes has raised serous questions regarding how effectively assets are being employed. While Iran has escalated to use hypersonic glide vehicles against targets in Israel, it has notably refrained from doing so against targets in the United Arab Emirates, possibly because the shorter distances involved make it more practical to saturate defences with low value missiles and drones.

Colonel Dovgach is likely to have been flying one of the Ukrainian Air Force’s last Su-27 long range air superiority fighters, which are one of the two fighter types operated by the 39th Fighter Aviation Brigade alongside a small number of recently donated Mirage 2000s. The unit traces its history back to the Soviet Air Force 894th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which was initially equipped with MiG-29s, but transitioned to operating more capable Su-27s in the early 2000s. The brigade has suffered several combat losses, with multiple pilots killed in action on the first day alone, including Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Vahorovsky and Major Dmytro Kolomiiets, both of whom were posthumously awarded the title Hero of Ukraine. The Su-27 has retained an elite status within the Ukrainian Air Force, with pilots having commented that its combat potential far exceeds those of other fighter types in service including the MiG-29, F-16 and Mirage 2000.

Having been developed as the Soviet Union’s premier air superiority fighter, the Su-27 is particularly prized for its much larger and more powerful radar than other Ukrainian operated fighter types, as well as its far longer range and higher weapons carrying capacity. Although obsolete for air-to-air engagements with Russian fighters, Su-27s remain highly capable for strike operations against Russian targets, and have been extensively modernised with the support of multiple NATO member states to be able to integrate Western-produced guided weapons, as these weapons have been donated to Ukraine as aid. The most significant of these is the AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missile, which homes in on radar emissions, and is considered optimal for strikes on Russian air defence systems.

Ukrainian Su-27s have also been modified to employ ADM-160 MALD decoy missiles, French AASM Hammer precision guided bombs, and U.S. GBU-39 small diameter bombs. To employ these new weapons, the aircraft's internal systems have also been modified, including the integration of a new navigation and information system, a helmet-mounted cuing and indication system, and a new digital processor in the weapons control system. Ukrainian air operations have faced very considerable challenges not only from far more modern Russian ground-based air defences and fighter and interceptor units, but also from strikes on air bases, which have been filmed destroying multiple Su-27s multiple times since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022. While the Ukrainian Air Force was previously the second largest operator of the Su-27 by a significant margin, it is estimated to have only 12-20 of the aircraft still in service.

Serbia inherited a small number of MiG-29 fighters from the Yugoslav Air Force, and received further fighters as aid from Belarus and Russia in the 2000s and 2010s. It is notable that no other fighter types in Europe have integrated air-to-ground missiles capable of operating at hypersonic speeds, including U.S. Air Force fighters deployed to bases across the continent. Although the Russian Aerospace Forces has been reported by local sources in 2025 to have integrated hypersonic air-to-ground missiles, possibly based on the Zircon cruise missile, onto its Su-57 fifth generation fighters, this remains unconfirmed. Serbia’s MiG-29s integrate radars that are several generations behind the cutting edge, which has seriously limited their air-to-air combat potentials, with the integration of the CM-400AKG considerably improving their combat potentials to compensate for their other shortcomings. As missiles are fired using targeting data provided by offboard sensors, the age of the MiG-29’s own radar will not affect performance.

It was previously speculated that the Serbian Defence Ministry may have intended to retire the Air Force’s MiG-29s, as the Ministry was reported in April 2024 to have finalised a deal to procure Rafale fighters from France. Rafales sold to Serbia are to be significantly downgraded, with their primary air-to-air missile type, the Meteor, not being offered to the country. The selection of the Rafale was considered to have been very heavily influenced by political factors and Belgrade’s plans for further integration into the European Union. European pressure has been a primary factor limiting defence procurements from Russia, including procurements of S-300 or S-400 long range air defence systems which were previously planned, and while the country has also faced considerable pressure not to procure Chinese armaments, this is considered a less objectionable decision in Europe due to the much greater intensity of the European Union’s conflict with Russia. The Chinese HQ-22 air defence system was thus selected as an alternative to the S-300 and S-400, representing a major landmark in the previously limited defence ties between the two countries.

The CM-400AKG is reported to have been used by the Pakistan Air Force to strike Indian forces in May 2025, causing multiple casualties, although this remains unconfirmed. When combined with the MiG-29’s ability to take off from short or makeshift airfields, allowing them to disperse and making them highly challenging to neutralise from the air, the missile provides an asymmetric means of challenging NATO forces in the event of a new regional conflict. NATO members have widely recognised the independence of the Kosovo region as a separate state, which is internationally recognised including by the United Nations as part of Serbia, with this territorial dispute being a primary hotspot for potential conflict. The decision to modernise the MiG-29s with the new Chinese missiles indicates that the aircraft are likely to be kept in service for the foreseeable future, and may lead the Serbian Defence Ministry to finance further procurements of the aircraft from Russia’s vast surpluses. The missile’s integration may also attract attention from other operators of the MiG-29, such as Algeria, Myanmar, Belarus, and Turkmenistan, leading them consider a similar procurement from China to enhance their own fighters.

President Lee has made the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States Armed Forces a flagship policy of his administration, aiming to complete the transition before his term ends in 2030. This represents a significant shift toward a more self-reliant South Korean defence posture, although it is a complex, conditions-based process that requires substantial military investment, and one which Washington has indicated reluctance to allow to proceed. Currently, the U.S. Armed Forces retain operational command over the Republic of Korea Armed Forces in the event of war on theKorean Peninsula. The president has stated that a transfer of wartime OPCON is vital to achieve “self-reliant national defence” and overcome a “dependent mindset” on the United States. At a February 2026 military ceremony, Lee stated that true self-reliance in national defence begins only when South Korea recovers wartime OPCON and leads the combined defence posture with the U.S.

President Lee has also linked an OPCON transfer to avoiding entanglement in international disputes, such as the U.S.-China rivalry, arguing that a stronger, autonomous defence capability is essential for South Korea's security. In late 2025, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to accelerate the transfer, aligning with President Lee's pledge. South Korea is widely considered to field by far the most capable military among U.S.-aligned states, which has made command over its forces an invaluable asset for the United States’ strategic position in East Asia. The withdrawals of high value U.S. equipment from the country, and the significant strengthening of local capabilities over the preceding two decades, have strengthened calls for the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to gain independent wartime operational command. The geopolitical implications of such a shift are significant, and could allow South Korea to take a more neutral position in the Sino-U.S. conflict, with China’s position as by far South Korea’s most critical trading partner making alignment against it highly unfavourable for the country’s future economic prospects.

Preceding the latest withdrawals of Patriot long range air defence systems, the U.S. Army between March and October 2025 redeployed two MIM-104 Patriot systems and approximately 500 personnel from South Korea to the Middle East, which reinforced defences at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. South Korean sources revealed on March 5 that over 1,000 guided bomb kits were withdrawn from U.S. military facilities in Korea in mid-December 2025, as part of what analysts have widely interpreted as large scale preparations for the initiation of a military assault against Iran. AH-64 Apache attack helicopters were subsequently withdrawn in January, causing considerable concern domestically. South Korean sources have widely reported that the United States Armed Forces are exploring contingencies for the withdrawal of more high value long range air defence systems, most notably THAAD systems. Such a withdrawal could entail the launch of their interceptor missiles, which are in extremely short supply worldwide, and possibly the withdrawal of launchers and AN/TPY-2 radar systems, after it was confirmed that two of these systems had been destroyed in Iranian strikes.

Israel and the United States initiated a large scale assault against Iran on February 28, with the F-16 having served as the primary workhorse for Israel’s high intensity campaign of air attacks against Iranian targets. Iran has retaliated by launching ballistic missiles to strike strategic targets across Israel, as well as U.S.-linked targets across the Middle East. It is likely that the direct participation of the United States in attacks on Iran from the outset has allowed the new configuration to be used, since the U.S. Air Force deploys a much larger fleet of KC-135 and KC-46 tankers that can provide aerial refuelling support, reducing Israeli fighter units’ reliance on external fuel tanks. The RAMPAGE missile was developed in the mid-late 2010s as a joint project by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Israel Military Industry (IMI) in response to the Israeli Air Force’s requirement to be able to strike targets defended by advanced air defences, most notably those in Syria. The missile was developed as a derivative of the Extended Range Artillery (EXTRA) guided rocket. With an engagement range of 150-220 kilometres, the missile can be delivered from relatively safe distances.

The ability to engage targets from longer ranges has been critical for attacks on targets in both Syria and Iran, with Syrian air defences having proven capable of shooting down Israeli fighters multiple times, although Israel has denied the majority of claimed shootdowns, while Iranian air defences have shot down large numbers of U.S. and Israeli high value drones, which are used for higher risk missions within Iranian airspace. Commenting on the importance of the RAMPAGE missile, director of marketing and business development for IAI’s Malam, Amit Haimovich, observed: “If you take the Middle East arena and areas protected by air-defence systems, the whole point of this missile is that it can hit targets within standoff ranges,” all without threatening the launching aircraft.

Western fighter aircraft have much shorter ranges and lower missile carrying capacities than their average Chinese and Russian counterparts, with even the West’s longest ranged fighter type the F-15 requiring multiple external and conformal fuel tanks to be able to overfly Iran from airbases in Israel. The Su-35 fighters Iran has ordered from Russia, by contrast, could comfortably overfly Israel from Iranian bases with a full weapons load and no external fuel. The F-16 has a significantly shorter range than the F-15, which makes refuelling support and carriage of longer range missile types particularly vital. Carriage of four RAMPAGE missiles could potentially allow each F-16I to strike for separate Iranian targets with each sortie, serving as a force multiplier for the fighter fleet. Missiles have Mach 2 speeds and follow quasi-ballistic trajectories, which makes them more challenging to intercept than most subsonic cruise missiles.

An estimated 95 F-16I fighters are currently in service, with the design being heavily oriented towards air-to-surface roles, rather than air-to-air combat, and using conformal fuel tanks to extend their ranges. Their dorsal avionics compartmentsintegrate predominantly indigenous avionics including computers, processors and interfaces produced by Elbit systems and communications systems produced by Rafael. The fighter’s Elisra electronic warfare suite includes radar warning receivers, missiles approach warners and jamming systems, making the aircraft optimal for air defence suppression operations. The extra weight from this fuel and additional avionics, however, has resulted in a significantly poorer flight performance than most other F-16 variants. The fighters have benefitted from support from F-35I fifth generation fighters, which although themselves incapable of firing air-to-surface missiles, integrate much more advanced sensors including passive electronic sensors that can detect adversary radar emissions and provide early warning of potential targeting by Iranian ground-based air defences.

The importance of the Cheongung-II system, otherwise known as the KM-SAM, has grown as the UAE’s U.S.-supplied THAAD and MIM-104 Patriot anti-ballistic missile systems has been assessed to be running extremely short of surface-to-air interceptors, while the system’s sole radar, the AN/TPY-2, has been destroyed by Iranian strikes. Iran began to launch missile and drone attacks on targets in the United Arab Emirates after the country’s territory was used by the United States as a staging ground to attack Iran, as part of a campaign which killed the country’s supreme leader and had devastated both civilian and military targets across the country. The Cheongung-II uses both indigenous and Russian technologies, and was developed with extensive support from the Russian firms Almaz-Antey and Fakel based on their experience with the S-400 and S-350 systems.

The United Arab Emirates agreed to procure ten Cheongung-II medium-range surface-to-air missile batteries under a landmark US$3.5 billion contract signed in 2022, with Abu Dhabi having recently requested immediate replenishment of interceptor missiles after stocks were heavily depleted when repelling Iranian strikes. South Korea’s compliance with the request is expected to both strengthen its strategic partners, and also place it in a stronger position to market the Cheongung-II abroad in future to gain further contracts. It is notable that South Korea is the only country that is able to delivery high performing NATO-compatible air defences on such short notice, with European states’ own systems having very limited capabilities, while U.S. systems have seen stockpiles severely depleted primarily due to operations in the Middle East, but also due to large scale donations to Ukraine in preceding years.

The dispatching of interceptors from the Cheongung-II system to the United Arab Emirates has occurred as the United States has itself withdrawn MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems from the country, while considering making withdrawals of THAAD systems or their interceptors as well, thus potentially compromising local defences. The Cheongung-II has been valued on international markets for allowing Western-aligned clients to acquire advanced Russian air and missile defence technologies without risking being targeted by Western political or economic pressure, including threats of sanctions which the United States has made against clients that acquire high value Russian air defence systems directly. Russia began to make extensive transfers of defence technologies to South Korea after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while simultaneously cutting off North Korea and Iran from arms supplies as part of its geopolitical reorientation towards the Western world in the 1990s and 2000s. Although relations between Moscow and Seoul deteriorated from 2022, South Korea has taken a less hardline position over the Russian-Ukrainian War than Japan or Western Bloc states, leaving potential for further joint weapons programs and technology transfers in future.

During prior U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran from June 13-25, the Turkish Kurecik Radar Station in the country’s Malatya province played an important role in supporting Israeli missile defence efforts to block Iran’s retaliatory ballistic missile attacks. Iranian state media outlet Press TV cited officials stating on this basis that Turkey was “spying on Iran for Zionist [Israel’s] interests.” The AN/TPY-2 radar systems at the facility in question were installed by U.S. military personnel in the early 2010s, allowing it to open it 2012. While Iran has successfully targeted and destroyed AN/TPY-2 radars positioned in both Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as an even higher value AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, the AN/TPY-2 in Turkey has yet to be targeted, possibly due to a perceived need to avoid bringing Turkey more directly into the conflict.

Preceding the initiation of direct attacks against Iran in 2025, Turkey played a primary role in the wider U.S. campaign against Iran through sustained attacks and support for jihadist paramilitary forces against Iran’s primary security partner Syria, resulting in the state’s collapse in December 2024 after close to 14 years of hostilities. During clashes between Israel and Iranian-backed paramilitary groups from 2023-2024, Turkey also served as a vital supplier of oil to Israel. Preceding this, illegal Turkish procurements of Iraqi oil through Ankara’s ties to the Islamic State terror group in the 2010s had also resulted in much of this being sold on to Israel. As the United States and Israel have faced growing setbacks in their campaign against Iran, the possibility of Turkey and other NATO members intervening more directly, including by launching strikes on Iran with their own forces or providing basing rights for sorties to be flown against Iranian targets, remain significant.

The Swiss Air Force announced the result of its tender to acquire a new generation of fighter aircraft on June 30, 2021, with the F-35A having been selected to replace the F-5E/F and F-18C/D lightweight jets. As the only fifth generation fighter in production in the Western world, the F-35 has won every tender in which it has competed by overwhelming margins, with its success in Switzerland closely following that in Belgium, and preceding further major successes in Finnish and Canadian tenders. In October 2023 it was confirmed that the Swiss Defence Ministry would spend over $330 million to modernise multiple airfields to accommodate the new fighters, with new infrastructure set to be built at bases of Payerne near Geneva, Meiringen near Interlaken and Emmen in the canton of Lucerne in central Switzerland.

With the dimensions of the F-35A being comparable to those of the F-18, many of the existing facilities can be reused for the new aircraft which has reportedly reduced costs significantly. Nevertheless, training infrastructure, technical installations and security devices, have all required significant changes. Preparations to transition from F-18 to F-35 operations are expected to be far from straightforward, with the F-35’s maintenance requirements far exceeding those of its predecessor, resulting in much lower availability rates. The F-35’s selection has been criticised domestically for compromising Swiss neutrality, since the aircraft are very closely networked with those of the U.S. Armed Forces and other foreign operators, including using a common globe spanning logistics system, while the autonomy of foreign operators remains highly limited.

The ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to remotely disable F-35s fielded by the aircraft’s foreign operators, likely using the fighter’s highly centralised ALIS and ODIN logistics systems, has been viewed with concern by a number of foreign operators. While Dutch Defence Minister Gijs Tuinman in mid-February stated that there was an option for foreign operators to ‘crack’ its code, making it accept third party software against the restrictions imposed by its developer Lockheed Martin, the viability of this remains highly questionable. This limited autonomy has fuelled considerable criticism of the decision to procure the F-35 domestically in Switzerland. Nevertheless, the F-35’s vast performance advantages over rival fighter types, and particularly European fighters such as the Eurofighter and Rafale, have led clients to accept more limited autonomy in exchange for a vastly superior combat potential. Europe’s much more limited technological and industrial bases have made the development of a similarly capable fighter appear far from viable for the foreseeable future, particularly as the F-35 will continue to benefit from rapid incremental modernisation.

The withdrawal of Patriot systems from South Korea represent part of a broader trend of the U.S. presence in the country appearing to be deprioritised, with AH-64 Apache helicopters having been withdrawn in January, while the withdrawal of THAAD missile defence systems is reportedly also under consideration. South Korea is the only foreign country that hosts a permanent foreign deployment of U.S. Army THAAD systems, which were initiated in 2016 primarily to provide cueing data against Chinese ballistic missile launches. The global arsenal of THAAD systems has come increasingly under strain, however, with two AN/TPY-2 radars having been destroyed in Iranian strikes, seriously limiting their effectiveness. The U.S. Army also expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system during twelve days of hostilities in June 2025, representing over 25 percent of its, total global arsenal, which is estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion. Further depletion of interceptors in recent clashes with Iran, which have been significantly more intense, is likely to create pressures to withdrawn them from elsewhere in the world including from South Korea, even if the launchers, radars, and command posts themselves remain in place.

Reports from multiple Western sources have indicated that the U.S. Army has expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems during the first five days of hostilities with Iran, exceeding the total estimated number of Patriot interceptors launched throughout the entire Russian-Ukrainian War, in which the system has been operated for close to three years. Patriot interceptors cost approximately $3 million each, with costs varying depending on the types of interceptors in use, meaning that engaging Iranian missiles using the systems in five days cost an estimated $2.4 billion. The very large size of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal has left the Patriot’s ability to provide a sustained defence in serious question, with the system’s reliability against even more basic Iranian strikes having also proven to be questionable on multiple occasions. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is the primary facility to which U.S. Army Patriots were forward deployed, was shown in satellite footage to have taken major damage from Iranian ballistic missile strikes, after footage showed the Patriots failing to hit their targets.

Highlighting the growing consensus regarding the Patriot’s limitations to provide a defence against large ballistic missile arsenals, Vice Chairman of the Republic of China Forward Auxiliary Association Li Wenzhong recently observed that that surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot system were outstandingly expensive, particularly when considering that they were designed to be launched in pairs against incoming targets. Such launches were wholly unaffordable and unsustainable against the Chinese mainland’s vast ballistic missile arsenal, he noted, with the PAC-3’s cost ensuring that the surface-to-air arsenal would be exhausted quickly. This issue similarly affects the arsenal in South Korea, which is not only likely to be easily overwhelmed by North Korean missile strikes in the event of war, but would also suffer from an inability to intercept hypersonic missile attacks that a significant number of new North Korean missile types are capable of launching.

The Eastern Theatre Command Navy currently fields 20 destroyers, including two Type 055 class and 10 Type 052D class ships, and eight older vessels including four Type 052C class air defence class destroyers and four Sovremenny class destroyers. Chinese shipyards are currently producing destroyers at by far the fastest rates in the world, with six to ten destroyers being built per year, including the commissioning of seven Type 052D class ships into service in 2025. U.S. shipyards, by contrast, have produced destroyers at rates of just 1.6 per year, allowing China’s destroyer fleet to rapidly close the gap in numbers, as shipbuilding shortfalls in the United States have hindered efforts to expand production. Compared to the Type 052D, the Type 055 integrates a much larger and more powerful sensor suite, including a dual band radar system similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer, providing a particularly high degree of situational awareness including over-the-horizon detection capabilities. The Type 055’s firepower is also considerably greater, with 112 vertical launch cells integrated compared to just 64 on the Type 052D class.

The first Type 055 class destroyer, the Nanchang, was commissioned into service on January 12, 2020, while the last of eight ships in the first production batch was launched on August 30 that year. This eighth ship, the Xianyang was commissioned into service in April 2023. The second batch has consisted of just two destroyers. The deployment of four Type 055 class destroyers under the Eastern Theatre Command Navy would provide one of the most advanced destroyer capabilities of any fleet in the world, with capabilities that are highly complementary to the other warships and aviation assets in the region. A shortcoming of concentrating 40 percent of Type 055 class ships under the command, however, is that there will be less of the ships to serve as escorts for aircraft carriers under the Northern Theatre Command Navy and Southern Theatre Command Navy.

Type 055 destroyers from the second production batch are speculated to have integrated new turbo-generators, which were reportedly developed by the 704 Research Institute of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation. These would provide significantly greater power levels, potentially better facilitating the integration of directed energy weapons. Chinese state media outlets in December 2025 for the first time published live footage of a YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile in flight following its launch from the Type 055 class destroyer Wuxi, after the new missile was first confirmed to have begun flight testing at sea in April 2022. This provided a revolutionary improvement to the Type 055 class’s already world leading firepower. It remains uncertain whether further batches of Type 055 class ships will enter service, whether a new variant possibly designated the Type 055A will be developed, or whether shipyards will transition to producing a new class of heavy destroyer. The Type 055 class is already widely considered to be the world’s most capable class of surface combatant.

Commenting on the T-72’s performance in the Russian-Ukrainain War from 2022, and the multiple efforts made to customise the vehicle, Rostec observed: "During the special military operation, about 200 different modifications were made to the T-72’s design, aimed at increasing its power, protection, and mobility. However, the upgrading potential is far from depleted.” The corporation stressed that the T-72 is the most used and most combat tested type of main battle tank serving anywhere in the world, adding: “It is not only a tank, but also a highly protected tracked platform for an entire family of special-purpose vehicles: the Buratino and Solntsepek heavy flamethrower systems (TOS), the MTU-72 bridge layer, the BREM-1 maintenance and evacuation armoured vehicle, the IMR-2 military engineering vehicle, etc.”

A major milestone in the T-72’s modernisation was the development of the T-72B variant, which first entered service in 1985, and incorporated many features from the newer T-80 tank including a laser rangefinder and much improved armour protection levels. After the USSR’s disintegration, the further enhanced T-72BU variant was redesigned as the T-90 for marketing purposes, with the vehicle today remaining in production at Uralvagonzavod at a higher rate than any other tank type in the world. Although the T-90 represented only a conservative improvement over the late Soviet era T-80UK, and in many respects was less capable with its mobility being far poorer, the new T-90M variant brought into service in early 2020 marked a further major landmark in the evolution of the T-72 design. The tank’s 2A46M-5 125mm smoothbore gun and Kalina fire control system allow it to deploy the wide range specialised munitions, some of which began to be seen in Ukraine in early 2023, while its survivability benefits from the integration of Relikt explosive reactive armour as well as isolation of munitions from the remainder of the vehicle internally.

The T-90M’s capabilities improved significantly since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in Ukraine, with a notable example being the integration of Russia’s first hard kill active protection system, Arena-M, from late 2024. It was confirmed in early January that a new variant of the Arena-M system capable of intercepting single use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development. Production of T-90 tanks has increased rapidly from approximately 90-110 tanks per year in 2020-2021, to an estimated output of 280-300 tanks in 2024, and approximately 400 in 2025.In parallel to the modernisation of the T-90M, the very large inventories of T-72 tanks which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union have continued to be enhanced, primarily by bringing them up to the T-72B3M standard with the integration of third generation thermal sights, Relikt explosive reactive armour, and modern communications and data sharing systems, and the 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun, among other upgrades.

From late 2022 further armour enhancement to the T-72B3M, which mirrored that made to the T-90M, began to be seen on frontline units, as the rate of modernisation of T-72s increased significantly to respond to wartime attrition. Some sources informally referred to this as the T-72B4. From late 2024, T-72B3 tanks also began to integrate hard kill active protection systems in parallel to the integration of such systems onto the T-90M fleet. The firepower of the T-72B3 gained particular attention in the Ukrainian theatre when, shortly after U.S.-supplied M1 Abrams tanks were first deployed for combat operations, one of the enhanced Russian tanks became the first in the world to frontally penetrate it in a tank-on-tank engagement in early 2024. While the T-72 and T-90 were previously expected to be phased out of service from the late 2020s as the T-14 next generation tank was brought into service, failure to complete the program has resulted in continued importance being attributed to enhancing the older Soviet design with the latest available technologies.

Chairman Kim announced that the launch of two surface combatants of the Choe Hyon class, or of larger more capable ships, are planned for every year during the new five-year plan. With two Choe Hyon class ships already in the water, this will bring the fleet up to 12 destroyers, which assuming a year of sea trials for each ship places the Navy on schedule to operate all 12 by 2032. To place this in perspective, only four countries in the world field 12 or more destroyers, with the United States fielding approximately 73, China 57, Japan 40, and South Korea 13. A fleet of 12 destroyers would place the Korean People’s Army Navy ahead of India, which fields 11 destroyers, France which fields ten, Russia which fields nine, and the United Kingdom which fields six. For a country which fielded no ocean going surface combat ships before 2025, this represents one of the most significant buildups in naval history.

North Korea’s fielding of a fleet of twelve destroyers is particularly significant when considering the advanced capabilities of the Choe Hyon class, and the very limited capabilities of the destroyers in many rival fleets. Russia, for example, has laid down no surface combat ships larger than a frigate for its own navy since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and although its destroyer fleet has been extensively modernised, the ships carry less firepower and have significantly older designs that are less stealthy and efficient than more modern vessels fielded abroad. France and the United Kingdom, meanwhile, field ships with very limited capabilities, integrating just 48 vertical launch cells each, and lacking the versatile multirole capabilities seen on destroyers built in the U.S., China, Japan and the Koreas. British ships in particular suffer from very significant reliability issues not seen in the destroyer fleets of other countries, other than the U.S. Navy’s three Zumwalt class ships.

Choe Hyon class destroyers each integrate 74 vertical launch cells, compared to 96 on the U.S. Navy Alreigh Burke class, 80 on the Zumwalt class, 64 on the Chinese Type 052D class, and 64 on the Russian Udaloy class. The North Korean ships’ firepower is greater than the number of missile cells alone would indicate, however, with 20 much of their 74 cells being much larger and accommodating high diameter ballistic missiles. The ships deploy a wide range of missile types including Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, Hwasal-2 cruise missiles, possibly Kumsong-3 anti-ship cruise missiles, and long range surface-to-air missiles thought to be derived from those of the Pyongae 6 air defence system. The ships are reported to also integrate a hypersonic cruise missile type, possibly of similar design to the Russian Zircon. Each Choe Hyon class destroyer also integrates two dual torpedo tubes integrated into the superstructure and a bow sonar system. Their firepower and carriage of nuclear weapons makes them a potentially highly potent force in the Pacific, posing new challenges to the U.S. Armed Forces with which North Korea remains in a state of war.

While several countries have announced ambitious naval programs in the past, only to consistently failed to live up to them, with Russia and the United Kingdom being leading examples, North Korea, much like neighbouring China and South Korea, has consistently lived up to its officials’ projections for its military modernisation. When the country launched its second Choe Hyon class destroyer, the Kang Kon, during a ceremony at Rason port on May 22, 2025, an accident resulted in the ship falling on its side, leadingWestern analysts to near unanimously predict that the vessel could not be relaunched on the highly ambitious schedule set by the Korean Workers’ Party. Concerted efforts, however, allowed it to be relaunched just 22 days later on June 13, which was a particularly outstanding feat. With Chairman Kim having framed the country’s destroyer program as part of efforts to “correctly implement the gigantic plan of increasing the fighting strength of surface warships,” the Korean People’s Army Navy’s emergence as one of the world’s leading ocean going forces will align with broader trends towards a rise in North Korea’s status as a world power. This trend been observed with considerable concern by the U.S. Department of War.

While Iranian officials claimed that 500 U.S. personnel had been killed as early as March 4, just four days after U.S. and Israeli attacks led Iranian forces to strike adversary targets across the Middle East, U.S. sources have not disclosed a high number of casualties. Iranian-aligned Iraqi paramilitary groups have also claimed causing over 100 U.S. casualties by striking major hotels and other facilities hosting them. It is notablethat a prior very limited Iranian strike on a single U.S. military facility in Iraq on January 8, 2020, for which the U.S. had been given significant prior warning, first saw very limited casualties reported, before Pentagon estimates steadily rose from under 30 to over 60, and finally in mid-February that year to 109 personnel. The wholly unprecedented scale of missile and drone attacks by Iranian forces on U.S. military facilities since February 28, 2026, including hotels and other civilian buildings where U.S. personnel are reported to be staying across much of the Gulf region, has fuelled expectations of very high casualties, with the pressure on medical services in Germany indicating that losses have indeed been severe.

The DF-17 is estimated to have a 900 kilometre engagement range, and has reportedly seen variants brought into service capable of carrying penetrative ‘bunker buster’ warheads. The ability of hypersonic glide vehicles to penetrate deep and very well hardened fortifications has been demonstrated by both the Russian Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine, and more recently by an Iranian hypersonic missile, likely the Fattah-2, against Israel. This could be of particular value to strike U.S. military facilities in Japan and South Korea, and Republic of China Armed Forces targets across the Taiwan Strait. The ability of hypersonic glide vehicles to manoeuvre in both pitch and yaw, and to maintain extreme speeds in their terminal phases, makes them effectively impossible to intercept. This may be particularly useful in the Taiwan Strait, where U.S.-supplied air defence systems are heavily concentrated.

In January 2021 the DF-17 was revealed to have a new launch vehicle using an integrated cover that enclosed the missile. This could help the missile disguise itself and could also shield it from harsh terrain in sub-freezing or desert climates. Since the missile’s development, China’s defence sector has continued to increasingly lead the world in hypersonic glide vehicle technologies, with Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten having warned in November 2021 regarding a test of a much longer range strategic glide vehicle: “They launched a long-range missile. It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” He stressed that the vehicle had shown that it could strike targets accurately anywhere in the world, and that this was highly concerning for U.S. interests. In December 2025 Pentagon provided new insight into how the China’s hypersonic missile arsenal could be used to sink even the newest and most capable U.S. Navy carrier groups, with the leaked Overmatch Brief highlighting how the very major losses of U.S. ships to these arsenals were expected in the event of war.

The AN/FPS-132 is relied on heavily to provide cueing data to missile defence systems, as well as early warning to allow personnel and civilians to find shelter. Each radar costs an estimated $1.1 billion, with U.S. sources estimating that it will take five to eight years to replace the one destroyed. The sole radar of its kind in outside the United States first became operational in Qatar in 2013, with the specific purpose of countering the Iranian and Syrian ballistic missile arsenals, the latter which was neutralised after the government in Damascus was toppled in December 2024. Despite general efforts to downplay the successes of Iranian strikes, reporting by U.S. sources has indicated the the destruction of the AN/FPS-132 on February 28 degraded missile-warning capabilities in the region because such radars are rare and hard to replace. The fact that the system was singled out and prioritised for targeting in the opening hours of hostilities indicated that doing so may well have been seen as a force multiplier for subsequent ballistic missile attacks.

Beyond the AN/FPS-132, Iranian forces have also destroyed two AN/TPY-2 X-band mobile radar system from the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, including one fielded by the U.S. Army at Muwafak Salti Air Base in Jordan, and another fielded by the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. Only 15 of these radars are estimated to exist worldwide, the large majority of which are part of THAAD systems. Cost estimates for the AN/TPY-2 have ranged from $550 million to $1 billion, possibly depending on its configuration and support packages, making it the most most valuable air defence radar operated by the U.S. Army. Assuming a cost $800 million per radar, this would place the cost of losing the two, when added to the cost o losing the even more scarce AN/FPS-132, at approximately $2.7 billion.

Western air defence systems including THAAD rely on just a single radar, and thus without the AN/TPY-2 a THAAD battery cannot independently search for or track targets. Although the systems can still fire interceptors using data from external sensors, they do so with significantly lower external coverage, under certain specific conditions, and with much reduced effectiveness. This contrasts to Russian air defence systems such as the S-400, which deploy multiple complementary radar types often reaching half a dozen, allowing them to remain operational and maintain high degrees of situational awareness even if a single long range radar is destroyed, as seen in the Ukrainian theatre.

Ballistic missile defence has been a leading cost for the U.S. Armed Forces in its campaigns against Iran, with the use of THAAD from June 13-25, 2025, alone having seen over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the system expended to intercept Iranian ballistic missile attacks, which is estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion, with missile costing approximately $15.5 million each. This depleted over 25 percent of its the Army’s global arsenal of THAAD interceptors. Due to the much higher intensity of Iranian missile strikes from February 28, and the pre-positioning of a greater number of interceptors in the Middle East, it is estimated that the expenditure of interceptors was significantly greater in the first week of hostilities from February 28 than it was in the preceding 12 days of hostilities in June 2025. Assuming the same missile expenditures as the previous period of hostilities, although it is likely far higher, this would bring costs inflicted by Iran for operations of THAAD and the AN/FPS-132 alone to over $5 billion at aconservative estimate in less than a week of hostilities.

Although observing that a more advanced air defence capability was invaluable for morale, Vice Chairman Li noted that surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot system were outstandingly expensive, particularly when considering that they were designed to be launched in pairs against incoming targets. Such launches were wholly unaffordable and unsustainable against the Chinese mainland’s vast ballistic missile arsenal, with the PAC-3’s cost ensuring that the surface-to-air arsenal would be exhausted quickly. Returning to the M109A7 self-propelled howitzer, Li noted that it would be deployed in the hills to the west of Taiwan Island, but its unit price was too high and speed too slow, leaving it potentially highly valuable to drone attacks.

While criticising the procurement of PAC-3 missiles, M109 howitzers and M1A2 Abrams tanks, Li praised the decision to procure HIMARS rocket artillery systems, highlighting their high sophistication and the fact that their capabilities had been verified in actual combat. He singled out the system’s ability to launch ATACMS ballistic missiles with 300 kilometre ranges as being of particular high value due to its ability to strike high value targets across the Taiwan Strait, and stated that in future the Republic of China Armed Forces should strike to field a multi-warhead missile type with a longer 500 kilometre range. ATACMS gained greater attention from early February after it was confirmed that the Republic of China Armed Forces would forward deploy the missiles to the islands of Penghu and Dongyin, and allowing the establishment of a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre with the U.S. in late January which would allow U.S. personnel permanently stationed in Taipei to oversee planning and potential use of local missile forces.

The U.S. has responded to the shortcomings of both the Patriot system and the Abram tank, which were demonstrated clearly in the Ukrainian theatre, by initiating the development of deeply revised new variants. The U.S. Army in December 2025 confirmed plans to develop a new variant of the Patriot, which will gain a 360 degree targeting capability that Russian, Chinese and North Korean systems have long had. This appears to be the most revolutionary upgrade since the system first entered service in 1981, and follows the demonstrated vulnerability of the Patriot to Russian missile attacks. The Army has also cancelled plans for further modernisation of the M1A2 to deeply revise the Abrams design, instead financing the development of the M1E3 Abrams next generation variant, the first images of which were released in mid-January 2026. By early June 2025 the Ukrainian Army was assessed to have lost 87 percent of theAbrams tanks it had been supplied, despite prior Western expectations that the vehicles could represent a game changer in the theatre, which was considered a key factor stimulating this change.

Chinese commercial satellite imagery from the MizarVision satellite company first confirmed the deployment of a U.S. Army THAAD system at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in mid-February, as part of a much broader military buildup intended prepare for the initiation of a U.S. and Israeli assault against Iran on February 28. Unlike Russian air defence systems such as the S-400, which deploy multiple complementary radar types often reaching half a dozen, Western air defence systems including THAAD rely on just a single radar. Thus without the AN/TPY-2, a THAAD battery cannot independently search for or track targets. It can still fire interceptors, but only under certain conditions and with much reduced effectiveness, namely by relying on external sensors, which significantly educes external coverage.

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is expected to continue to target key air defence radars operated by the U.S. and its strategic partners across the Middle East, which the United States may struggle to replenish. The redeployment of THAAD systems from South Korea, the only location in the world where permanent foreign deployments have been made, are underway, with the systems otherwise already being heavily concentrated in Jordan and Israel. Cost estimates for the AN/TPY-2 have ranged from $550 million to $1 billion, which may depend on its configuration and support packages, making it the most most valuable air defence radar operated by the U.S. Army. The fact that the radar was reportedly destroyed by single use attack drones, which costs approximately $20,000-60,000 dollars depending on the model, highlights a major point of vulnerability in U.S. missile defence capabilities.

The U.S. Army currently deploys just eight THAAD systems worldwide, which first saw high intensity combat test from June 13-25, 2025, after Israel launched high intensity attacks on the country. The U.S. Army expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system to intercept Iranian ballistic missile attacks during the 12 day conflict, depleting over 25 percent of its total global arsenal. Each THAAD interceptor launch costs approximately $15.5 million, with the defence of Israeli airspace using these systems for 11 days is conservatively estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion. The much higher intensity of Iranian strikes since the country was attacked on February 28, 2026, is likely to have depleted the interceptor arsenal considerably faster, which presents a further significant and long term challenge to U.S. missile defence efforts beyond the destruction of radar systems.

The confirmation of the withdrawal of a large number of bomb guidance kits from South Korea has occurred at a time when talks are actively underway to also withdraw MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems for redeployment to the Middle East. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun on March 6 confirmed U.S. and South Korean militaries are discussing the possible redeployment of some U.S. Army MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems based in South Korea to be used in the war against Iran. U.S. Forces Korea declined to comment. Such redeployments would be far from unprecedented, with the U.S. Army between March and October 2025 having redeployed two MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems systems and approximately 500 personnel from South Korea to the Middle East. The U.S. was in January also confirmed to have withdrawn its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from South Korea, causing considerable concern within the country.

South Korean sources have widely reported that the United States Armed Forces are exploring contingencies for the withdrawal of high value long range air defence systems or redeployment to the Middle East, including not only Patriot, but also the more scarce and higher value THAAD system. South Korea is the only foreign country that hosts a permanent foreign deployment of U.S. Army THAAD systems, which were initiated in 2016. Although it is more likely that the U.S. Army will withdraw only interceptors for THAAD systems to replenish stockpiles in the Middle East, the confirmed destruction of radars, and possible destruction of command posts, or launchers by Iranian forces, could result in these being replaced by subsystems in South Korea. The U.S. Armed Forces field only eight THAAD systems worldwide, several of which have been concentrated in Israel and Jordan.

The withdrawal of U.S. armaments has occurred as North Korea has continued to pursue comprehensive modernisation of its armed forces and defence sector capabilities at historically wholly unprecedented rates, with the capabilities of all parts of its forces, other than its fighter fleet, having been totally revolutionised. An assessment by the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency in mid-2025 concluded that North Korea has reached its “strongest strategic position” in decades, elaborating that the country was confident in “possessing the military means to hold at risk U.S. forces and U.S. allies in Northeast Asia while continuing to improve its capability to threaten the U.S. homeland.” With the United States having initiated no comparable modernisation of its forces in Korea, the balance of power on the peninsula has become increasingly unfavourable for Washington’s interests. The withdrawals of equipment are also occurring at a time of renewed ties between South Korea and China following the landslide election of President Lee Jae-myung on June 3, 2025, who has repeatedly cautioned against tightly aligning with Washington against Beijing or Moscow, and previously criticised THAAD deployments in Korea for derailing ties with China.

The survivability of U.S. carrier groups in the Middle East remains highly uncertain, with a significant possibility remaining that Iran is capable of targeting them highly effectively using a considerable arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles. Iran’s demonstration of hypersonic glide vehicle strike capabilities for the first time during the conflict to destroy high value targets in Israel may be particularly problematic for carrier groups. Nevertheless, it is expected that causing critical damage to a carrier would mark a point of no return in the conflict, fuelling demand in the United States for a more total victory and ending the possibility of a negotiated settlement - a possibility which is currently seen by analysts to still remain. As Iran’s definition of victory may be limited to its survival, it may be deterred from striking carrier groups.

After having departed its home port at Naval Station Norfolk near the beginning of the year, the USS George H. W. Bush has been operating in the Western Atlantic Ocean, conducting training and readiness operations with its carrier strike group. The carrier usually deploys 40–44 F-18E/F fighters, five EA-18G electronic attack jets, 4–5 E-2D AEW&C systems, and a range of logistics aircraft and helicopters. The lack of modern F-35C fighters, or of larger numbers of EA-18Gs, remain a major constraint on its utility. A primary benefit of deployment the carrier group will be increasing the presence of Arleigh Burke class destroyers within range both to launch strikes with BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles on Iran, and to support both tactical strategic missile defence efforts using their SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles. The USS George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group typically sails with three to four Arleigh Burke class destroyers, a supply ship, a nuclear attack submarine, and at times a single Ticonderoga class cruiser.

Russian and Iranian forces have a history of close integration of their frontline operations, most notably in Syria where the two conducted years long joint operations alongside Syrian government and North Korean against Western and Turkish backed insurgent groups. Iranian drone operators were also reported by Western sources to have played a significant role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, particularly from 2022-2023, as Shahed 136 and other Iranian drone types were rapidly brought into service six months after the beginning of full scale hostilities. Nevertheless, the extent of defence ties between the two countries has had serious limits, with Russia having proven to be highly prone to bending to Western and Israeli pressure over the issues of providing air defence related armaments to Iran and Syria, cancelling multiple major deals to equip both contries with assets such as MiG-31 interceptors and S-300 air defence systems, and blocking several more, contracting with its position in the Soviet era.

Russian intelligence support could potentially mirror the vast quantities of intelligence which Western Bloc states have provided to Ukraine. The large numbers of Western high impact weapons provided to Ukraine that use satellite guidance, however, and the very considerable numbers of advisors, contractors, and active duty personnel from NATO members states operating in Ukraine, has made this support much more impactful, while Russia has no similar presence on the ground to support Iran to make greater use of its intelligence. Following a Ukrainian attack on Russian energy infrastructure in March 2025 using U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket artillery, for example, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed that the United Kingdom and France played a central role in facilitating it. “[We] have reasons to believe that targeting and navigation were facilitated through French satellites and British specialists input [target] coordinates and launched [the missiles].” “The command came from London,” she observed.

In October 2025 U.S. and Ukrainian officials speaking to the Financial Times reported that the U.S. had been playing a key role in the ongoing large scale attacks on Russian energy facilities being launched from Ukraine. U.S. intelligence was revealed to be being supplied to allow Ukrainian drone operators to plan the routes and the altitudes for their flights, and to select the best timing for the attacks, while U.S. advisors also set target priorities. The sources reported that Ukrainian strikes on energy facilities were seen in Washington as an “instrument” to undermine the Russian economy and pressure Moscow towards freezing the conflict on terms favourable to Western interests. The revelations follow a statement by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov asserting that it was “obvious” to Moscow that “all of NATO and U.S. infrastructure is being used to collect and pass on intelligence to the Ukrainian side.”

As early as February 2023 an official statement from the Kremlin alleged: "We see how NATO’s entire military infrastructure is working against Russia, and we see how NATO’s entire intelligence infrastructure, including reconnaissance aviation, and satellite groupings are working in the interests of Ukraine in a 24/7 mode.” This included rapid provision of targeting data for missile and artillery strikes, which had taken a heavy toll on Russian forces. Preceding the outbreak of fulls scale war in Ukraine, Russian officials have also widely alleged that insurgent groups in Syria used targeting data provided by NATO members to strike high value Russian and Syrian targets. Following the major losses which Russian forces have suffered as a result of Western attacks launched through Ukraine, the provision of a significant, albeit much lower, degree of support for Iranian strikes on the United States and its strategic partners would be far from unthinkable. Nevertheless, with relations between Russia and Iran being far less close than those between NATO members and Ukraine, the possibility remains significant that Russian support is more minimal than Western sources have widely reported.

Germany was alongside the Netherlands and the United States one of the first three countries to donate Patriot systems to Ukraine in early 2023. In April 2024 German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock confirmed the exhaustion of the country’s capacity to make further donations, stating: “Unfortunately, the stocks, especially our own Patriot systems, are now pretty much exhausted. Therefore I made it clear at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting that we need to check the availability of all Patriot systems in Europe and globally, and that we will make every effort to obtain these systems for Ukraine.” The deployment of systems to Poland the following year, however, placed domestic defences under even further strain. The rapid destruction of Patriot systems by Russian forces in Ukraine has meanwhile ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high.

Although the German Defence Ministry ordered eight new Patriot systems from the United States in 2024 to replenish systems donated to Ukraine, with these costing $2.33 billion each, these are not expected to be delivered for the foreseeable future. With the U.S. Army’s own stockpiles of interceptors for the systems having fallen critically low, new production is expected to be prioritised for the U.S. Army, and potentially for the Republic of China Army. The U.S. Armed Forces confirmed in July 2025 that their own supplies had fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon, following both large scale donations to Ukraine, and combat use against Iran in June. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army has expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. While the U.S. is expected to withdraw much needed interceptors for Patriot and THAAD systems from bases in South Korea, it is also likely to request resupplies from the Patriot’s remaining foreign operators, seriously limiting the possibility of significant numbers of new interceptors being delivered to Germany until at least the early 2030s

The U.S. Air Force has prioritised Alaska to deploy a particularly high concentration of fifth generation fighters, including approximately 40 F-22s at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson, with the number having varied, and 54 F-35A fighters under the 354th Fighter Wing at Eielson Air Force Base. This reflects the Armed Forces’ prioritisation of maximising capabilities in both the Arctic and the Pacific theatres, with Alaska also being well positioned to reinforce bases across East Asia, most notably in Japan. Russia’s own capabilities across the Bering Strait have declined significantly since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and while MiG-31 interceptors in the region were previously dominant in the 1980s, and far surpassed U.S. fighters in their beyond visual range capabilities, the large majority of these were placed in storage in the 1990s due to an inability to sustain them. Although remaining MiG-31s have been modernised to the much improved MiG-31BM standard, these are two few in number to provide a meaningful defensive capability across the vast region.

U.S. air defences in Alaska have come under growing strain from Russian bomber patrols, and from 2024 from Chinese bomber patrols as H-6 bombers have been temporarily based in Russia. The two countries are currently the only ones in the world serially producing bomber aircraft, and are modernising their aircraft’s strike capacities by integrating new generations of ballistic and cruise missiles. China is also expected to begin fielding its first intercontinental range stealth bomber in the early 2030s, with the aircraft having already seen in flight testing in October 2025. U.S. defences in Alaska have been hampered by the outstandingly low availability rates of both the F-22 and the F-35, as well as by the growing obsolescence of the E-3 AWACS fleet. The Department of War’s announcement of a decision in early June 2025 to cancel the planned procurement of replacement E-7 systems has faced significant domestic opposition in large part because it will leave Alaska increasingly vulnerable.

The very large size of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal has left the Patriot system’s ability to provide a sustained defence in serious question, with the system’s reliability against even more basic Iranian strikes having also proven to be questionable on multiple occasions. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is the primary facility to which U.S. Army Patriots were forward deployed, was shown in satellite footage to have taken major damage from Iranian ballistic missile strikes. Shortages of Patriot systems were already acute before hostilities with Iran began, with the U.S. Armed Forces confirmed in July 2025 to have seen their supplies fall to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon following both large scale donations to Ukraine, and combat use against Iran in June. This has fuelled widespread speculation from both Western and South Korean analysts that the U.S. Army will very likely seek to withdraw interceptors, and possibly complete systems, from Korea to restock its supplies in the Middle East, if it has not already done so.

The U.S. Army has suffered from even more acute shortages of THAAD anti-missile interceptors, which are considerably more costly at approximately $15.5 million, and were procured in much smaller numbers. During much lower intensity Iranian strikes on Israel in June 2025, which were launched in response to Israeli attacks on the country from June 13, the U.S. Army expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system during 11 days of conflict. This represented over 25 percent of the Army’s total arsenal deployed around the world. The current conflict has seen THAAD not only operate with much higher intensity in Israel but also be deployed to two separate countries, with one battery deployed in Jordan in January. Although inventories of missiles for THAAD were not depleted in other conflicts, as those for the Patriot were in Ukraine, there is also a much smaller pool of foreign operators and other foreign deployments to draw supplies from, with the only foreign operators, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, requiring the systems to defend against Iranian strikes on U.S. bases on their own territories.

The Patriot system previously saw by far the most intensive combat use in its history in the Ukrainain theatre from May 2023,although its effectiveness was widely questioned by both Western and Ukrainian officials. The U.S. Army in December 2025 confirmed plans to develop a new variant of the Patriot, which is by far the most revolutionary since the system was first introduced into service in 1981, and will gain a 360 degree targeting capability that Russian, Chinese and North Korean systems have long had. The program’s initiation has been widely assessed to be a response to the system’s recently demonstrated shortcomings. The extreme costs of expending hundreds of interceptors form the Patriot and THAAD systems is likely to have been one of the most expensive aspects of operations against Iran in terms of direct weapons depletion, and one which will undermine U.S. and allied capabilities across multiple theatres in which the systems are relied on.

Developed to revolutionise the situational awareness of the U.S. Air Force and its command and control capabilities during the Cold War, and entering service from 1977, 17 E-3s were procured by NATO and are staffed by rotational crews from multiple member states. The growing obsolescence of both the U.S. and NATO E-3 fleets has spurred increasingly urgent calls to retire them and finance the procurement of the more modern E-7 to replace them, although the U.S. Department of Defence early June 2025 announced to cancel the planned procurement of the E-7 due to budgetary constraints and concerns regarding the vulnerability. NATO subsequently formally abandoned plans to procure E-7 in November, after the U.S. ceased to contribute funding to the program.

The importance of replacing the E-3 was previously highlighted by commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces General Kenneth Wilsbach, who noted in March 2022 shortly after the first encounter with Chinese J-20 stealth fighters was confirmed: “our early warning aircraft could not see the J-20… Those sensors that we rely on on the E-3 aren’t really capable in the twenty-first century especially against a [stealth] platform like the J-20 or something similar to that. It just can’t see those platforms far enough out to be able to provide an advantage to the shooters.” “That’s why I would like to have the E-7,” he added. Although Russia lacks an aircraft with comparable stealth capabilities to the J-20, its Su-57 fifth generation fighter has seen its scale of production rapidly increase, while its stealth capabilities have also significantly improved. Russia also operates a wide and growing range of cruise missile types with advanced radar evading capabilities.

E-3 operations over Finland tested the linking the Finnish national radar network with NATO’s alliance-wide airborne command system, and enhanced the alliance’s ability to coordinate air operations and monitor activity across. It further validated new procedures for synchronising Finnish air assets with NATO’s real-time air battle management network, allowing both Finnish and alliance assets to maintain greater collective situational awareness along the Russian border. While the future of the NATO airborne early warning and control fleet remains highly uncertain, with a significant possibility remaining that it will be retired without replacement, Finland’s integration into the alliance is nevertheless expected to provide significant benefits to alliance-wide situational awareness. new David’s Sling ground based air defence systems, F-35A fighters, and the possible hosting of U.S. Air Force F-35As, are all expected to provide a much expanded ability to detect, track, and if necessary lock onto and engage targets deep inside Russian territory.

In early February influential aide to Kremlin and Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board Nikolai Patrushev stated that a permanent naval presence was essential to prevent European countries from obstructing Russian civilian shipping’s access to international waters, noting that the Russian Navy is ready to use force to protect commercial vessels from Western attacks. He added that Russia is considering establishing a greater permanent presence of naval assets to international shipping lanes to prevent NATO members from attempting to seize or otherwise disrupt its merchant shipping. With Russia’s surface naval capabilities having declined very significantly since the end of the Cold War, however, the viability of establishing such a presence remain in serious question. Patrushev at the time noted that Russia's updated naval shipbuilding program to 2050 would be submitted for approval soon, raising the possibility that it could place a greater emphasis on blue water capabilities.

Days prior to Patrushev’s statement, Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov issued a warning that NATO members were planning to impose a maritime blockade of the country, which would be aimed at “restricting freedom of navigation,” noting that this “violates international law norms.” Operations would involve “putting the Baltic-Arctic region on a barrack-like footing” through expanded military operations and exercises, with NATO members also developing plans for “a partial or complete naval blockade.” His statement followed a report on February 13 that British Defence Secretary John Healey had met with his counterparts from Baltic and Nordic countries at the Munich Security Conference to discuss plans for illegal seizures of Russia-linked oil tankers in international waters.

The Untied States has in recent months conducted multiple forced takeovers of oil tankers in international, primarily those shipping Venezuelan oil for export, as part of a policy aimed at crippling the country’s economy. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard on February 9 targeted the oil tanker Aquila II in international waters in the Indian Ocean, which was at least the eighth vessel targeted for forceful seizure by U.S. forces. Commenting on these operations against the civilian shipping, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently warned that the U.S. leadership “want to take control of all the routes for providing the world’s leading countries and all continents with energy resources… A ‘war’ against tankers in the open sea is being waged.” Western operations against civilian shipping have been far from restricted to Russian oil shipments. In November 2025, for example, U.S. special forces boarded a cargo ship in the international waters in the Indian Ocean, securing, removing and destroying civilian goods that were being shipped from China to Iran.

Otherwise known as Unit 125, the Radwan Force is widely considered to be Hezbollah’s most capable and best-trained combat unit, with most Western and Israeli intelligence assessments placing the force at 2,500–3,000 elite fighters, supporting by logisticians and other non-frontline personnel. These are drawn from Hezbollah’s most experienced personnel, and are organised into small assault battalions and platoons. Training is reported to have been provided by North Korean special forces, which have gained a particularly outstanding reputation over several decades, and have demonstrated very high level capabilities in engagements with South Korean and other hostile forces. This reflects the broader North Korean training which has been provided to Hezbollah’s leadership, including its former General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah, as well as to the leaders of its intelligence apparatus.

The Radwan Force has gained extensive combat experience operating in a wide range of terrain, and while their involvement in clashes with Israeli forces in late 2024 remains uncertain, they were heavily involved in supporting Syrian government counterinsurgency efforts from 2013. Western, Turkish and Israeli backed jihadist militants fighting in Syria widely commented on the capabilities of Hezbollah’s special forces, with jihadists fighting in Al Qusayr stressing the significant discrepancy in capabilities between Hezbollah and Syrian Arab Army units, stating that they particularly feared combat with the former. One member of an Islamist insurgent brigade stated to this effect regarding Hezbollah’s performance in the field: “None of them were under 35 years old. They were very professional and tough fighters. You can tell they are superior fighters from the way they move in battle and how they fight.”

When first deployed to support Syrian government forces in the Battle of Al Qusayr in 2013, Hezbollah’s special forces managed to gain ground quickly despite jihadist positions being heavily fortified an extensive tunnel network, booby traps and multiple elevated sniper positions. Experience in conducting offensives in both urban and mountainous terrain may prove to be invaluable against Israeli forces. Like other Hezbollah frontline units, Radwan Forces are reported to be experts at infiltration and the use of underground tunnel networks to conduct redeployment, and in integrating rockets, drones, and infantry. Considering the difficulties which Israeli ground units have faced when engaging Hezbollah’s regular units, the deployment of the Radwan Force is likely to cause significant complications for current offensives.

Israeli expert on Hezbollah Dima Adamsky was among multiple analysts to have observed that the Radwan Force’s operations in Syria, including with local elite units, facilitated its transition from an advanced infantry into a a commando force in the 2010s. He projected that this would allow it to achieve significant operational and strategic effects in a potential war against Israel. Hezbollah special forces also operated alongside elite Russian Naval Infantry units during the conflict. Although generally performing well, the Radwan Force is reported by Israeli sources to have suffered significant setbacks and casualties when attacked by Turkish forces in Syria, with Turkey alongside Israel having extensively targeted Hezbollah positions as part of their support for the insurgency against the Syrian government. The open terrain in Northern Syria left units exposed to Turkish air power, in ways the mountainous terrain and underground fortifications in Southern Lebanon did not.

While the Radwan Force was held in reserve during previous engagements, the existential nature of the threat posed to Hezbollah by a full scale U.S. and Israeli assault on Iran makes it vital for the paramilitary group to commit its full strength to the campaign. It remains possible that should Israeli ground forces suffer sufficient losses, the Radwan Force may be deployed for offensive commando operations into Israel territory, which would closely mirror the kinds of operations that the North Korean special forces units which trained them have already proven to be highly proficient in. Following the toppling of the Syrian government in 2024 by Turkish, Western and Israeli backed insurgent groups, Hezbollah remains the only adversary ground force deployed near Israel’s borders, meaning Israeli ground units are expected to be increasingly focused on countering them.

The development of the Khorramshahr missile series reportedly benefited from extensive technology transfers from the North Korean Hwasong-10 ballistic missile program in the 2000s and 2010s, with later variants of the Korean missile achieving a 4,000 kilometre range allowing them to strike key U.S. bases on Guam. The Khorramshahr has a shorter range estimated at around 2,000 kilometres, but carries a much larger warhead, which is the heaviest known to exist in Iran’s missile arsenal. The missiles are speculated to be able to deliver either large conventional payloads or multiple submunitions. The size of the missile’s warhead may make it optimal for penetrating heavily fortified targets, including the aircraft shelters at key bases.

The Khorramshahr 4 is reported to integrate a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle, a technology first reported to have been transferred from North Korea to the country and to Syria in the 1990s to provide Korean-supplied missile types with superior penetrative capabilities against advanced U.S. and Israeli air defences. These vehicles can change trajectory during descent, using small thrusters for terminal manoeuvres. Iranian reentry vehicle technologies have advanced significantly since the 1990s, possibly through continued cooperation with North Korea, with new generations of missiles, most notably the Fattah, using more advanced vehicles that are more capable of evading newer generations of air defences.

Although a shortcoming of the Khorramshahr 4 compared to other new Iranian ballistic missile designs is its lack of a solid fuel composite, meaning it cannot be stored fully fuelled, it uses hypergolic liquid fuel, which ignites automatically when components mix. This allows for a much shorter preparation time. Iran relies on multiple complementary ballistic missile types to optimise its ability to strike Western Bloc and Israeli military targets across the Middle East, with the Khorramshahr 4 having gained considerable publicity due to the power of its warhead, which is a particular threat to Israel due to its high reliance on underground fortifications. Israeli sources have recently reported that the destruction of early warning radars has limited warning times when Iranian missiles are launched, which may serve to limit casualties.

Satellite images have shown major damage to U.S. military facilities across the Middle East from Iranian ballistic missile strikes, as well as to targets across Israel. Despite pre-positioning an unprecedented concentration of missile defence assets in the region, the United States is suffering from a rapid diminishing of its stockpiles, resulting in desperate measures including the reported redeployment of anti-missile interceptors for the Patriot and THAAD systems from South Korea, where they are heavily concentrated. The redeployment of complete systems from Korea is also reported to be under consideration. The effectiveness of missile defences has increasingly been brought to question, particularly against newer generations of missiles, with Iran fielding a limited number of Fattah-2 ballistic missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles, which have been filmed impacting strategic targets in Israel.

South Korea is the only foreign country that hosts a permanent foreign deployment of U.S. Army THAAD systems, which were initiated in 2016, and proved highly beneficial to the United States as it derailed the then highly positive relations between Seoul and Beijing. The system’s AN/TPY-2 radar has provided the capability to peer almost 3,000 kilometres into Chinese territory. South Korean security commentator and retired navy captain Yoon Sukjoon accordingly referred to the system as “part of the U.S.’ global anti-China united front... a strategic tool for containing China from one of the closest countries and one of the most trustworthy allies of the U.S.” Although it is more likely that the U.S. Army will withdraw only interceptors for THAAD systems to replenish stockpiles in the Middle East, the possible destruction of radars, command posts, or launchers by Iranian forces could result in these also being withdrawn from South Korea.

U.S. Army THAAD systems have been deployed to both Israel and Jordan to provide a missile defence capability against Iranian attacks. The system saw its first high intensity combat test from June 13-25, 2025, when used to blunt Iranian retaliatory strikes on Israel, after Israel initiated of a major air assault against Iran in on June 13. The U.S. Army expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system during the conflict, representing over 25 percent of the Army’s total arsenal deployed around the world. Each interceptor launch costs approximately $15.5 million, with the defence of Israeli airspace using these systems for 11 days conservatively estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion. The rapid depletion of interceptors in June 2025 has made sustained missile defence operations appear far from feasible, and made the possibility of drawing down the number of interceptors in South Korea appear highly likely.

Alongside the THAAD system, the U.S. Army is also likely to send interceptors from Patriot missile systems to the Middle East, with the U.S. Armed Forces confirmed in July 2025 to have seen their supplies fall to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. The Patriot is a less costly system, with new generations of interceptors costing approximately $3.8 million, or around a quarter as much as those from the THAAD systems. It is optimised for intercepting short and medium range missile attacks, where THAAD engages targets at much higher altitudes and can engage strategic intermediate range missiles. Serious questions have been raised regarding the Patriot’s effectiveness, both in the ongoing conflict with Iran, and during all major prior conflicts in which it had been used. The withdrawal of THAAD and Patriot systems or their interceptors are not likely to significant affect the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, with South Korean forces themselves fielding superior air defence capabilities.

Both U.S. and South Korean systems are expected to be wholly incapable of significantly blunting a North Korean or Chinese strike due to the sheer scale and sophistication of their arsenals. Not only is North Korea’s arsenal much larger and more advanced than that of Iran, but the much shorter distances separating its territory from adversary bases allows it to saturate missile defences more easily with salvos of low cost short range missiles. North Korea has led the world in introducing hypersonic glide vehicles onto its missiles, including from 2025 onto a shorter ranged tactical missile type, while it is widely thought to have shared these technologies with Iran, which has in turn used them to considerable effect to bypass U.S. and Israeli missile defences.

Chairman Kim confirmed the construction progress of the third Choe Hyon class destroyer, while revealing that there were plans to produce ten similarly capable destroyers over the coming five years. “Every year during the new five-year plan period we must build two surface warships of this class or of a higher class, and correctly implement the gigantic plan of increasing the fighting strength of surface warships,” he observed. Choe Hyon class destroyers stand out for their integration of outstandingly large armaments suites, particularly relative to their sizes, with each integrating 74 vertical launch cells, despite displacing just 5,000 tons. To place the in perspective, British Type 26 class frigates displace 7,700 tons, but integrate just 24 cells, while U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Class destroyers displace 9,700 tons, making them almost twice as large, but integrate just 33 percent more cells at 96. The number of missile cells integrated is all the more outstanding when considering that they include 20 much larger cells for ballistic missiles.

Choe Hyon class ships’ primary land attack capability is provided by Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, Hwasal-2 cruise missiles, and a yet unconfirmed other cruise missile type. Kumsong-3 anti-ship cruise missiles are reportedly relied on for anti-shipping roles, although unconfirmed reports indicate that a hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile class is also expected to be fielded. Each ship also integrates two dual torpedo tubes integrated into the superstructure and a bow sonar system. The Korean People’s Army Navy first test launched multiple missiles from the new destroyer in April 2025, with the state run Korean Central News Agency announcing that these earlier trials included the launches of supersonic cruise missiles, nuclear-capable cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and electromagnetic jamming projectiles, as well as the firing of the ship’s 127mm gun.

North Korea launched its second Choe Hyon class destroyer, the Kang Kon, during a ceremony at Rason port on May 22, although this saw the ship fall on its side causing damage to its structure. At the time Western analysts were near unanimous that the damage to the ship would prevent it from being relaunched in the near future, although concerted efforts allowed it to be relaunched just 22 days later on June 13. It remains uncertain how many Choe Hyon class destroyers are intended for service entry, and whether a new larger destroyer type may be planned. The ships represent a step change for the Korean People’s Army Navy’s surface capabilities, with their standings against rival vessels fielded by the United States being unprecedentedly high, where previously the surface navy had for decades been among the weakest sections of the country’s armed forces.

The Choe Hyon class’ ability to conduct long range air and missile operations, and to launch nuclear strikes using ballistic missiles that follow complex trajectories, may seriously complicate defence planning. Destroyers with similar capabilities are fielded only by China, the United States, South Korea and Japan, with neighbouring Russia notably having launched no new destroyers for its own navy since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It remains highly uncertain to what extent the North Korean defence ministry is planning to invest in developing an ocean going surface naval capability, although should further investments be made, it would allow the Navy to establish a continuous far sea presence in the Pacific, complementing progress being made to begin fielding nuclear powered submarines in the early 2030s.

The United States and other NATO members gained extensive access to early variants of the S-300 system following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, with these then cutting edge systems having been widely deployed by Warsaw Pact member in Eastern Europe which were absorbed into NATO, and highly willing to transfer them for study. Ukraine inherited a particularly large S-300 arsenal, and is widely reported to have sent S-300PS or S-300PT systems to the United States for study. Nevertheless, these Soviet era S-300s were far more constrained in their capabilities than then S-300PM family of systems, the first of which entered service in 1992, meaning they were not fielded by Warsaw Pact members. Despite this, Israel and multiple NATO member states gained access to newer S-300 variants and trained extensively against them in simulated engagements.

Following the sale of S-300PMU-1 systems to Cyprus, which were quickly obtained by Greece, the Greek Armed Forces provided NATO allies and Israel with extensive opportunities to fly simulated attack missions against targets protected by the systems. These familiarised NATO and Israeli forces with the radar wavebands in which the S-300PM system operated, while providing opportunities to test electronic warfare techniques and other tactics against them. Greece also provides training access to the S-300 site for officers from NATO member states and from Israel. Greek S-300s have also at times fired missiles during exercises, providing opportunities to perform live fire evaluations of the missile’s engagement envelopes. In parallel to this cooperation, U.S. and Israeli delegations have visited Ukraine on multiple occasions to learn about the S-300’s capabilities and operational procedures, including its radar modes, command-and-control procedures, and vulnerabilities.

The Iranian S-300PMU-2 is closely related to the Greek S-300PMU-1, although having been produced two decades later, and benefitted from significant customisation, its degree of vulnerability to electronic warfare techniques and other measures developed during simulated engagements with Greek systems remains uncertain. It is highly possible that avoiding vulnerabilities to intelligence which adversaries gained through Greek systems was a specific consideration when customisation was requested. Beyond training with Greek systems, however, the U.S. Air Force has notably also conducted multiple operations to collect electronic intelligence on newer variants of the S-300 system during the Russian-Ukrainian War.

The U.S. Air Force from early 2022 deployed F-35A fighters to fly near the Ukrainian theatre for signals intelligence operations, with Russian air defence systems, including newer S-300 variants, being primary targets. Regarding operations in Eastern Europe 388th Fighter Wing Commander Colonel Craig Andrle elaborated in an interview regarding how these operations provided new information on the systems’ capabilities: “the jet is always sensing, gathering information. And it was doing that very, very well… We’re looking at an SA-20. I know it’s an SA-20. Intel says there’s an SA-20 there, but now my jet doesn’t ID it as such, because that SA-20 is operating, potentially, in a war reserve mode that we haven’t seen before.” The SA-20 is a NATO reporting name for the S-300PMU-1 and PMU-2 variants.

The value of being able to tackle S-300PMU-2 system far exceeds their utility against Iran, with the systems also deployed by Vietnam, China, Russia and Algeria, all of which are potential targets for future Western Bloc attacks, while the North Korean Pyongae-5 system is though to have been developed with extensive technology transfers from the S-300PMU-1 program. Highlighting the importance o being able to tackle the systems, the U.S. Marine Corps in November 2025 used full scale mockups of air defence systems closely resembling theS-300 in the Resolute Hunter 26-1 exercise at Naval Air Station Fallon, indicating that the drills were intended to simulate engagements with the systems. Although the operational effectiveness of Iran’s S-300 systems were expected to be enhanced considerable in 2026, with the delivery of the first Su-35 fighters to the country allowing the aircraft to provide targeting data and strengthen situational awareness, the initiation of attacks before these were delivered ruled out this possibility.

As the United States and Israel have faced multiple setbacks in the initial stages of their campaign, projections regarding the length of the assault have continue to be revised, with the Pentagon having announced on March 4 that it is expected the conflict will take at least 100 days, and probably required operations until September. The U.S. Central Command has requested an expansion of its Tampa-based staff of intelligence officers to support operations in Iran until September, further indicating that the conflict is expected to last far longer than initially projected. Alongside France and the United Kingdom, a growing number of NATO members have indicated that they may soon join the war effort, with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte having stated that the alliance is ready for the possible application of Article Five, regarding collective defence, in the U.S. operation against Iran.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has stated that he does not rule out the participation of the Canadian armed forces in military actions against Iran, while German officials have similarly indicated that the country’s armed forces could soon intervene. Italy has since confirmed that it will support air defence operations in Gulf region, where local and U.S. air defence efforts have come under growing strain. Multiple NATO members states, including Germany and Italy, have wartime access to U.S. nuclear weapons under nuclear sharing agreements, providing multiple alliance members with room for escalation against Iran should the course of the conflict evolve too unfavourably. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard on March 5 announced that in the coming days, with growing numbers of adversary radar and air defence systems having been blinded, Iranian strikes will become more intense and larger in scale than before.

The British Royal Air Force in January pre-positioned Eurofighter FGR4 combat jets operating under No. 12 Squadron at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, supporting the broader and much larger scale military buildup initiated by the United States that month to prepare for attacks on Iran. These fighters have also been involved in flying defensive air patrols to intercept drone and missile attacks, with one of the fighters on March 1 reported to have shot down an Iranian single use drone. Although the Eurofighter and the Rafale both lack anti-ballistic missile capabilities, they are capable of engaging low value unmanned aircraft, such as the Shahed 136 single use attack drone, which have been launched against military and strategic targets in significant numbers.

The Eurofighter and Rafale were initially developed under a joint program, before France left to complete work independently. This has resulted in the two fighter types having very similar designs and highly comparable capabilities. The Rafale until the early 2020s had the advantage of a significantly more capable radar, with the aircraft from 2001 having used a passive electronically scanned array radar, and from 2013 an active electronically scanned array radar, providing overwhelming advantages in terms of situational awareness, targeting capabilities, and electronic warfare capabilities over the Eurofighter’s obsolete Captor mechanically scanned array radar. The large majority of Eurofighters, including all those in British service, still use these obsolete sensors.

The Rafale’s superior sensors have contributed to its achieving much greater success on export markets, with the Eurofighter widely considered an export failure. Nevertheless, both fighter types are restricted to carrying radars that are small and have very limited power compared to the much larger fighters fielded by the United States, China and Russia, including the F-15 fighters sold to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the Su-35s which Iran was scheduled to receive later in 2026. Primary responsibility for air defence operations against Iranian drone strikes was previously assigned to U.S., Israeli and Qatari F-15 fighters, which combine very long ranges with powerful sensor suites and large weapons carrying capacities, optimising them to loiter and engage large numbers of low value targets.

Al Udeid is the largest foreign air base operated by any country in the world, giving it critical importance for a U.S.-led assault on Iran, with satellite images indicating that missile defence efforts at the facility have been far from successful, and that it has suffered critical damage. Alongside the deployment of Eurofighters in Qatar, the British Royal Air Force has also deployed F-35B fighters at RAF Atkotiri in Cyprus, where they have reportedly also ben responsible for shooting down a single Iranian single use drone. The British Royal Navy has also dispatched the Type 45 class air defence destroyer HMS Duncan to further support regional air defence efforts against Iran, although the ship’s lack of any ballistic missile capabilities, a longstanding shortcoming, combined with its very limited arsenal of just 48 vertical launch cells, are expected to seriously limit its effectiveness.

Hezbollah has previously demonstrated advanced anti-tank capabilities, and when repelling an Israeli invasion in 2006 made effective use of Kornet missiles to destroy multiple Merkava III and Merkava IV tanks. Fighting with North Korean influenced tactics, the paramilitary group has also benefitted extensively from support from Korean specialists in the early 2000s who oversaw the construction of a vast network of underground tunnels, bunkers and other military facilities stretching for kilometres across southern Lebanon. Israeli experts described Hezbollah’s paramilitary units as operating as “a defensive guerrilla force organised along North Korean lines,” concluding: “All the underground facilities [Hezbollah’s], including arms dumps, food stocks, dispensaries for the wounded, were put in place primarily in 2003–2004 under the supervision of North Korean instructors.”

The growing difficulties Israeli forces have reportedly faced in their initial days of hostilities with Hezbollah have fuelled calls in the United States, including among multiple senators, to dispatch forces to support Israeli offensives into Lebanon. Hezbollah’s North Korean tunnel networks have consistently proven to be key to its success in countering Israeli armoured advances, allowing its forces to be concealed underground from hostile surveillance and air strikes, and launch ambushes using a wide range of anti-tank weapons. The paramilitary group’s tactics have included extensive use of pre-surveyed firing lanes, and employment of strict fire discipline to rapidly redeploy after engaging.

Hezbollah has made use of more advanced types of anti-tank guided missiles than the Kornet in the past, most notably the Iranian Badr man-portable anti-tank missile system. The Badr has a comparable performance to the Israeli Spike and U.S. Javelin missiles, and was reportedly closely based on the Spike design after these were captured from Israeli forces in 2006. Nevertheless, these missile have only been filmed in use striking air defence systems and armoured vehicles across the Israeli border, rather than striking Israeli tanks inside Lebanon, possibly because the Kornet better suits Hezbollah’s ambush tactics which emphasise close quarter engagements.

Israel has suffered from a shortage of Merkava tanks, and preceding its invasion of Lebanon in November 2024, footage frequently showed successful attacks by Hamas paramilitary units against the tanks in the Gaza Strip. These attacks often involved pairing planted explosives with the use of rocket propelled grenades, and using the cover of cities to ambush the vehicles. Some of these ambushes destroyed heavily enhanced new Merakva IV variants with advanced Trophy active protection, killing their crews. Hamas paramiltiary units are significantly less well trained or equipped than Hezbollah units, and as a result losses in Southern Lebanon have been much more intense than those seen in Gaza.

The announcement of the shootdown of a Yak-130, which is by far the most modern type of manned combat jet in Iranian service, closely followed Iranian sources’ announcement of the successful shootdown of an F-35 near Tehran, raising the possibility that it may have been made to divert attention away from the Iranian claim. The ability of the F-35 to achieve the shootdown remains in question for a number of reasons, primarily because it would require the fighters to operate deep inside Iranian airspace. Israeli and U.S. fighters have primarily operated from well beyond the country’s borders to launch ballistic and cruise missiles from safe distances, avoiding engaging the country’s vast air defence network, with Iran’s widely distributed infrared guided air defence systems posing a particular threat. Operating the F-35 deep inside Iran at such an early stage in the war, and firing air-to-air missiles which would increase the fighter’s radar cross section and heat signature in a heavily defended area of the country, thus would be a very high risk operation that is out of line with how Israeli fighter operations have generally been conducted.

Israeli Air Force officers have noted that without an air-to-ground missile capability, which is only expected to be achieved when fighters are brought up to a Block 4 standard in the early 2030, the F-35 has been relegated primarily to intelligence collection roles using its powerful sensors to serve as a force multiplier for fourth generation fighters. Thus deploying the fighters for a deep penetration operation into Iran to shoot down fighters over the capital would appear highly out of line with how the fighters have been operated. The F-35 is the only new fighter type Israel has introduced into service since the 1970s, and as a result public relations efforts have focused very heavily on promoting its capabilities, at times leading to the publication of highly implausible stories particularly during its first months in service in 2016-2017. While the shootdown of a Yak-130 fighter is not impossible, it is also highly plausible that the report is part of public relations effort intended to strengthen the image of the Israeli Air Force, and of the F-35, while raising morale as the war takes an unprecedented toll.

The Shahab 3 is Iran’s oldest type of medium range ballistic missile, and the first in service capable of striking targets in Israel. The missile is a license produced derivative of the North Korean Hwasong-7, which entered service in the mid-1990s, and had been developed to provide a capability to strike U.S. military bases across Japan. It has been widely speculated that Iran may have helped finance the missile’s development to ensure access for its forces. Iran was cut off from Soviet arms supplies in the1990s following the USSR’s disintegration, as post-Soviet Russia proved highly willing to respond to Western and Israeli pressure to limited supplies to their adversaries, which made North Korea particularly valuable as a defence supplier.

Although the Shahab 3’s ability to penetrate Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences remains limited, the extreme shortages of anti-ballistic missiles in both countries means that the launch of interceptors to neutralise it would still represent a victory for Iran, particularly as an interception would likely cost more than an order of magnitude more than the missile itself. The Hwasong-7 has demonstrated high levels of precision in the past, both during testing in North Korea in the 1990s, and in Iran when used to strike Western and Turkish backed jihadist insurgent groups in Iraq. The Shahab 3 is several generations behind the cutting edge of North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile technologies, with its use of liquid fuel composites significantly increasing its launch time, and thus leaving it vulnerable to being targeted on the ground. With North Korea having fitted Syrian Hwasong-9 ballistic missiles with manoeuvring reentry vehicles in the 1990s, however, there has been speculation that similar vehicles were also provided to modernise the Hwasong-7 in Iran.

Deptula described U.S. fighters as providing the “the ability to strike rapidly and deeply to confound the Russian scheme of manoeuvre,” adding that “we could have done in the first year of the war and put this thing to an end already.” “Imagine what the Ukrainian Air Force could do if they had a wing of F-35s,” he added, observing: “You give me a wing F-35s, a wing F-22s, and this thing would be over in a month.” “Those F-16s have got some Ukrainian pilots who got upwards of 100 kills,” he added. Deptula’s argument remains at odds with the consensus view among analysts in both the Western world and in Russia and East Asia, namely that F-16s required several years of training and preparation, and were very costly to operate, which made setting up an operational force in Ukraine highly challenging. Nevertheless, had the United States prepared for this in the mid-2010s, rather than waiting until 2022, a more substantial Ukrainian aerial warfare capability likely could have been established.

A primary factor delaying the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine was that the United States was not willing to donate fighters to the country, and instead granted European states permission to donate their own U.S.-built F-16s. These included 30 fighters pledged by Belgium, 24 by the Netherlands, 19 by Denmark, and 14 by Norway, all of which were able to transfer their aircraft only after receiving new F-35A fighters from the United States. Had F-16s been provided earlier, they would have need to come from another source. A pause in F-16 productionin the United States from 2018-2022 further prevented new aircraft from being supplied, while the new F-16 Block 70/72 fighters produced from 2022 have faced a very significant backlog of orders due to serious delivery delays, and would likely be wholly unaffordable to equip a significant Ukrainian force.

Even with fighters having begun deliveries at a much later date, the operational effectiveness of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet has remained limited. A shortage of trained Ukrainian pilots was identified at an early stage as the main obstacle to integrating F-16s into the Air Force, which has throughout its history operated only Soviet origin fighter types. Training courses were reportedly further undermined by language barriers, a lack of qualified trainees, and a range of other issues. Following significant losses suffered by Ukrainain F-16 units to accidents, with four losses having been confirmed while unconfirmed reports have indicated further incidents have occurred, U.S. and Dutch contractor pilots have been widely reported to have been dispatched to operate the aircraft.

Further complicating the F-16’s integration into service, Ukrainian Air Force officers have highlighted that an entirely new clean sheet set of tactics needed to be developed to operate F-16s, criticising the air combat tactics taught by NATO members as "unsuitable" for engagements with Russian forces, particularly due to their advanced ground-based air defence network. A report by Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov similarly highlighted that the fighters had been forced to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines to avoid being targeted by Russian fighters. Ukrainian sources have consistently warned that F-16s and French supplied Mirage 2000 fighters are wholly incapable of matching the capabilities of advanced Russian fighters. This has further undermined Deptula’s assertion that earlier provision of fighters could have significantly altered the tide of the war.

A significant further factor undermining Deptula’s argument is that the Ukrainian Air Force already fielded highly capable fourth generation fighters, which were in many respects superior to the F-16s and Mirage 2000s supplied by NATO members. The Su-27 air superiority fighter in particular had overwhelming advantages in situational awareness, radar power, range, manoeuvrability, weapons carrying capacity, and in its flexibility to operate from makeshift airfields. Ukraine’s Soviet-built fighters, although wholly capable of threatening Russian fighters in air-to-air combat, saw their strike capabilities significantly enhanced with U.S. and British support, namely through the integration of glide bombs, Storm Shadow cruise missiles, and AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. As a result, the F-16s provided by NATO member states did not introduce any fundamentally new capabilities, and primarily served to replenish numbers after Ukraine’s Soviet-built fleet had suffered from years of attrition.

Despite the considerable destruction seen across Al Udeid Air Base, the sheer size of the facility, which covers roughly 31 square kilometres, means it may still be able to function. The base has hosted multiple types of combat aircraft including B-52H strategic nuclear-capable bombers, F-15E strike fighters, F-22 and F-35 fifth generation fighters, and a wide range of support aircraft including KC-135 tankers, E-8 command and control aircraft, and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. Chinese satellite imagery in early February exposed the exact positions of an Army MIM-104 Patriot air defence system at the facility, before later confirming deployments of large numbers of support aircraft, namely KC-135s and RC-135s, as part of the military buildup against Iran. These aircraft were withdrawn shortly before attacks on Iran were initiated, although it is expected that they may return to conduct forward operations should Iran’s ballistic missile and drone strike capabilities be seen to have been sufficiently eroded.

On February 28 footage taken atAl Udeid showed three interceptor missiles launched by MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems fail to shoot down incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. Their failure closely coincided with confirmation that Iranian strikes destroyed key air defence radars at Al Udeid Air Base, which may be among several targets that have been hit at the facility as a result of the limitations of U.S. air defences. The Patriot’s reliability has long been questioned, with even very limited Iranian strikes on June 23, 2025, having been capable of striking Al Udeid, despite using lower end Fateh-313 missiles, and in spite of prior warning of the attacks having been provided to the United States. U.S. officials at first praised the success of U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force Patriot systems, before the release of satellite footage showing the destruction of a radome housing the terminal communications suite forced Pentagon sources to concede that they were not fully successful. Beyond the Patriot’s reliability, the limited numbers of interceptors available has made a defence against sustained barrages appear to be far from feasible.

After a single friendly fire incident, joint emergency command orders would usually to be shared with Kuwait, meaning for three F-15s to be shot down in one night, F-15s either would need to have been operating without broadcasting IFF, or withoutIFF encryption keys or ID data having been shared with Kuwait. Any of these possibilities would have been highly unlikely during a high intensity air operation. Moreover, three shootdowns would require that Link 16 was not shared, or Link 16 broadcast capabilities were destroyed, that Air Tasking Orders were not shared, that emergency alerts were not shared after the first shootdown, and that there was no AWACS data sharing or no higher level C2 node integration.

Analysts have widely concluded that the shootdown of three F-15s over Kuwait was the result of one of three possibilities. Either the U.S. made an operational decision to ignore our standard practices and not share data, placing U.S. forces at serious risk, which would be highly unlikely, or that Iranian attacks were far more successful than U.S. sources had indicated, and had damaged critical identification and communications infrastructure. A third possibility was that the aircraft were not shot down by friendly fire, and instead by either paramilitary groups in Iraq, or long range air defence systems in Iran, both of which can fire on targets in Kuwaiti airspace.

Iraqi paramilitary groups have claimed responsibly for the shootdowns, with Iranian-armed groups having demonstrated significant successes against U.S. aircraft in the past using various infrared guided missile types, including shooting down Royal Saudi Air Force F-15s over Yemen. With the F-15 shootdown having only been reported after civilians filmed the aircraft crashing, questions have been raised regarding whether significant further shootdowns have occurred and simply not been reported. Analysts have also widely observed that the U.S. Armed Forces have a long history of not reporting, or otherwise misattributing, losses of their aircraft during operations to protect the reputations of the forces and the defence sector.

Sustaining the M60’s original power system has presented significant challenges as parts and components have aged, with the Republic of China Ministry of National Defence having responded by contractor RENK America, the original engine manufacturer, to develop an engine upgrade program. The program will see new AVDS-1790-2CAU diesel engines integrated onto 460 M60A3 tanks. The AVDS-1790-2CAU boasts a maximum output of 950 horsepower and an increased payload capacity of 5 tons, providing additional load-bearing space for future upgrades to armour, turrets, and other components. By replacing older parts, engine efficiency is improved, and the risk of failure during prolonged high-load operation is effectively reduced. The upgraded power system offers more stable acceleration response and torque output compared to the original configuration, aiding the vehicle in performing missions in complex terrain.

Improvements to the M60’s engine performance directly translates to enhanced mobility, while also stabilising power output, and reducing movement limitations caused by mechanical factors. This is expected to enhance armoured units’ mobility efficiency and their flexibility of rapid deployment and battlefield response. It is expected that the engine upgrade program will be complete by 2028. Although the upgrade will improve mobility and reduce maintenance issues, obsolescence issues affecting the M60 design are expected to worsen. The tanks were evaluated as far inferior to peer level Soviet armour during the Cold War, including during the Iran-Iraq War where they lost overwhelmingly to the T-62 and T-72, and previously during the Yom Kippur War when only the superior training of Israeli crews allowed them to engage Egyptian Army T-62s, and face far more extreme disadvantages today.

Facing the Republic of China Army’s tank units across the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), with which the Republic of China remains in a state of civil war, has introduced multiple generations of overwhelmingly superior tanks into service. The new PLA Type 100 main battle tank was revealed in September 2025 to be in active service, and has widely been assessed to be the most advanced tank design in the world. It is heavily optimised for operations in an era of ground warfare centred on the use of drones and loitering munitions. The M60’s crew protection levels are considered very poor by 21st century standards, with efforts to address this by integrating explosive reactive armour having failed, while new threats from top attack missiles and loitering munitions have strengthened the consensus that the vehicles would be very far from survivable in a high intensity conflict.

Although the Republic of China Army is scheduled to receive 108 M1A2 Abrams tanks, a successor to the M60, with the first of these having entered service in 2025, these are also considered to have limited suitability for conditions in the Taiwan Strait, and to be technologically far behind new Peoples Liberation Army tanks such as the Type 100. After observing the Abrams’ extreme vulnerability in the Ukrainian theatre, the U.S. Army itself ceased to invest in further incremental modernisation of the M1A2 design, and instead pursued a radical new tank program to develop the deeply redesigned M1E3, which has many of the same design priorities as the Type 100. Sufficient Abrams tanks were procured to replace only a small portion of the Republic of China Army’s armour, meaning that the older M60A3 will likely remain in service into the late 2030s, and possibly significantly longer.

Although U.S. and Israeli missile defences are under strain from strikes by older types of Iranian ballistic missiles, with the number of interceptors remaining highly limited, the use of hypersonic missiles, and to lesser extents missiles with manoeuvring reentry vehicles or multiple warheads, have posed particularly significant challenges. Hypersonic glide vehicles can manoeuvre in both course and pitch, carrying out lateral manoeuvres several thousand kilometres above the Armstrong Limit, which combined with their extreme speeds makes them nearly impossible for existing air defence systems to intercept. The use of the Fattah-2 to strike very high value Israeli command infrastructure not only demonstrates the high levels of precision achieved, which is particularly difficult for such high speed weapons, but also an ability to gather intelligence within Israel.

The first launch of the Fattah in the current conflict was reported on February 28, followed by the first reported launch of the Fattah-2 on March 1, with footage from Israel indicating that at least three successful Fattah-2 strikes have been launched. Iran’s development of ballistic missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles has been singled out as a particular threat by Israeli sources. Vice President of the leading Israeli missile defence system developer Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, Yuval Baseski, in August 2025 highlighted that thishad forced the firm and the Israel Defence Forces to rethink their approach to missile defence. “Hypersonic missiles open a new era in air defence,” he observed, warning that traditional approaches to missile defence could not be relied on against them. “Every air defence system today is based on flying faster than the target. But this principle does not apply to hypersonic missiles. To intercept an object moving at Mach 10, one would need a defence moving at Mach 30, which is impossible in the atmosphere due to friction,” he stated.

Drawing an analogyto basketball, Baseski observed: “One interceptor missile tracking one hypersonic missile is like defending LeBron James with a single player. You may keep chasing him, but you won’t stop him from scoring.” He instead suggested a “zone defence” model, under which multiple interceptors covered defined areas and engaged threats as they approached. As Israel has yet to show signs of being able to implement this approach, which even if financed would take several years and likely cost tens of billions of dollars, it is likely that Iran’s Fattah-2 arsenal will continue to be able to penetrate Israeli defences with impunity. This has placed more pressure on Israeli and U.S. forces to quickly gain greater dominance over Iranian airspace to destroy ballistic missile launchers on the ground before they are able to fire.

Available reports and footage indicates that U.S. and Israeli fighters have refrained from launching penetration strikes into Iran, and are instead primarily launching long range strikes using cruise, ballistic and anti-radiation missiles, such as the respective Delilah, Rampage, and AGM-88 HARM. Unmanned aircraft operating in Iranian airspace have suffered heavy losses, which appear to have primarily been caused by ground-based infrared guided air defence systems which engage targets without emitting radar signatures, and thus cannot be detected and neutralised from the air as easily. The Iranian Air Defence Forces have also made extensive use of decoy air defence launchers to deplete adversary resources. With its airspace still relatively well defended, Iranian aircraft like Yak-130 and MiG-29 can be used for anti-drone duties with little risk of being engaged by more capable fighter types.

The Yak-130 is the only new type of combat jet which the Iranian Air Force has received in the last 35 years, with the decision to purchase the aircraft thought to have been motivated by a perceived need to prepare pilots to operate new Su-35 fighters, which were reportedly scheduled to begin deliveries later in 2026. Statements by Russian officials in early February that a contract had been signed for the export of the Su-57 fifth generation fighter to a country in the Middle East also fuelled speculation that Iran was the intended client, with the Yak-130 having also been designed to train pilots for the newer aircraft.The Yak-130 retains a formidable combat capability alongside its role as a trainer, and although suffering from a low climb rate, mediocre manoeuvrability, a low operational altitude and a subsonic maximum speed, its avionics, sensors and access to a range of advanced munitions partly compensate for this.

The Type 45 is a heavily specialised air defence destroyer, and lacks a cruise missile strike capability or any significant offensive capabilities against surface ships or ground targets. Despite this specialisation, its air defence capabilities remain highly limited, particularly compared to those of U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke class destroyers deployed in the Middle East. Against drone attacks, Type 45 class ships are highly prone to being overwhelmed, as they carry some of the smallest missile arsenals in the world, with just 48 vertical launch cells. To place the limitations of the ships’ arsenals in perspective, Arleigh Burke class destroyers integrate 96 vertical launch cells, while Chinese Type 055 class destroyers integrate 112 cells.With Iranian forces having deployed swarms of hundreds of attack drones in the past, the Type 45 is far from an optimal asset to engage them.

In spite of its focus on air defence operations, Type 45 class destroyers have no ballistic missile defence capabilities, again contrasting to Arleigh Burke Class ships which integrate a multi-layered networks built around the SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles. At a Defence Select Committee in early 2021 it was highlighted that this had left the British Armed Forces without any maritime ballistic missile defence capability. Dr Sidharth Kaushal, a research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, stressed “the absence of a capability to counter anti-ship ballistic missiles on the Type 45 destroyer.” “That was discussed in the 2015 strategic defence and security review, as part of a wider ballistic missile defence capability for the vessel, but it was absent in this review, which I thought was noteworthy,” he added.

Regarding the Type 45’s inability to defend against ballistic missile attacks, Rear Admiral Alex Burton in 2021 similarly observed: “one of the gaping holes within the defence review is an anti-ballistic missile defence mechanism, both at sea and ashore.” “There is a gaping hole in our ability to defend a carrier against a ballistic missile without the support of our allies… The Navy has been clear that there has been a national capability gap, for the last 10 years, at least, in an anti-ballistic missile defence capability,” he added. Although Type 45 class destroyers are scheduled to be modernised with subsystems and new missiles that will allow them to defend against ballistic missile attacks under the Sea Viper Evolution Programme, this will only meet required standards in the late 2030s or early 2040s. Thus while the deployment of a Type 45 class destroyer will represent a show of force, its practical utility remains limited. Moreover, Iran’s advanced anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities may lead it to escalate by seeking to fire on the vessel, which represents a high value target for such strikes.

Entering service in 2007, the S-400 currently forms the backbone of Russia’s air defence capabilities, with investments in procuring the systems exceeding investments in procuring all types of fighter aircraft collectively more than twofold since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The system is prized for its high mobility, very long engagement range, and the outstandingly high speed of its longest ranged missile types, which engage targets at speeds exceeding Mach 14. This allows the S-400 to shoot down hypersonic targets, with shutdowns of Mach 8 ballistic missiles having been demonstrated during testing. The use of multiple complementary networked radars operating in separate wavebands also provides an outstandingly high degree of situational awareness, including the ability to detect large aircraft up to 600 kilometres away.

In early August 2025 Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh commented on the S-400’s performance, observing: “The S-400 system which we had recently bought has been a game changer… The kill range of that system kept their aircraft away from the maximum distance at which they could employ their long-range air-to-ground weapons, like those long-range glide bombs that they have.” Previously on May 13, Prime Minister Narendra Modi singled out the Russian air defence system’s performance, stressing that “platforms like the S-400 have given unprecedented strength to the country.” Russian and Indian defence ministers Radjnath Singh and Andrey Belousov in June held discussions on further accelerating the delivery of S-400 systems, and eight months later the Indian Defence Ministry cleared an order for 288 surface-to-air missiles for existing systems.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that the new contract for S-400 systems will be valued at $6.1 billion, indicating a price increase that is below the rate of inflation seen since 2018. The procurement of ten additional battalions reflects much broader investments being made by the Indian Defence Ministry to enhance the country’s aerial warfare capabilities, with local media outlets in December having confirmed that the country’s defence ministry is scheduled to begin formal discussions with Russia regarding the procurement of the S-500 long range air defence system. The Defence Ministry was also reported in February 2025 to be considering the near term procurement of 40 Russian Su-57 fifth generation fighters to rapidly enhance the combat capabilities, days after it was confirmed that a license production agreement for the aircraft was also being considered.

The S-400 gained greater importance after India’s French-supplied Rafale fighters were considered to have seriously underperformed during engagements with Pakistani forces in May, and as neighbouring China has rapidly expanded and modernised its fifth generation fighter fleet, while also moving to begin introducing sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s. India’s own fifth generation fighter development efforts have meanwhile faced serious delays, in line with prevailing trends affecting the country’s high profile defence programs. A pairing of the Su-57, likely with extensive customisation, and the S-400, is currently widely considered to be the best available option to secure the country’s airspace.

The J-11B and J-16 are both heavily enhanced derivatives of the Soviet Su-27 air superiority fighter, which the People’s Liberation Army Air Force became the first foreign client to receive in 1991, the design of which was subsequently modernised extensively in China to significantly surpass the capabilities of Soviet and Russian models. The development of the J-11B represented an important landmark in the emergence of China’s combat aviation sector as a global leader, with the fighter being brought into service in 2009. It benefitted from new engines, a much higher use of composite materials, and more modern avionics. The J-16 was developed in parallel to China’s first fifth generation fighter, the J-20, and used many of its technologies. When entering service in 2014, it was the first Chinese fighter to integrate an active electronically scanned array radar and new generations of air-to-air missiles, data links, and composite materials, representing an even greater landmark for the Chinese fighter industry.

While the J-16 serves as a multirole fighter, the J-11B fleet is thought to be deployed primarily for air superiority roles, meaning the reduced ground mapping capabilities of the J-11BG’s radar will have a much lower impact than it would for the J-16. The fighters were confirmed in the early 2020s to integrate the same PL-10 short range air-to-air missiles as the J-20, which are considered top contenders for the title of the most capable of their kind in the world. They are capable of being cued by helmet mounted sights to engage targets at very extreme angles. The aircraft also integrate the complementary radar guided PL-15 long range air-to-air missile, which has an estimated 200-300 kilometre engagement range that capitalises on the significantly greater power of the J-11BG and J-16’s active electronically scanned array radars. This combination makes the J-11BG one of the most formidable fourth generation fighters in terms of its air-to-air potential, overwhelmingly outperforming Japan’s F-15J air superiority fighters, and maintaining a significant advantage over the newer South Korean F-15K and U.S. Air Force F-15E fighters.

A significant uncertainty regarding the J-11BG fleet is whether they integrate the world’s longest ranged air-to-air missile, the oversized PL-17, which can engage large high value aircraft over distances of close to 500 kilometres. Although the missile was tested on the J-11B, it is only confirmed to have been integrated on the J-16. While a successor to the J-11B, the J-11D, reached an advanced prototype stage in development, the far superior capabilities of the J-20 and J-35 fifth generation fighters appears to have been a primary factor leading development to be cancelled. The J-11D design was instead used as a basis to develop the J-15B carrier based air superiority fighter, which was confirmed in 2025 to have entered service in the Navy. It remains uncertain, but highly possible, that modernisation of the J-11B fleet to a ‘4+ generation’ standard will expand beyond the approximately 100 aircraft that radars from early batches of the J-16, although this will depend heavily on cost effectiveness evaluations when considering the fighters’ remaining time in service, and the costs of replacing them with more capable J-20s, J-35s or J-16s.

A number of unconfirmed reports indicate that Qatari Air Force F-15QA fighters were responsible for the shootdowns, which are the first confirmed air-to-air engagements against Iranian fighters by any of the countries involved in the war effort. The F-15QA is one of the most capable fighter types produced in the Western world, rivalled only by the F-35 fifth generation fighter, and the F-15EX being produced for the U.S. Air Force, with its long range, high speed, high weapons carrying capacity, and integration of a particularly large and powerful radar making it highly capable for air defence operations. Compared to the U.S. Air Force F-15E and Israeli Air Force F-15I variants, the Qatari fighters have the advantage of using fly-by-wire controls, which significantly improved the aircraft’s flight performance and its maximum weapons load.

The Su-24M is one of the most modern fighter types in the Iranian Air Force, with 12 of the fighters having been ordered in 1989 from the Soviet Union, after which a similar number were flown to Iranian airfields from Iraq during the Gulf War and were integrated into the service. Subsequent plans to continue procurements were disrupted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, after which post-Soviet Russia refused to supply advanced combat aircraft to modernise Iranian capabilities due to sustained Western and Israeli pressure. Iranian Su-24s were previously thought to be able to strike targets across much of the Middle East without leaving the country’s airspace, by relying on a reverse engineered derivative of the Soviet Kh-55 cruise missile acquired through Ukraine.

This Su-24M’s beyond visual range targeting capabilities have raised questions regarding the reports of the aircraft approaching Qatari airspace, with the possibility remaining that the incident was fabricated to raise morale in the country and the wider Gulf region, as local air defences have conspicuously fallen far short of success in intercepting Iranian missile attacks. Although Iran is one of only a ew countries to have acquired the Su-24M, the aircraft has played important roles in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War on both sides, and in Ukrainian service has been modified to deploy Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles to conduct long range strikes on Russian targets. The aircraft is currently being phased out of service in Russia and replaced by the much more capable Su-34M. Iran’s inability to procure modern fighter aircraft, largely due to Western pressure on Russia not to supply them, has remained a serious shortcoming that has left its defences exposed.

With Kuwait employing exclusively NATO standard air defence systems and fighter aircraft, modern identification friend or foe systems leave only a minimal possibility of shooting down friendly fighter aircraft, fuelling speculation that claims that the aircraft were shot down by friendly forces may be an attempt to deny Iran credit for what would be one of the most signifiant air defence operations in recent decades. Iranian air defence systems have proven to be capable in the past, most notably when they shot down a U.S. Air Force MQ-4 reconnaissance drone in 2019, and commandeered a CIA RQ-170 reconnaissance drone in 2011. Iran operates a number of long range air defence systems which can target fighters far beyond the country’s airspace, with its longest ranged system, the S-200D, having a 300 kilometre engagement range allowing it to shoot down targets across Kuwait from deep inside Iran.

The U.S. Armed Forces have a history of seeking to conceal major details in the losses of high value aircraft, with a notable example being the attribution of the loss of an F-18 fighter on the first day of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq to ground-based systems, despite persistent reports that Iraqi aircraft had been responsible. It was only later conceded that a MiG-25PD interceptor had shot down the fighter. Eight years later, repots of Yugoslav air defences critically damaging a second F-117 stealth fighter, after shooting down a first, were widely denied or ignored, and were only confirmed by a U.S. Air Force pilot in December 2020. This allowed the first shootdown, which was confirmed by images of the wreckage, to be dismissed as an isolated incident. The loss of three F-15s, which are among the most costly and high value fighter types in service, to a single Iranian air defence operation, would be a significant embarrassment for the U.S. Armed Forces and the country’s defence sector, particularly at a time when efforts are being made to market the F-15 abroad for well over $300 million each.

The Royal Norwegian Air Force was the first service in the world to fully convert from fielding fourth to fifth generation fighters, retiring Cold War era F-16s to operate the F-35A. These have been involved in engagements with Russian military aircraft at higher levels of intensity than the F-35s fielded by any other country. Beyond the Barents Sea, the Air Force in December 2025 concluded a deployment of F-35s as part of an integrated air and missile defence mission to Rzeszow Airport, just over 70 kilometres from Poland’s border with Ukraine, with the Norwegian Defence Ministry reporting that the fighters’ presence “supports the protection of Polish airspace and a key logistical hub for aid to Ukraine.” Procurement of the F-35 has significantly shifted the balance of power over the Barents Sea, where Russian Northern Fleet MiG-31 interceptors previously held overwhelming dominance against Norway’s F-16s.

Although the Soviet Union had been a peer level competitor to the United States in developing fifth generation fighters, following the state’s disintegration and the collapse of the highly ambitious MiG 1.42 fighter program, the Russian Aerospace Forces were forced to rely heavily on modernised fourth generation designs. The Su-35 is one such aircraft, and while significantly more advanced than the Soviet Su-27 on which its design was based, its ability to operate on a peer levels to fighters such as the F-35 remains limited. Significant discrepancies remain not only in their survivability, due to the Su-35’s almost total lack of stealth features, but also in their avionics, with the F-35’s data links and passive sensors providing a particularly distinct advantage, while the Su-35’s late 1990s data link technologies are far from cutting edge.

The Russian defence sector has significantly increased the Su-35’s scale of production from 2025, in part due to the unprecedented export successes that were achieved that year. Deliveries were reported in December,early November, late September, mid-August, late June, mid-May, and late March. While numbers have grown more rapidly, the fighters were in late July confirmed to have integrated the new R-77M air-to-air missile, which has revolutionised their beyond visual range combat capabilities and bridged the gap with the latest AIM-120D missiles integrated onto U.S. Air Force F-35s. Although lacking comparable stealth capabilities or similarly advanced avionics to the F-35, the Su-35 benefits from a much larger and more powerful radar, a far superior flight performance, a much longer engagement range, and a far greater weapons carrying capacity.

The Su-35 has been more intensively combat tested in air-to-air engagements than any post-Cold War era fighter type, with reports from November 2025 having indicated that fighters had forced the Ukrainian Air Force’s newly delivered F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines. While minimising the possibility of Russian targeting, this has also limited the kinds of support the Ukrainian aircraft are able to provide for their forces. Ukrainian sources have consistently warned that new Western-supplied F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters are wholly incapable of matching the Su-35’s capabilities. Pressure on the Su-35 fleet has diminished as the Aerospace Forces have expanded the fleet of more advanced Su-57 fighters, and bringing them into service at an accelerated rate and with incrementally superior capabilities.

The U.S. Air Force in January redeployed a large number of F-15E Strike Eagle fighters supported by KC-135 aerial refuelling tankers from RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, where they are permanently forward deployed under the 48th Fighter Wing, to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, which emerged as the U.S. Armed Forces’ most prominent forward operating location as they prepared for a planned assault against Iran. The F-15’s long range, high weapons carrying capacity, and much larger radar than other Western fighter types makes it optimal for multiple kinds of missions, including serving as a launch platform for beyond visual range missile strikes, and providing an air defence capability against Iranian drone units. Reflecting the importance of the fighters, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was heavily fortified, and is one of just eight in the world to host a high value THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, which was revealed to have been deployed there in early February.

The shootdown of at least one F-15 may have been achieved by ground-based air defence systems, possibly deployed in Iraq, which is situated between Iran and Kuwait, either by Iraqi paramilitary groups or by Iranian forces operating in the country. Iranian-backed paramiltiary group have seriously threatened more advanced U.S. fighter aircraft in the past, most notably the Ansuruallah Coalition in Yemen which achieved near misses against F-35s and F-16s in prior clashes, and shot down multiple MQ-9 Reaper drones and possibly F-18E/F fighters. Other possibilities include the use of unmanned aircraft to strike the F-15s in the air, or possibly, albeit less likely, shootdowns by Iran’s fighter aircraft. Iran is not known to field modern fighter types, but was reported by local sources to have received new MiG-29 fighters from Russia in late 2025, possibly with modern radars and missiles.

Kuwaiti Defence Ministry reports of multiple U.S. fighters crashing indicate that the shootdown may have been the result of a well planned air ambush. F-15E fighters have taken losses in the past, with two having been shot down by Iraqi air defences on January 17 and 19, 1991, during the Gulf War. The fighters have been prioritised for funding for modernisation, with modern ‘4+ generation’ avionics, including the AN/APG-82(V)1 active electronically scanned array radar, having been integrated. The demonstrated ability of Iranian or allied forces to shoot down some of the U.S. Air Force’s most high value fighters, and to bombard key military bases, is expected to add unprecedented levels of complexity to the ongoing U.S.-led war effort.

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has hardened key missile bases deep underground, often constructing them under mountains, which has been achieved with North Korean assistance. Similar hardening has been applied to a number of air bases, and to the Fordow nuclear facility. The B-2 stands in a league of its own in terms of its ability to penetrate fortifications without using nuclear force due to its combination of stealth capabilities and a high weapons carrying capacity, that allow it to drop GBU-57 bombs. The U.S. Air Force is nevertheless highly constrained in its ability to launch strikes against hardened facilities, with the GBU-57 inventory having been severely depleted following strikes in June 2025, and possibly in prior strikes on heavily fortified Yemeni targets in October 2024. B-2s did not use the GBU-57 in the latest strikes on March, which weigh approximately 14,000 kilograms each, instead dropping much lighter 900 kilogram bombs with significantly reduced penetrative capabilities.

The limited number of GBU-57s constrains the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to sustain attacks against high value fortified targets without escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. Without the GBU-57, the B-2 has advantages over other types of aircraft due to its unique combination of a long range and advanced penetration capability, with runways and hangars at Whiteman Air Base in Missouri being well out of range of Iranian retaliation. Nevertheless, the very small number of bombers in service at an estimated 18 aircraft, and their outstandingly high maintenance needs and poor availability rates, means that even against less well defended targets the bombers will still be limited in their ability to contribute to the war effort.

Developed in the 1980s, and entering service in the U.S. Air Force from 1997, the B-2 was deigned to be able to deliver strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The aircraft’s large flying wing design is far more difficult to detect for long waveband radars than stealth fighters like the F-117, F-22 and F-35, while its size allows it to carry carry several times the payload of any other stealth aircraft. Despite its unrivalled stealth capabilities for its time, the Soviet defence sector’s demonstrated capability to produce world leading radar systems led to concerns that the new bomber would quickly see its stealth capabilities compromised, leading the Air Force to instruct the B-2’s developer Northrop Grumman to add a low level flying capability at the expense of stealth performance. The B-2’s stealth features today are considered decades behind the cutting edge, raising questions regarding its survivability in high intensity conflicts, and raising the possibility that it could be vulnerable to shootdowns by Iranian air defences if entering Iranian airspace without a significant escort to provide electronic warfare support.

An official stated that the proposed arms sales to the Republic of China Armed Forces include long range surface-to-air missiles for the MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems, complementary medium range NASAMS air defence systems, and anti-drone equipment, as well as small arms, and maintenance and logistical support items. The Wall Street Journal previously reported that U.S. officials were hesitant about proceeding with the deal, with arms sales to the Republic of China having bene highly controversial due to its almost total lack of international recognition, including at the United Nations, and its ongoing state of civil war with the Chinese mainland. The United States has significantly increased arms supplies to Taipei under the Trump administration, with President Trump having specifically stated that Taipei must may for U.S. protection by supporting American industry with large scale acquisitions.

The United States was reported in mid-February to be preparing a large sale of PAC-3 MSE interceptors for the Republic of China Air Force Patriot systems, which are expected to be used to support the formation of at least one new Patriot battalion. According to sources in Taipei, the missiles are part of a package that includes IBCS command systems, NASAMS, LTAMDS sensors, and vehicle-mounted counter-drone systems. The prospective package is reported by sources in Taipei to be part of a broader arms procurement plan valued at up to $20 billion. The Republic of China Air Force has already procured 102 PAC-3 MSE interceptors at a cost of approximately $637 million, with initial deliveries having begun in early January 2026. PAC-3 MSE interceptors provide complementary capabilities to the indigenously developed Tien Kung III and Tien Kung IV systems, the latter which is specialised in ballistic missile defence roles.

It remains unlikely that the United States will be able to quickly deliver new interceptors to the Republic of China Air Force, with the U.S. Army having heavily depleted its own stockpiles of surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot system during conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Stockpiles were in July 2025 confirmed to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volumes deemed necessary by the Pentagon, while the initiation of a large scale assault on Iran on February 28 has resulted in further significant depletion of stockpiles as Iran has launched unprecedented attacks on U.S. bases across the Middle East.Delays to U.S. arms deliveries have caused a major scandal in Taipei, with outstanding backlogs of arms sales having reached over $21.45 billion by late 2025. Analysts have also noted that the Republic of China Ministry of Defence is paying significantly more for the same equipment than the United States Department of War, with each PAC-3 MSE interjector costing approximately $6.25 million when procured for Republic of China Air Force use, but only $3.9 million when procured for the U.S. Army.

Significant concerns have long been raised regarding the state of the Republic of China Air Force’s air defence capabilities, particularly as the People’s Republic of China has rapidly enhanced its own air defence suppression capabilities and led the world in developing new sixth generation fighters and pioneering new capabilities on its fifth generation fighters. Retired Republic of China Navy Captain Lu Lishi as early as December 2017 published a report warning of an “Air Defense Crisis,” raging that “Not even the Gods or Buddha" would be able to avert a swift defeat for Taipei in the event of a new air campaign in the Taiwan Strait. While Patriot systems have demonstrated significant reliability issues event even more basic ballistic missile attacks in the Middle East and Ukraine, the much higher costs of an interception compared to the costs of launching a ballistic missile have also made the use of the systems far from viable to provide production against a sustained missile offensive.

While the large majority of ballistic missiles launched are reported by Iranian sources to have been lower value missile types, which may be intended to depleted hostile missile defences in the conflict’s earlier stages, higher value missiles like the Fattah and Fattah-2 may have been launched to neutralise high value targets that it is seen as important to destroy early on, such as the missile defence radar destroyed in Qatar. Their use may also serve as an important show of force regarding the room the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retains for escalation. While the U.S. has suffered from severe shortages of anti-ballistic missiles for its Patriot and THAAD missile defence systems, however, it remains highly uncertain in what quantities the Fattah and Fattah-2 have been brought into service, with the latter in particular estimated to cost several times as much as older ballistic missile types such as the Khorramshahr.

Iran was reported to have first obtained manoeuvrable reentry vehicle technologies from North Korea in the 1990s, with such vehicles having also been sold to Syria that decade for its Hwasong-9 ballistic missiles, providing countermeasures against interception by Israel’s newly supplied Patriot air defence systems. North Korea began flight testing of hypersonic glide vehicles in September 2021, and reached a landmark in 2024 with the service entry of the Hwasong-16B intermediate range ballistic missile which integrates such vehicles. It has been speculated that Iran may have either jointly developed these technologies, or purchased them from North Korea. Although adversary missile defences, most notably the Patriot system, have proven to be far from reliable, the much improved penetrative capabilities of the Fattah and Fattah-2 are nevertheless game changers for Iran’s offensive potential.

Although the more complex Fattah-2 was never reported to have been used in combat before March 1, 2026, the Fattah was reported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on June 18, 2025, to have been used to engage Israeli targets in the early hours of the day. The Corps reported that the missile proved capable of penetrating Israel’s multi-layered missile defence network, and was fired as part of the eleventh wave of strikes under Operation True Promise III, in response to sustained Israeli air attacks on the country. The Revolutionary Guard stated that employment of the Fattah marked “the beginning of the end” for Israel’s “mythical” missile defences. “The powerful and highly manoeuvrable Fattah missiles repeatedly shook the shelters of the cowardly Zionists tonight, sending a clear message of Iran’s strength to Tel Aviv’s warmongering ally, which continues to dwell in delusions and false assumptions,” the Corps claimed, adding that the new missile left Israel defenceless against its precision strikes.

The Fattah’s ability to maintain controlled manoeuvrability inside the atmosphere seriously complicates possible interception efforts using systems such as the Israeli Arrow and U.S. Army THAAD. The missile has a reported 1,400 kilometre range, and according to Iranian sources uses a hypersonic glide vehicle to achieve a terminal speed of Mach 13 to Mach 15. Its combination of speed and manoeuvrability make it nearly impossible to intercept. Leading technological challenges in moving from manoeuvrable reentry vehicles to hypersonic glide vehicles include enduring skin temperatures exceeding 2,000 degrees celsius, avoiding the extreme cracking of composite materials, and maintaining stable control despite ablative erosion. Extremely accurate inertial systems, and pre-loaded terrain and trajectory shaping, are also vital. Both the Fattah and the Fattah-2 have been assessed to have significantly complicated Western and Israeli missile defence planning.

Vice President of the leading Israeli missile defence system developer Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, Yuval Baseski, in August 2025 highlighted thatIran’s development of hypersonic missiles had forced the firm and the Israel Defence Forces to rethink their approach to missile defence. “Hypersonic missiles open a new era in air defence,” Baseski observed, warning that traditional approaches to missile defence could not be relied on against such targets. “Every air defence system today is based on flying faster than the target. But this principle does not apply to hypersonic missiles. To intercept an object moving at Mach 10, one would need a defence moving at Mach 30, which is impossible in the atmosphere due to friction,” he stated. Drawing an analogyto basketball, he observed: “One interceptor missile tracking one hypersonic missile is like defending LeBron James with a single player. You may keep chasing him, but you won’t stop him from scoring.” He instead suggested a “zone defence” model, under which multiple interceptors covered defined areas and engaged threats as they entered. As Israel has yet to show signs of being able to implement this, it is likely that Iran’s Fattah-2 arsenal will be able to penetrate Israeli defences with impunity.

ATACMS first saw combat during the Gulf War in 1991 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, but gained significantly greater prominence from the mid-2020s both for its very extensive use in the Ukrainian theatre, and for its increasingly central role in NATO members’ exercises in Europe. In Ukrainian service ATACMS have provided an asymmetric means of countering larger and more capable Russian frontline units, and have been used to neutralise multiple Russian targets, including the destruction of launchers and radars from S-400 long range air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers. This makes their use for similarly high impact operations in the U.S. war effort against Iran, and the singling out of ballistic missile and air defence systems for targeting, far from unprecedented.

The destruction of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal on the ground is particularly critical for the United States and its strategic partners due to the limited capabilities of their ballistic missile defence capabilities, with the MIM-104 Patriot system having proven to be far from reliable in multiple conflicts, while stocks of interceptors missiles for both the Patriot and THAAD systems are very limited, and far from sufficient to endure sustained bombardment. Iran also operates a number of higher value ballistic missiles, such as the Fattah and Fattah-2 which have hypersonic strike capabilities, both of which are reportedly capable of evading existing missile defences. After the Fattah was used against Israel in June 2025, Israeli officials responded with considerable concern, concluding that a revolutionary and entirely new approach to missile defence operations would be needed to be able to engage them. With no such approach having been developed, the destruction of missiles before launch remains the only effective defence against them.

Footage taken atAl Udeid Air Base on February 28 has interceptor missiles launched by MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems repeatedly failing to shoot down incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, raising further questions regarding the defences at the facility. Qatari F-15s have some of the most advanced air defence capabilities of any Western fighter type, with by far the longest ranges and largest radars of any modern Western produced tactical combat jets, which they pair with advanced data links and high missile carrying capacities. While the F-15QAs are likely to provide a potent defence against drone and cruise missile attacks, however, their viability for intercepting ballistic missiles is likely to remain negligible, with the AIM-120 air-to-air missile they integrate as their primary air-to-air weapon lacking the speed or general flight performance characteristics needed to engage such targets.

The Qatari F-15QA has a significant advantage over U.S. Air Force variants due to its integration of fly-by-wire controls, which significantly improved the aircraft’s flight performance and its maximum weapons load. Qatar currently fields 36 of the fighters, which were procured under a $12 billion, placing the cost of the aircraft at $333.3 million. This makes them some of the most costly fighters ever sold. By contrast, Israeli orders for F-35I fighters have cost only around $120 million per aircraft, highlighting the much higher prices which Arab states have often been charged for equipment compared to Israel and NATO allies. Qatar and Israel have long maintained a significant strategic partnership, and cooperated particularly closely alongside Turkey and other NATO members in operations to topple the Syrian government from 2011-2024. Qatar and Israel held their first joint air force exercises in early 2025.

The failure of the U.S.-supplied air defence systems at Al Udeid Air Base closely coincides with confirmation that Iranian strikes destroyed key air defence radars at the facility. This follows a similar failure of the Patriot system during much lower intensity Iranian retaliatory strikes, which were launched with prior warning, in June 2025. The state of air defences, and the very limited available arsenal of anti-missile interceptors available, has raised questions regarding whether Qatar, the United States and the United Kingdom will be able to sustain operations from there. This has significant implications for the future operations of the F-15QA fleet. Should Qatari F-15s remain operational, it is expected that beyond air defence operations, they may also support U.S.-led air strikes against Iran, with their offensive capabilities far surpassing those of fighter types in the Israeli Air Force and most U.S. Air Force fighter types.

Operations aimed at destroying the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal face multiple challenges. Iran’s missiles largely use solid fuel composites and deploy from mobile transporter-erector launchers, which allows them to rapidly redeploy and maintain short firing cycles. The country has also with North Korean assistance constructed missile storage facilities very deep underground, often under mountains, which attacks by cruise missiles and the large majority of air-launched weapons will struggle to seriously threaten. The United States in the early 2000s developed the GBU-57 penetrative bomb specifically to be able to neutralise such targets, with the bomb having been designed for use by the country’s single squadron of B-2 stealth bombers, and allowing multiple bombers to ‘layer’ attacks to achieve greater penetration.

Although analysts have widely noted that the very small size of the B-2 fleet at just 19 aircraft significantly limits its utility, with the Air Force reported in mid-February to be working to keep the fleet at unusually high levels of operational readiness to prepare for possible attacks on Iran, a further constraint to the possible use of the aircraft to strike underground missile sites remains the serious shortages of GBU-57 bombs. The most immediate cause of the shortage was the use of 14 GBU-57 bombs during Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 to target nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz, causing a massive drawdown of the available inventory. The strike exposed the risks of having a very small pool of the cost bombs. Estimates for the remaining number of bombs stand at between six and 15 bombs. The possible use of the bombs to strike heavily fortified Yemeni targets in October 2024, when the use of B-2s was confirmed, has further raised uncertainty regarding remaining quantities.

With each bomb is estimated to cost over $370 million, the GBU-57 was never produced in large numbers, and is considered a high-value, low-density munition. A critical issue highlighted after strikes on Iran in June is the U.S. government relies on a single contractor, Boeing, which owns the intellectual property for the bomb's critical tail kit guidance system. This "vendor lock" prevents the government cannot easily sourcing components from other manufacturers to quickly increase production or resolve parts obsolescence. To meet urgent replenishment needs after the strikes, the Air Force had to award a sole-source contract to Boeing, while reverse-engineering one component from the ATACMS ballistic missile system. The supply chain issues reflect broader issues that have affected the U.S. defence sector increasingly severely since the end of the Cold War due to the contraction of industry.

While a contract valued at over $100 million was awarded to Boeing in early 2026 to produce new tail kits and other components, deliveries of replenishment GBU-57 bombs are only expected to begin in 2028. Without near term replenishment of the inventory, the B-2 fleet will be impeded in its ability to strike heavily fortified targets in Iran, including underground missile bases, with no non-nuclear weapons in the U.S. or allied arsenals having similar destructive potentials. A successor to the GBU-57 is currently under development, and will reportedly be smaller to allow for its carriage by the B-21 next generation bomber, which was designed to be lighter than the B-2 to make it more affordable for large scale procurements. There remains significant uncertainty regarding how the United States will approach the challenge posed by Iran’s heavily fortified underground missile bases.

Iranian ballistic missile strikes have been responded to with intense missile defence operations by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which have employed their own air defence systems to protect U.S. bases and other targets from Iranian strikes, making them direct participants in the war effort. The possibility of Gulf states deploying their air forces, which include some of the region’s most sophisticated fighter types, to launch retaliatory strikes on Iran, has been speculated by analysts. Alongside the United States, Israel, and the five aforementioned Gulf states, the United Kingdom has also announced its participation in the war effort, with Defence Secretary John Healey referring to the Iranian government as “abhorrent,” in line with the broader consensus in the Western world regarding the need for attacks to ensure its destruction. Royal Air Force Eurofighters which were pre-positioned in Qatar in January are reported to have been scrambled to support air defence efforts.

The failure of Patriot systems closely coincides with confirmation that Iranian strikes destroyed key air defence radars at Al Udeid Air Base, which may be among several targets that have been hit at the facility as a result of the limitations of U.S. air defences. The reliability of the Patriot system has long been in serious question, with even very limited Iranian strikes on June 23, 2025, having proven capable of striking Al Udeid Air Base, despite using lower end Fateh-313 missiles, and in spite of prior warning of the attacks having been provided to the United States. Although U.S. officials at first praised the success of U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force Patriot systems that month, the release of satellite footage showing the destruction of a radome housing the terminal communications suite forced Pentagon sources to concede that they were not fully successful despite the optimal conditions in place.

The capabilities of the Patriot system have long been cause for considerable controversy, with the systems assessed to have almost totally failed against very basic Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War, before being a primary cause of friendly fire during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq firing on multiple U.S. fighter aircraft. Despite claims of success by U.S. and Saudi sources in intercepting Yemeni ballistic missile attacks in late 2017, an investigation quickly proved that they had totally failed. When deployed to guard Saudi oil fields, they were also totally unsuccessful in intercepting drone strikes launched by either Yemeni paramilitary units or by Iran in 2019. The effectiveness of the Patriot system against Russian missile attacks has increasingly been brought to question in the Ukrainian theatre, with Ukrainian and Western sources having for months warned that its ability to intercept attacks has been limited. Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Igor Ignat having on May 26 highlighted the system’s shortcomings in this regard, , while chief of communications for Ukrainian Air Force Command Yuri Ignat in early October confirmed that the service was facing growing challenges in intercepting Russian ballistic missile attacks.

Constructed in 1996 with Qatari funding, Al Udeid serves as one of the largest U.S. military bases outside the United States, and the largest U.S. air installation in the Middle East. The base hosts the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. joint command responsible for military operations across the Middle East, and houses the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) which plans, directs, and controls coalition air operations across a wide region stretching from North Africa through Southwest and Central Asia. The base covers roughly 31 square kilometres, approximately twice the size of the primary hub of U.S. air operations in Europe Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The facility has at times operated close to 10,000 personnel, and played central roles in both years long offensives against Syria, and in the air campaign in Afghanistan up to 2021. Chinese satellite imagery in early February exposed the exact positions of an Army MIM-104 Patriot air defence system at the facility, before later confirming deployments of large numbers of support aircraft as part of the military buildup against Iran.

The capabilities of air defences in Qatar against even limited Iranian missile attacks has long been in question. Although U.S. defence officials initially praised the success of U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems in protecting Al Udeid Air Base were successful on June 23, it was later conceded by Pentagon sources that despite Iran having used less advanced Fateh-313 missiles to launch the attack, the systems were not fully successful. This admission was madefollowing the release of satellite footage which appeared to show the destruction of a radome housing the modernisation enterprise terminal communications suite, which had a value of approximately $15 million. After this was exposed by the footage, Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell confirmed in mid-July: “One Iranian ballistic missile impacted Al Udeid Air Base June 23 while the remainder of the missiles were intercepted by U.S. and Qatari air defence systems.”

The failure of missile defences in June 2025 was particularly notable not only because they were heavily concentrated at and around Al Udeid Air Base by two separate services coordinating their defences, which represented an unusually high concentration of interceptors and radars, but also because Iran had given the U.S. Armed Forces prior warning of the strike. This has long led analysts to project that a viable defence of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ assets across the Middle East will not be possible in the event of a large scale conflict. It remains uncertain, but highly possible, that the destruction of ballistic missile defence radars may significantly further impede U.S., Qatari and Bahraini forces’ ability to conduct missile defence operations. The U.S. Army has heavily depleted its stockpiles of surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot system, which in July 2025 were confirmed to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon, in large part due to the scale of donations of the systems and associated munitions made to Ukraine by the Joe Biden administration from 2023-2024. This has further limited its ability to sustain shootdowns of Iranian ballistic missiles, particularly against forward positioned facilities like Al Udeid Air Base.

The statement by the UAE Defence Ministry has fuelled speculation that the country may escalate its involvement in the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran, with the possibility of other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia also contributing by flying fighter sorties remaining significant. The UAE Air Force’s primary offensive capability is provided by a fleet of 78 F-16E/F Block 60 Desert Falcon fighters, with the country being the sole operator of this unique and heavily customised F-16 variant. Delivered from 2004-2007, the fighters were among the first in the word to integrate active electronically scanned array radars, namely the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-80, giving them a comfortable advantage over Iranian fighter types, and over all Israeli fighter types other than the F-35A.

Compared to the mechanically scanned array radars integrated onto prior F-16 variants, the AN/APG-80 gives the F-16E/F significantly more advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground detection and targeting capabilities, including simultaneous track-while-scan operations, much lower vulnerability to jamming, and a much greater electronic warfare capability. The fighters also integrate the Falcon Edge electronic warfare suite, and the AN/ASQ-32 targeting system. If launching sorties against targets in Iran, the fighters could use targeting data from allied U.S. or Israeli assets, and launch AGM-84H SLAM-ER missiles to engage targets at beyond visual ranges. They can also employ AGM-88C HARM anti-radiation missiles to seek and destroy Iranian air defence systems. The UAE Air Force is expected to procure fifth generation fighter aircraft in the near future, with the South Korean KF-21, Russian Checkmate, and Chinese J-35, all considered leading potential options.

If striking Iranian targets, the UAE remains highly vulnerable to retaliation due to its proximity to Iran and the vast quantities of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones which the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fields. This may deter the country from openly participating in hostilities beyond defending U.S. assets on its territory using its air defence systems. The UAE Air Force’s F-16s were particularly outstanding assets when procured in the 2000s, and by far the most sophisticated Western fighter types ever exported at the time, although today their performance has been overshadowed by other fighter types, such as the F-35s sold to Israel, the F-15SA/QA fighters sold to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Su-30MKA, Su-35 and Su-57 fighters fielded by Algeria, and the Su-35s ordered by Iran, which have yet to be delivered. While the UAE’s fleet is capable, its air defence capabilities against escalated Iranian strikes are very limited, which may deter it from taking to the offensive.

Iran first ordered MiG-29A fighters and MiG-29UB trainers from the Soviet Union in 1989, providing the country with its first Soviet origin fighter types. These saw their numbers supplemented by additional MiG-29s which were flown to Iranian airfields by Iraqi pilots to escape U.S.-led coalition strikes during the Gulf War in 1991. The fighters have been conservatively modernised domestically, but are considered obsolete for high intensity engagements with modern fighter types. Nevertheless, the Israeli Air Force notably relies on ageing fourth generation fighters to form the large majority of its fleet, many of which are similarly obsolete and some of which are much older than Iran’s MiG-29s. MiG-29s can thus potentially pose a threat to Israeli F-16C/D, F-16I, F-15A/B/C/D, and F-15I fighters, particularly if these aircraft are carrying heavy loads of air-to-ground ordinance.

Iran has made no significant fighter procurements since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with post-Soviet Russia having consistently been pressured by Israel and Western Bloc states not to supply new fighters. The first fighter deal between the two countries was reported in 2022 to have been signed for the supply of Su-35 fighters, although these have yet to be delivered.Leaked Russian government documents in late 2025 showed that Russia was scheduled to deliver of 48 Su-35 fighters to re-equip the Iranian Air Force, representing half of the Su-35’s entire export profile. With U.S.-led attacks having been launched before the Su-35 could be delivered, the MiG-29 remains Iran’s most capable fighter type.

The Iranian Air Force was reported by local media in September to have received new MiG-29 aircraft from Russia, with these reportedly arriving at Shiraz Air Base. The aircraft have far lower procurement and operational costs than the Su-35, which may lead them to be seen as more cost effective. The large numbers of MiG-29s Russia has in reserve, and the lack of requirements for new training for Iranian personnel, could allow them to be delivered much more quickly. If these local media reports were accurate, it remains highly uncertain what quantities of MiG-29s may have been delivered, and whether these were modernised to a ‘4+ generation’ standard with modern phased array radars and new types of missile such as the R-77-1 and R-74, which would provide a tremendously superior combat potential to the Soviet era MiG-29A. Russia has developed a number of ‘4+ generation’ modernisation packages for Soviet era MiG-29 airframes, most notably the MiG-29SMT and MiG-29UPG, which have significant performance advantages over Israeli fighter types other than the F-35.

The United States has relied on its vast network of regional military bases for a wide range of operations, including to support an almost 14 year long campaign against Iran’s close strategic partner Syria from 2011, which involved extensive use of air power to allow the U.S. to establish illegal military bases on Syrian territory, and punish any attacks by the Syrian government on forces based there. This culminated in the total defeat of the Syrian government in December 2024, leaving Iran isolated and now allowing Syrian airspace to be used to launch air strikes from Israel. Iran’s attacks on the U.S. network of bases is historically totally unprecedented, and if successful has the potential to shift the balance of power in the Middle East by denying forward staging grounds for air strikes.

Initial U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted multiple Iranian cities including Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj and Kermanshah, reportedly targeting military infrastructure, and missile production facilities associated with Iran’s leadership. Multiple Western and Israeli sources have reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was a primary target in the opening strikes of the war, with significant uncertainties remaining regarding the extent of U.S. and Israeli successes in eliminating their targets. Supporting the United States and Israel, the United Arab Emirates has stated that it reserves the right to respond, raising speculating that it may deploy its F-16 or Mirage 2000 fighters to launch air strikes. Qatar and Bahrain have reportedly already participated in engagements by activating their U.S.-supplied air defence systems to attempt to intercept Iranian strikes.

Preceding hostilities the United States launched a major military buildup across multiple regional military bases, with satellite imagery confirming a large buildup of U.S. Air Force support aircraft at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia, including the stationing of 16 KC-135 aerial tankers and six E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Satellite imagery previously confirmed aa surge in Air Force deployments of KC-135s to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with at least 16 of the aircraft seen at runways at the facility, and exposed the exact positions of an Army MIM-104 Patriot air defence system at the same facility. Prior satellite imagery confirmed the deployment of Army THAAD anti-ballistic missile systems at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where EA-18G electronic attack jets and F-15E strike fighters were previously deployed. Satellite images showing a withdrawal of assets from a number of facilities in the hours preceding attacks has fuelled speculation that they may have been redeployed to bases in Turkey.

China has built “the second-best remote sensing architecture in the world from outer space, and that’s now what they have,” according to Gagnon. He added: “So when 2013 started, and he came to power, he had less than 100 satellites that were the total of what China had in outer space. They have about 1,900 today. Over 500 of those satellites are remote sensing satellites, which are purposely designed and networked to track mobile forces such as U.S. carriers, destroyers, and cruisers in the Pacific, as well as aircraft that deploy around the Pacific. Those have been built with a purpose. The purpose is to cue their long-range fire weapons.” Gagnon also observed that efforts were underway to bolstering the survivability of U.S. satellites, observing: “Protective measures on satellites is just like thinking about protective measures on aircraft, okay? And we’re working through that.“ “I won’t provide specifics, because I want those protective measures to work, right? I don’t want to tell Beijing and Moscow what I’ve done,” he added.

China has increasingly led the world in developing new space capabilities, including leading by close to a decade in operationalising a space-based quantum communications network, where no other countries have taken serious steps to contest its leadership. The world’s first quantum satellite Micius, which was launched in August 2016, quickly demonstrated satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution, creating cryptographic keys based on quantum physics rather than mathematical complexity. This provides communications that are outstandingly resilience against cyberattacks, and makes command and control significantly more robust. In January 2026, Chinese firm Alibaba’s Qwen-3 on January 25 was confirmed to have become one of the world’s first general-purpose artificial intelligence models to be uploaded and operated in orbit, marking a major milestone in China’s emerging leadership in space-based computing sector.

The U.S. Golden Dome program announced in 2025 is expected to unprecedentedly escalate the militarisation of space through the deployment of the world’s first space-based anti-missile interceptors. These interceptors have seen their feasibility widely questioned, however, due not only to the costs involved, but also to the viability of reliability neutralising advanced new generations of ballistic missiles such as those with hypersonic capabilities. The Golden Dome program has been widely assessed to represent a response to major advances in Chinese intercontinental range hypersonic strike capabilities. Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned as early as 2021 regarding the threats these posed: ”They launched a long-range missile. It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” He stressed the high degree of accuracy demonstrated, adding that China was is developing capabilities "stunning," and that its technological advantages could provide the capability to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. The future head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Vice Admiral Richard Correll in November 2025 stressed that the Golden Dome had a vital role in ensuring the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes.

M1A2 Abrams tanks began deliveries to the Republic of China Army in December 2024, with 38 arriving in a first batch which was assigned to the 3rd Combined Arms Battalion of the 584th Armoured Brigade. Training for crews at the Hukou Armor Training Command began in early 2025, while a second batch of 42 tanks arrived in July that year, after which the Army operationalised the vehicles on October 31. Local officers have noted that the tanks provide “a major leap forward in firepower, mobility and protection” over Cold War era M60 tanks, particularly prising their“hunter-killer” capabilities, which allow “the gunner to engage a target while the commander uses an independent thermal sight to locate the next one” to increase engagement efficiency.

The Republic of China Army has recently provided considerable publicity to the roles being played by female personnel in operating newly procured M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks. Particular attention has been provided to female tank platoon leader from the University Reserve Officer Training Corps Liu Jingyao, who has earned the title of the third “Steel Flower” in the M1A2 fleet, who serves with the 269th Brigade’s Lion Force, after having graduated from the Department of Foreign Languages at Shih Chien University and the Army Academy’s ROTC Class of 2013. Female soldiers are reported to be playing key roles in the Army's replacement of its Cold War era tanks with the M1A2, and demonstrating professionalism and prowess. Efforts to promote female personnel appear to be part of broader efforts to bolster recruitment, with associations with the high profile new tanks potentially bolstering this recruitment drive.

The first delivery of Su-57 fighters to a foreign client was reported in November 2025, with the aircraft confirmed to have become operational in the Algerian Air Force. This was followed by the release of the first footage of their operations in Algerian service in the first week of February. Within days of the footage’s release, Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had already been signed in the Middle East region for the export of the Su-57, observing that “some contracts have been signed, though I cannot disclose the details.” Iran is considered the most likely client in the region. The Su-57 is considered India’s only near term option to procure fifth generation fighters, with other fighters produced by both China and the United States remaining excluded for political reasons, the former due to ongoing border disputes, and the latter due to considerable restrictions placed on the levels of autonomy with which they can be used.

Assessments of possible Indian procurements have centred around three primary possibilities, including ‘off the shelf’ orders, license production with conservative changes, and a more ambitious joint program under which the aircraft is heavily adapted to integrate local Indian-designed subsystems. The most likely option appears to be that orders for Russian-built fighters will be placed to quickly equip equip two to three initial squadrons, after which deliveries from local production lines will begin, either for similar aircraft or for a highly customised variant. Another possibility is that the level of customisation and inputs of indigenous subsystems will be planned to increase over successive production batches. This would mirror the Su-30MKI’s significant increase in indigenous inputs over more than 15 years of license production, including not only Russian-designed components built under license, but also in a small but growing number of cases locally designed subsystems.

Commenting on the possibility of a deeply customised Su-57 variant being brought into service, Indian Air Force Group Captain M. J. Augustine Vinod noted in January 2026 that the combination of the Russian airframe and engines with local avionics and other subsystems could be particularly potent. “When you combine the exceptional aerodynamics of Su-57 and the Indian avionics and software to it, you have an airplane much better than the F-35,” he claimed. Indian sources have widely speculated that a miniaturised variant of theVirupaksha AESA radar currently under development for the Su-30MKi could be integrated onto the Su-57. The radar will reportedly use an antenna with a 950mm diameter and approximately 2400 transmitter/receiver modules, and gallium nitride technologies for improved efficiency. The ability of Indian industry to provide a competitive airborne radar and other subsystems by the mid-2030s remains in question.

In February 2025 it was confirmed that a license production agreement for the Su-57 was being considered. Eleven months later the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. In June 2025 the Russian Defence Ministry was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the Su-57’s source code as part of a license production deal, while Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev six months later in December alluding to the possibility of this reaching the stage of a fully joint program. This would prove India with joint ownership of key technologies, and potentially allow a jointly developed variant with Indian avionics to be exported as an alternative to fully Russian variants. Offers of customisation and high autonomy in operating and modifying the aircraft contrast sharply with the strict controls which Western suppliers have placed over their fifth and even fourth generation fighters.

Chairman Kim highlighted the need to integrate nuclear forces into broader military doctrine, emphasising that nuclear forces are the “backbone” of deterrence and national defence and will be maintained at constant readiness, with testing and exercises to ensure effectiveness. He also stressed the importance of developing more advanced delivery systems, elaborating that plans include developing more capable types of intercontinental ballistic missile, including missiles with such ranges that can be launched from submarines. Also planned for development are more nuclear-capable submarines and sea-launched systems. The chairman revealed that these programs would be complemented by the development of AI enabled attack drones and other advanced weapons, as well as development of weapons designed to strike satellites and other space targets.

At the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a strategic plan for the next five years (2026-2030) of modernisation of the Korean People’s Army focused heavily on nuclear and strategic weapons modernisation, including conventional and unconventional capabilities undergirded by nuclear strength. The planned development of anti-satellite weapons was a particularly notable aspect of the new plan, and follows speculation that North Korea could seek technology transfers from the Russian S-500, S-550 or A-235 space warfare systems to achieve this. This would represent a clear next step for the country’s air defence network after the development of tactical systems with broadly analogous capabilities to the Russian S-400 system. North Korea’s export of tens of billions of dollars worth of armaments to Russia since 2022 has likely provided considerable capital and leverage to request access to sensitive technologies.

North Korea first demonstrated the ability to launch nuclear strikes against the United States mainland with the successful test of the new Hwasong-14 ballistic missile on July 4, 2017, in what would prove to be a pivotal moment in the East Asian state’s seven decades long conflict with the United States. The test was the first of three that year demonstrating an effective intercontinental range strike capability, which experts would consider key to pressing the United States to come to the negotiating table in 2018 and significantly revise its objectives for its conflict with Pyongyang. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command John Hyten would be among several to later stress the pivotal significance of North Korea’s achievement, observing during an assessment in early 2020 that this had “changed the entire structure of the world,” for the first time allowing a small state to deter a superpower without relying on its own superpower protector.

North Korea has continued to significantly improve its missile deterrent, most recently with test launches of the Hwasong-17 from March 2022, and the solid fuelled Hwasong-18 from April 2023, and the larger solid fuelled Hwasong-19 from October 2024. The latest ICBM type, the Hwasong-20, was unveiled in October 2025. North Korean state media in December 2025 published the first images of the country’s long anticipated first nuclear powered submarine, revealing that the ship is currently under construction. A nuclear submarine fleet is expected to revolutionise the country’s second stage nuclear deterrent. The development of an airborne nuclear delivery capability to form a fully nuclear triad has been speculated, with the possibility having been widely raised of exports of Russian Su-34 strike fighters or Su-57 stealth fighters to help cover the costs of mass imports of North Korean ground forces equipment. Either of these aircraft would provide a long range nuclear delivery capability against U.S. bases across much of the Pacific, and in the Su-34’s case as far as Hawaii or even the U.S. mainland depending on its missile loadout.

F-22s have seen far fewer deployments outside the United States, with no units permanently stationed abroad, unlike the F-15, F-16 and F-35 which are permanently stationed at multiple facilities across the world. This reflects both the more limited numbers of F-22s that are in service, with over 75 percent of production numbers having been cancelled, as well as the type’s very low versatility and low availability rates which limits its suitability for foreign deployments. Despite being one of the newest fighter types in the Air Force, the F-22’s availability rates have remained by far the poorest at well below 50 percent, with this expected to worsen as the fleet ages and airframes become more worn out. In May 2021 the Air Force confirmed that the F-22 was not part of its future plans for the fighter fleet, with the aircraft intended for an early retirement despite the Cold War era F-15s and F-16s it was designed to replace being retained in service and continuing to be produced.

Preceding the service entry of the F-35 and F-15EX, and the modernisation of the F-15E Strike Eagle fleet, the F-22 had an elite status within the U.S. Air Force, leading it to be deployed during times of high tensions. This included a deployment to Osan Air Base in South Korea, which is a active air base located close to the Korean Demilitarized Zone, during high tensions with North Korea in early 2016 and late 2017, and a subsequent deployment to Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates in 2019 at a time of high tensions with Iran. When based at Al Dhafra, the fighters also operated extensively inside Syrian airspace against the objections of the Syrian government, supporting U.S. forces in maintaining an illegal occupation of territory in the country’s northeast to appropriate and sell off oil resources there as part of a campaign to starve the Syrian economy. The United States worked particularly close with Israel, Turkey and Qatar to maximise pressure on the Syrian state, culminating in its total defeat in December 2024 after an almost 13 year long collective campaign.

The Air Force’s efforts from the early 2020s to begin retiring F-22s that were only a fraction of the way through their service lives, while continuing to invest in the procurement of new F-15s, the Raptor’s direct predecessor and a design that is 30 years older, provided a strong indicator that the F-22 program had been far from successful. Although designed as a high performing air superiority fighter, the F-22’s increasingly obsolete avionics leave it at a severe disadvantage against the F-35 which is in production today. The fighter’s utility in a potential war with Iran remains in question, with its short range, ageing radar, and lack of any air-to-ground missiles limiting its ability to launch strikes, collect intelligence or support the destruction of air defences as EA-18Gs, F-15s, F-35s and other aircraft can. Iran’s obsolete fighter fleet, meanwhile, poses little challenge to U.S. air dominance, meaning the F-22’s specialised air-to-air capabilities will likely be of limited value. A limited payload and endurance, meanwhile, make the F-22 far less optimal for anti-drone duties than fighters such as the F-15. A primary function of the deployment to Israel may thus be to boost local morale due to the F-22’s reputation, which has been built up over decades with extensive public relations efforts.

The release of images of the F-22s in Israel closely follows the release of Chinese satellite imagery confirming a large buildup of U.S. Air Force support aircraft at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia, including the stationing of 16 KC-135 aerial tankers and six E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Chinese satellite imagery previously confirmed a number of deployments by the U.S. Army and Air Force across the Middle East, including a surge in Air Force deployments of KC-135s to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with at least 16 of the aircraft seen at runways at the facility. Satellite earlier in the months exposed the exact positions of an Army MIM-104 Patriot air defence system at the same facility. Prior publication of imagery confirmed the deployment of a Army THAAD anti-ballistic missile systems at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where EA-18G electric attack jets and F-15E strike fighters have also been deployed.

The F-16 has been involved in multiple crashes in recent months, with a Republic of China Air Force F-16V fighter having crashed during a routine training mission on January 6, marking the latest of several fighter losses by the service to accidents in recent years. An F-16 fielded by the Polish Air Force crashed during an airshow rehearsal near Radom, central Poland, in August. Ukrainian Air Force F-16s have suffered a particularly high crash rate, although this has been attributed to the complexity of their anti-drone duties and the lack of experience of local pilots, as the fighters were rushed into service for wartime use. This has reportedly resulted in experienced U.S. and Dutch pilots being dispatched as contractors to fly the aircraft for the service. It is notable, however, that F-16 crashes have been highly concentrated in South Korea. When the U.S. Air Force on January 31 confirmed that an F-16 under the 8th Fighter Wing had fallen into the sea near the western South Korean city of Gunsan, it marked the third crash of a U.S. F-16 in Korea in under nine months.

Previously a U.S. Air Force F-16C crashed into farmland near Osan Air Base, South Korea, during a routine training flight, on May 6, 2023, after which another U.S. F-16 experienced an in-flight emergency and crashed into the Yellow Sea off South Korea’s west coast on December 11 that year. The performance record of F-16 squadrons based in South Korea has been among the poorest in the U.S. Air Force in terms of their safety record. Locally operated F-16s have also suffered from a not insignificant crash rate, with a South Korean F-16D twin seat fighter having crashed on June 11, 2025 during a training exercise in Alaska, while preceding this in November 2022 a South Korean F-16C experienced an engine failure and crashed west of Wonju. A further accident, although not resulting in a crash, saw two South Korean F-16s accidentally released live Mk-82 bombs on a civilian area near Pocheon during an exercise in March 2025.

An estimated more than 750 F-16s have been lost two crashes since the type first entered service in 1978, although early F-16 years operated in the late 1970s and 1989s had significantly higher accident rates than those currently in service. Losses represent close to 19 percent of all F-16s ever built. The crash rate of the fighter’s successor, the F-35A, has been significantly lower, despite issues with the aircraft’s complex software having directly caused crashes in the past. The South Korean Air Force is currently one of the largest operators of the F-16, and has modernised a portion of its fleet to the F-16V standard integrating fifth generation level avionics and weaponry. The aircraft are expected to begin to be phased out of service and replaced by indigenously developed KF-21 fighters in the mid-late 2030s.

In June Indian Defence Minister Radjnath Singh held talks with his Russian counterpart Andrey Belousov on the further modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet. The meeting was held “against the backdrop of Operation Sindoor,” according to the Defence Ministry, in reference to India’s air offensive against Pakistan in early May. The perceived underperformance of the fleet during the operation, with the loss of several fighters confirmed including at least one newly procured French Rafale, is considered a major factor stimulating interest in modernising the Su-30MKI. During a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India from December 4, representatives of both countries reportedly discussed plans to upgrade the Su-30MKI fleet and the possibly of further expanding production.

It remains highly uncertain what technologies and subsystems are envisaged to modernise the Su-30MKI. A significant possibility is that they will integrate the AL-41F-1S engines that have been used on the Su-30SM2, providing a far superior flight performance, a longer range through improved fuel efficiency, and reduced operational costs and maintenance needs. The engine’s integration can considerably improve availability rates for the large and high maintenance aircraft. It would also provide three dimensional thrust vectoring capabilities, improving on the two dimensional thrust vectoring which the Su-30MKI was the first fighter in the world to operationalise to revolutionise the aircraft’s low speed manoeuvrability. The integration of the new R-77M air-to-air missile is also likely, and would provide a broadly peer level capability to the Meteor missiles on the Rafale fighters, and the PL-15 missiles carried by Pakistani J-10C and JF-17 Block III fighters.

A significant possibility remains that contracts to upgrade the Su-30MKI could be linked to technology transfers agreed to under a license production deal for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter, the procurement of which is planned to provide a direct successor as the backbone of the Indian fleet. It was confirmed in February 2025 that a license production deal for the Su-57 was being considered, while the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. In June 2025 the Russian Defence Ministry was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the Su-57’s source code as part of a license production deal, while Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December alluded to the possibility of this reaching the stage of a fully joint program, providing the Indian defence sector with joint ownership of key technologies.

Chinese commercial satellite imagery has confirmed a number of deployments by the U.S. Army and Air Force across the Middle East, including a surge in U.S. Air Force deployments of KC-135 aerial refuelling tankers to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with at least 16 of the aircraft seen at runways at the facility. This follows the publication of satellite imagery exposing the exact positions of a U.S. Army MIM-104 Patriot air defence system at the Al Udeid Air Base, and the prior publication of imagery confirming the deployment of a U.S. Army THAAD anti-missile system at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. Due to the far shorter ranges which Western fighters have on average compared to their Chinese or Russian counterparts, Western air forces generally rely heavily on aerial refuelling for operations against major state adversaries, which makes a sizeable presence of KC-135s critical for any large scale attack. Wide ranging issues with the newer KC-46 tankers, one of which recently broke down while transiting through Portugal, have further increased reliance on the older KC-135 fleet.

E-3s carry by far the largest airborne radars in the world, and are relied on to control the tactical battlespace, using data links to significantly increase the situational awareness of U.S. and allied networks. They also have the ability to guide missiles fired by fighters, ships, or ground-based systems to their targets using their powerful sensors, with the large majority of air-to-air kills achieved during the Gulf War having been achieved with E-3 support. Despite their critical role, the viability of the E-3 fleet has increasingly been called to question, as not only have availability rates fallen, but their radars and other avionics have also increasingly been considered obsolete. This limits situational awareness, particularly against stealth targets such as Iran’s Shahed 191 drones, while also increasing vulnerability to electronic warfare.

The importance of replacing the E-3 was previously highlighted by commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces General Kenneth Wilsbach, who noted in March 2022 shortly after confirmation of the first encounter with Chinese J-20 stealth fighters: “our early warning aircraft could not see the J-20… Those sensors that we rely on on the E-3 aren’t really capable in the twenty-first century especially against a [stealth] platform like the J-20 or something similar to that. It just can’t see those platforms far enough out to be able to provide an advantage to the shooters.” “That’s why I would like to have the E-7,” he added. Mounting maintenance issues have often left the Air Force with no AWACS support in key regions such as the Pacific, while limiting coverage for the defence of the U.S. mainland itself. Nevertheless, Iran’s lack of modern fighter aircraft, or of stealth aircraft beyond limited attack and reconnaissance drone fleets, means that the E-3 may still remain viable.

Ukraine first received ATACMS in early October 2023, with their first confirmed combat use occurring on the night of October 16. U.S. officials the following day acknowledged that ATACMS had been provided and already employed. Deliveries were made following the failure of large scale Ukrainian offensives that were launched against Russian positions in June, with ATACMS providing an asymmetric means of countering larger and more capable Russian frontline units after the Ukrainian Army suffered extreme losses over several months. The ballistic missile system has been used successfully to neutralise multiple Russian targets, with examples having included the destruction of launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers, and the destruction of high value combat aircraft on their runways. Where prior attacks were focused on targets in disputed regions, the first ATACMS strike on internationally recognised Russian territory was carried out in November 2025.

The previous confirmed employment of ATACMS missiles by Ukrainian forces was recorded on November 18, when Ukrainian strikes targeted military facilities in Russia’s Voronezh region, meaning the latest is the first confirmed strike delivered using the systems in over three months. The United States has faced shortages of the systems, and is delivering them to multiple clients across the world including the Republic of China Armed Forces, where they are being deployed under joint American command facing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. While HIMARS rocket artillery systems previously provided to Ukraine were limited in their ability to target frontline positions, as Russian electronic warfare systems seriously eroded their reliability, ATACMS can be used to strike strategic targets and command and control facilities far behind the frontlines which have less electronic defences. It remains uncertain on what scale the United States may have replenished Ukrainain stockpiles of the missiles.

Commenting on the deployment of F-22s, retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula described the move as significant, telling the New York Times it “indicates preparation for a more aggressive stance toward Iran and potential cooperation with Israel in an attack. It signals that the U.S. is serious about attacking if Iran does not agree to U.S. terms.” This aligns with a threat issued by President Donald Trump that“really bad things” will happen if Iran does not comply, with the United States demanding an abnormal degree of constraints on the country’s civilian nuclear program, and unilateral curbing of the Iranian ballistic missile deterrent. Iran’s ballistic missile strike capabilities are considered the primary factor which have deterred Western and Israeli attacks in the past, and which forced the United States and Israel to cease hostilities in June 2025 after causing very considerable damage to targets across Israel.

The F-22 is in many respects the least versatile 21st century fighter in service anywhere in the world, and lacks the advanced data sharing and electronic warfare capabilities of the F-35, while being restricted to a shorter range despite its much larger size due to its far greater fuel consumption. The aircraft lacks any access to air-to-ground or anti-ship missiles, meaning it can only engage targets at range using AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. The importance of this capability against Iran may remains, since the Iranian Air Force fields no post-Cold War fighter types, and primarily relies on Vietnam War era F-4D/E and F-5E fighters, while F-22s operating from bases in Israel will regardless remain out of range of penetration operations into Iran unless having extensive aerial refuelling support.

A likely primary purpose of F-22 deployments to Israel is to bolster Israeli morale, with the F-22’s reputation as a ‘super fighter’ having been built up over decades by extensive public relations efforts despite their aircraft’s considerable limitations and design issues. The F-22’s combat potential is today particularly limited when comparing it to newer fighter types such as the F-35 and F-15EX. A primary operating role the aircraft could perform is to support anti-drone operations, as Iran has in the past launched large swarms of single use drones against Israeli targets. Nevertheless, fighters such as the F-15 will arguably be much more capable of performing such operations, as they not only maintain higher availability rates, but also carry more air-to-air missiles, and can carry laser-guided rockets to provide a more cost effective solution against low value targets. The F-15 also has a much longer range, and while most variants in service integrate much more powerful radars than the F-22’s ageing AN/APG-77 which dates back to the 1990s. The U.S. Air Force has already deployed F-15E fighters to Jordan from late January.

Most of the USS Gerald Ford’s approximately over 600 toilets have reportedly become non-functional at times, forcing sailors to wait up to 45 minutes or more for working facilities. According to the Navy Times, the supercarrier received an average of one "sewage-related maintenance call per day" during its 2025 deployment. Internal records show hundreds of failures of the USS Gerald Ford’s sewage system over short periods, including an internal report of 205 breakdowns in four days during 2025, forcing the carrier to seek external assistance dozens of times since 2023 to try to keep the system serviceable. The use of a specialised acid flush, costing around $400,000 per use, has sometimes been necessary to clear buildup and can only be done in port, not at sea. The requirement for sailors and technicians to work long hours to manage the problem has reportedly contributed to low morale, exacerbating the demoralisation already caused by the significant extension of the supercarrier’s deployment long past usual durations. U.S. Navy officials say the toilet problems haven’t compromised mission capabilities, but they are a serious quality-of-life concern.

Issues with the USS Gerald Ford have been wide ranging, affecting its weapons elevators, electromagnetic catapults, human waste management and sensors. A Project on Government Oversight report accordingly referred to the program as an example of “how not to build a ship,” with radars proving to be sufficient flawed that it was decided an entirely new sensor suite would need to be developed for future Gerald Ford class ships. These issues caused major delays, and while the ship belatedly entered service in June 2017, it could not commence its first operational deployment for over five years until October 2022. At over $17.5 billion it is the most costly warship ever built, coasting over twice as much as its Nimitz Class predecessors. Delays the integration of the F-35C fifth generation fighter with the ship’s electromagnetic catapult system have been severe, leaving its air wing reliant solely on fourth generation F-18 fighters, and allowing China to integrate the rival J-35 fifth generation fighter with the electromagnetic catapult system of its first supercarrier the Fujian before the U.S. could with its equivalent aircraft, despite an American headstart of over a decade.

The F-16 has been involved in multiple crashes in recent months, withthe U.S. Air Force on January 31 confirmed that an F-16 under the 8th Fighter Wing had fallen into the sea near the western South Korean city of Gunsan, marking the third crash of a U.S. F-16 in Korea in under nine months. Earlier that month, a Republic of China Air Force F-16V fighter crashed during a routine training mission on January 6, marking the latest of several fighter losses by the service to accidents in recent years. An F-16 fielded by Turkey’s NATO ally and close security parter Poland crashed during an airshow rehearsal near Radom, central Poland, in August. A particularly high crash rate affecting Ukrainain Air Force F-16s flown by local pilots has reportedly resulted in experienced U.S. and Dutch pilots being dispatched as contractors to fly the aircraft for the service.

The Turkish Air Force relies on the F-16 to deliver nuclear strikes against potential adversaries, with the service having wartime access to U.S. Air Force B61-12 nuclear bombs stored in the country, and training its fighter pilots and ground crews to employ them. This shared Turkish nuclear capability, combined with Israel’s French-backed development of nuclear weapons, were considered among the primary factors leading Syria, which is situated between the two countries, to develop a chemical weapons arsenal and seek closer defence cooperation with the USSR, followed by Russia. Before the toppling of the Syrian state by Turkish and Western backed Islamist paramiltiary groups in December 2024, the Turkish Air Force F-16 fleet was highly active in providing air support to jihadist militias on the ground, which extended to shooting down Syrian aircraft deep inside the country’s airspace.

Su-57 fifth generation fighters from the latest batch delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces on February 9 have integrated a new passive sensor, the upgraded 101KS onboard optical-electronic self-defence system, among other enhancements that set them apart from prior batches. This has fuelled speculation that the Su-57s built for Algeria may have also been built to this new standard. In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway for accelerated Su-57 deliveries, following the opening of new facilities for their production, raising the possibility that Algeria will receive significantly more of the fighters in 2026, possibly even completing its order. Production is expected to exceed 25 fighters in 2026. Preceding the delivery of the Su-57, the Algerian Air Force was already considered by far the most capable in the Arab world, with the Su-30MKI ‘4+ generation’ heavyweight long range fighter forming the backbone of its fleet, while the first Su-35 air superiority fighters were delivered in February 2025.

In early February Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had already been signed in the Middle East region for the export of the Su-57, observing that “some contracts have been signed, though I cannot disclose the details.” This raised considerable speculation regarding which country may have placed orders, with Syria and Iraq, which during the Cold War were the primary regional clients for Russia armaments, have both seen their governments toppled by Western-led military interventions, while Yemen, which was a more minor client, has been deeply destabilised since 2011. With Western-aligned Arab states facing considerable pressure not to procure advanced Russian equipment, Iran thus appears to be the most likely buyer of the new fighter type in the Middle East, following confirmation that it has ordered 48 Su-35 fighters, and in January began to receive Mi-28 attack helicopters.

Following deliveries to Algeria and the signing of a contract with an unknown Middle Eastern client, it is expected that the Su-57 will make its most significant breakthrough on export markets with a major license production deal with the Indian Defence Ministry, which currently holding talks to procure a minimum of 140 aircraft. With India having recently been refused access to the source code governing the French Rafale fighter’s main electronic systems and its electronic warfare suite, including the SPECTRA defensive aids package, under a deal discussed for the sale of the fighters, the appeal of the Su-57 is expected to further increase. The Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to fifth generation fighter’s source code. Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December alluded to the possibility of this reaching the stage of a fully joint program with India, potentially resulting in the development of a heavily customised variant which could proven an alternative to the baseline Su-57 on export markets.

The Su-57 has the advantage over other fighters of its generation of far greater high intensity combat testing, including air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace in the Ukrainian theatre. The sale of the fighters to Algeria has significantly shifted the balance of power in the air in the region, providing distinct superiority over European fourth generation fighters such as the Rafale, and a challenge that is in some respects on a peer level to the F-35s being rapidly procured by NATO members and by Israel. NATO members across the Mediterranean continue to be considered the primary potential threat to Algerian security, particularly after their assault against neighbouring Libya in 2011 caused mass destruction and permanently destabilised the country. As the only Arab state which remains outside the Western sphere of influence, with the partial exceptions of Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania, Algeria is expected to continue to face major threats to its security from Western Bloc states, as well as their regional partners including Turkey, Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Although the Indian Air Force accepted restrictions on its previous 36 Rafales, should it procure an additional 114 fighters the aircraft would be the second most widely fielded in its fleet, behind a fleet of over 270 Su-30MKI heavyweight fighters procured from Russia. Although France has been able to a gain considerable market share or the Rafale abroad in large part by imposing far fewer restrictions on how it is operated and allowing greater autonomy than other Western fighter producers, in particular the United States, the constraints which it has imposed have been far less flexible than those put in place by Russia, which remains its primary competition for Indian fighter orders. While other clients for the Rafale have not faced Russian competition, due to Western Bloc political pressure which has locked Russian fighters out of key markets from Indonesia to the United Arab Emirates, India’s resilience to sanctions threats has posed a challenge to French efforts to market the aircraft.

Russia’s assent to very considerable autonomy in operating, modifying, and indigenising production of the Su-30MKI was a primary factor leading the Indian Air Force not only to plan a large fleet of over 150 aircraft, but also to expand it, with over 220 Su-30MKI fighters having been produced under license in the country after 50 were supplied by Russia. The fighters have extensively integrated both Indian and third party subsystems and weapons, from local Astra radar guided air-to-air missiles to British AIM-132 infrared guided air-to-air missiles and Israeli SPICE guided bombs. The fighters are currently planned to be modernised with the integration of an indigenous Indian active electronically scanned array radar in the early 2030s.

While the Rafale’s technologies are valued by the Indian defence sector, which has struggled to develop its own ‘4+ generation’ fighters and relies heavily on foreign technological inputs, the Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the source code of the Su-57 fifth generation as part of a license production deal. This would place Indian Su-57s entirely in a league of their own among fighters of their generation in their levels of customisability and the degree to which they can integrate indigenous technologies. Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December alluded to the possibility of this reaching the stage of a fully joint program, providing the Indian defence sector with joint ownership of key technologies. This has drawn a stark contrast to French restrictions on technology sharing and operational autonomy.

It was confirmed in February 2025 that a license production deal for the Su-57 was being considered, while the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. With France and the wider Western world remaining in a state of intense conflict with Russia, and working to starve its defence sector of revenues, there remains a strong incentive to present the Indian Defence Ministry with a more attractive offer to procure the Rafale. This would divert funds to French industry, which would otherwise likely finance larger scale Su-57 procurements. Delays to the development of the indigenous AMCA fifth generation fighter program in India have fuelled speculation that the Su-57’s appeal will continue to grow, with the possibility of a very high level of indigenisation of the Russian origin fighter making it particularly attractive.

Putin’s address was made at a time of high tensions and rising tensions with NATO across multiple theatres, and less than a month after the expiration of the New START Treaty, a bilateral agreement reached in 2010 which had limited the U.S. and Russian arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads on 700 delivery systems. The United States refused multiple offers to extend to treaty or to reach a new agreement.Preceding the treaty’s expiry, the importance of the Russian nuclear deterrent had continued to gain growing attention since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre in February 2022, as a primary factor preventing NATO members from further expanding their already very extensive military involvement on the ground.

The significance of the Russian nuclear deterrent in the context of the conflict of Ukraine was alluded to in November 2024 by head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer, who highlighted the central role Russia’s nuclear forces played in deterring the Western world from initiating an open conflict with Moscow directly. He asserted that the nuclear deterrent was the central factor distinguishing it from the Taliban in Afghanistan regarding its ability to combat NATO forces. “I am absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out,” he added. A year later in November 2025 former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that the unacceptable risk of open conflict with a nuclear armed Russia was the primary factor preventing Western Bloc states from a more direct intervention in the Ukrainian theatre against Russia.

In late January, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stressed the importance of the country’s nuclear deterrent in guaranteeing its continued existence, observing: “Without nuclear weapons, it is quite possible that our country would no longer exist. Whether that be the Soviet Union then or Russia today.” He predicted a new era of nuclear proliferation and further escalation of the nuclear arms race between Russia and the Western Bloc. Commenting in January on the impact of Russia’s newest strategic nuclear delivery system, the Oreshnik hypersonic ballistic missile, and its importance for deterring NATO attacks, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin reported that the combat use of the missile with a conventional warhead on January 8 against targets in western Ukraine had a “staggering” effect on defence planners in the Western world. The West perceived it “as a warning against their military’s direct involvement… in the hostilities.”

Commenting on the impact of Russia’s development of new nuclear delivery systems on policymakers in the Western world, Naryshkin assessed that the service entry of the Oreshnik and other advanced strategic assets were forcing the West to reconsider the possibility of further escalation, citing the Burevestnik cruise missile and Poseidon torpedo as examples. Both are nuclear armed and nuclear powered, have no counterparts abroad, and have effectively unlimited ranges. “Most politicians and the military… in the West did not expect Russia to develop such advanced weapons systems within a relatively short timeframe,” Naryshkin stated. The United States has notably faced repeated delays in modernising its nuclear forces, with the Sentinel ICBM program and B-52J strategic bomber program both facing very significant delays and cost overruns which has raised the possibility of their cancellation, while multiple key hypersonic missile programs have been cancelled, and even the relatively B-21 bomber program has also suffered not insignificant delays.

Ukraine’s defence sector was reported in August to have begun serial production of the Flamingo, which was seen to have the potential to revolutionise the armed forces’ ability to launch strikes deep into Russian territory due to the missile’s very long range of over 3,000 kilometres. The subsonic missile has a speed of Mach 0.75, making it one of the slowest in the world, although it carries a large 1000 kilogram warhead. The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the country’s supporters in the Western world have placed a significant emphasis on the ability to strike high value targets deep inside Russian territory, with the most successful deep strike operation being conducted on June 1 when a large scale drone attack on multipleairbases across Russia’s northern and western regions was launched from inside Russian territory under Operation Spider’s Web. The attacks were the most destructive in history ever launched against a strategic bomber fleet.

Ukrainian missile programs have relied particularly heavily on German funding, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz having announced in May 2025 that Berlin would finance Ukrainian production of long range missiles. Russia’s ability to launch strikes across Ukraine using a wide range of missile and drone types, and Ukraine’s relatively limited ability to strike targets deeper inside Russia, has left Ukraine and supporting foreign forces at a significant disadvantage since the outset of full scale hostilities in early 2022, with programs like the Flamingo intended to narrow the current vast gap in capabilities in this regard. Strikes into Russia have benefitted extensively from both the support of Western specialists and advisors on the ground, and from access to NATO members’ vast satellite network for target selection, targeting, and damage assessments.

Analysts have raised questions in the past regarding whether the Flamingo cruise missile program indeed exists, or whether it is one of the multitude of fabricated constructs of Ukrainian state public relations efforts, the most prominent of which was the ‘Ghost of Kiev’ MiG-29 fighter pilot in 2022. When Ukrainian government sources in early February claimed that the missile was used to launch successful deep strikes against infrastructure at the Kapustin Yar Test Range, Western analysts widely questioned these claims, with satellite imagery showing no damage to the facility. Nevertheless, the reported strike boosted the prestige of the Flamingo cruise missile program, due to the close association of the test range with the testing and launches of Russia’s newly operationalised Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile system.

The Su-34 was developed as a derivative of the Soviet Su-27 air superiority fighter, which was by far the longest ranged fighter type fielded by the Soviet Air Force or by any Western air force in the 20th century. The new fighter was approximately 50 percent heavier than the Su-27, which was already by far the largest fighter fielded by Russia or by any NATO air force, with its increased size combined with the integration of more fuel efficient AL-31FM2 engines, and a much higher use of composite materials to achieve a more efficient design, facilitating a much longer range. Where the Su-27 had a maximum ferry range of 4,000 kilometres on internal fuel, that of the Su-34 was closer estimated at approximately 4,800-5,000 kilometres. With an intercontinental range defined as a range of over 5,500 kilometres, this brought the Su-34 close to being able to reach this major milestone.

When carrying three 3,000 litre drop tanks, the Su-34’s ferry range can be increased to an estimated 8,000 kilometres when accounting for the penalties of the tanks’ additional weight and drag, which allows the aircraft to fly from Moscow to Washington DC. Nevertheless, this ferry range assumes an optimal flight profile with no manoeuvring and no weapons carriage, which would increase fuel consumption significantly. Thus while the Su-34 can fly over intercontinental distances without aerial refuelling support in ways Western fighter aircraft cannot, it cannot do so for combat operations. The aircraft may nevertheless retain some operational uses when operating over such ranges, with its ability to integrate a wide range of pods for electronic, radar and photo reconnaissance allowing it to still play important roles without a weapons load.

The Su-34 is expected to be surpassed in its position as the world’s longest ranged fighter with the service entry of a Chinese sixth generation fighter developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, which also appears to surpass the Su-34 as the world’s largest, and is optimised for very long range operations with advanced stealth capabilities. The Su-34 itself is nevertheless expected to see its long range engagement capabilities continue to improve as new missile types continue to be integrated, with a miniaturised variant of the Kh-101/2 5,500 kilometre range cruise missile reported to have been brought into service in 2024 without compromising on the original variant’s range. As the rate of the Su-34 fleet’s expansion has increased significantly, with production having more than doubled since early 2022 to facilitate deliveries of approximately 30 per year, it is expected that the scope of upgrades and new armaments developed will also continue to increase, some of which will improve its ability to engage targets thousands of kilometres from its operating bases.

A significant possibility which has been raised in the past is that the Su-34 will integrate the AL-51F engine developed for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter, which aside from improving flight performance and reducing maintenance needs, would also provide a far higher level of fuel efficiency, potentially allowing the aircraft to conduct truly intercontinental range strategic missions. The integration of the new engine, combined with new missile types and expanded aerial refuelling support, could allow the Su-34 to take on entirely new roles in the Russian Aerospace Forces, potentially extending to deployments under the Long Range Aviation Command, which is responsible for the strategic aviation fleet. Improvements to the aircraft’s reach have significant implications not only for Russia, but also for Algeria which is expected to begin receiving the aircraft in 2026, as well as for other potential export clients.

The British presence on the ground in Ukraine was more widely acknowledged following the death of one serviceman, Lance Corporal George Hooley of the Parachute Regiment, in December 2025. Almost two years prior in January 2024, however, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz confirmed that British special forces on the ground in Ukraine were providing vital support to facilitating launches of Storm Shadow cruise missiles against Russian targets. In May 2024 the head of the U.S. Special Operations Command General Bryan Fenton stated that the Pentagon had been learning about the ongoing war “mostly through the eyes of our UK special operations partners,” who he stated had been testing new approaches to modern warfare in on the ground in Ukraine. Polish officials speaking to local journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz also confirmed that British forces “uniformed. With weapons” were active in the theatre, and had played important roles in tracking the positions of Russian artillery.

The United Kingdom has been far from isolated in making considerable manpower contributions to the Ukrainain war effort, although where British deployments have included significant numbers of uniformed active duty personnel, other European states have more widely deployed non-uniformed personnel to operate as contractors. Most recently, unconfirmed reports from French sources in mid-February indicated that non-uniformed U.S. Air Force and Royal Netherlands Air Force pilots deployed as contractors were flying F-16 fighters for the Ukrainian Air Force. While contractor organisations such as the Polish Volunteer Corps are confirmed to have have deployed thousands of personnel for frontline combat roles, others have played more specialist roles. Russian state sources have referred to European contractors killed in a major strike on their headquarters in January 2024 as “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts.”

British officials’ expressions of willingness to deploy ground forces in Ukraine have been far from isolated, with similar sentiments having been widely expressed by European leaders. French President Emmanuel Macron has on multiple occasions stated that greater deployments of ground forces in Ukraine were not ruled out as part of a policy to “do everything necessary to prevent Russia from winning this war,” with the French government having begun considering options for such deployments as early as June 2023. Calls for such deployments to be considered have been raised by figures such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, and Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, among others.

In November 2024 head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer highlighted the key role played by Russia’s nuclear forces in deterring the Western world from initiating an open conflict with Moscow directly in the Ukrainian theatre, observing: “I am absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out.” The extent of NATO members’ involvement on the ground is already highly significant, however, with Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrey Kelin having stated in early February that the degree of the United Kingdom’s involvement in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War has strengthened a consensus that it was an active participant in the conflict.

The ability of European states to launch an effective intervention in Ukraine remains in question due to their limited ground force capabilities, with one European diplomatic source having informed The Times that U.S. participation would be necessary because “they have capabilities that all of Europe lacks,” including the “ability to retaliate at scale if needed.” Retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former National Security Advisor at the White House H. R. McMaster in February 7 2025 observed that European armies lackedthe necessary capacity to sustain large scale ground operations, noting when taking the United Kingdom as an example: “Look at the British Army right now. I mean, it makes me want to cry, almost.” A combination of European military limitations, U.S. reservations regarding overcommitment, and effective Russian deterrence, are considered primary factors preventing further escalation of NATO intervention in the Ukrainian theatre.

Having been brought into service only in 2014, Verba is widely considered the world’s most capable man-portable air defence system, and while far more costly than preceding Russian systems, it has very significant performance advantages. Most notably, it is the only known man-portable system with a three-spectral seeker, giving it a qualitative edge against modern countermeasures. These include ultraviolet, near-infrared and mid-infrared seekers. The system was also designed to have a high capability to discriminate targets from background heat sources, flares, and Directional Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM). The ability to engage targets at 6.5 kilometre ranges, and at altitudes of up to 4.5 kilometres, is also significant, with its altitude reach surpassing all known handheld air defence systems in service. The sensitivity of its tri-sensor system is key to its particularly long target lock range.

The Verba`s command & control system allows for the determining of targets’ flight variables and distribution of acquired targets between launching units, thus allowing systems distributed over wide areas to form defensive networks. Its new integrated automated control system terminal allows dispersed batteries to coordinate their fire, and use data from radars and aircraft, potentially including the airborne radars of Iran’s newly procured Mi-28 helicopters and Su-35 fighters. After tracking potential targets before they are within engagement range, the system can automatically assign tasks to launcher crews that are best poised to fire on the target, with this automation reportedly reducing reaction times by a factor of ten. Despite its range, complex sensors, and advanced fire controls, the each loaded launcher weighs just 17.25 kilograms, ensuring that it allows for infantry mobility.

The Verba was specifically designed for the modern battlefield, where small unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles with low infrared signatures are fielded widely, with its fuze and seeker allowing near-miss kills against fast or manoeuvring targets. Launchers have reportedly been sold to Iran at $47,000 each, and9M336 missiles at $200,000 each. A potential shortcoming of the Verba system, however, is that it was previously sold to Syria, the government of which was toppled in December 2024 by Turkish-backed insurgents, placing its arsenals at the disposal of a NATO member and making it likely that any high value Russian systems have already been extensively analysed with the goal of developing effective countermeasures. It remains possible that updates to the systems’ seekers have been made to reduce their vulnerability in this regard.

The value of handheld surface-to-air missile systems has from 2022 been demonstrated in the Ukrainian theatre, after the country inherited considerable quantities of Soviet systems such as the 9K38 Igla, while also receiving small quantities U.S. FIM-92 Stinger systems. A Sovietman portable surface to air missile reportedly shot down a Russian Su-34 strike fighter on March 5, 2022, possibly after multiple rounds of heat seeking surface fire weakened the aircraft's countermeasures, with Igla and Stinger systems having also brought down at least two Russian attack helicopters by that time. A number of other kills against Russian assets by Iglas and Stingers have been reported, although most remain unconfirmed. The primary value of these systems was that they could be integrated into infantry formations, while emitting no radar signatures, allowing them to be used with little warning.

The latest exercises reflect ongoing efforts by U.S. forces to improve readiness in Arctic regions, amid a broad surge in multiple NATO members’ deployments to the far north. Arctic temperatures created technical challenges for HIMARS launchers, freezing key components that threatened operational timelines. The 17th Field Artillery Brigade coordinated with the 11th Airborne Division and the 354th Operations Support Squadron’s Airfield Operations Flight to to secure the resources needed to keep launcherswithin operational temperature limits, allowing the live fire exercises to proceed successfully. Captain Benny Rodriguez, the brigade’s battery commander, emphasised the operational value of expeditionary training, observing: “It tests our ability to project power into austere environments, forcing us to confront and solve complex problems that we simply cannot simulate at our home station.” “Our battalion’s motto is ‘flexible,’ and this exercise made that word resonate with every Soldier in this Battery,” he added, elaborating on how personnel adapted to various environmental obstacles.

Of eight countries with Arctic territories, only Russia remains outside NATO, with NATO members’ growing presences in the region and training for high intensity regional conflict widely assessed to be aimed at preparing for possible war with the country. HIMARS have been deployed for multiple high profile exercises near Russian territory, with the U.S. Army in early February having conducted live-fire using the systems exercises near Klaipeda, Lithuania, approximately 50 kilometres from the Russian border, which was widely interpreted as a show of force. In mid-January U.S. Army and Lithuanian Army artillery units conducted advanced interoperability training centred on employment of the HIMARS at the Pabrade training area near the Belarusian border. Other NATO members have also made significant HIMARS deployments, with the Polish Army having deployed HIMARS to Finland to participate in NATO’s Swift Response 25 military exercises in May 2025, as part of a broader contribution that includes personnel from both the 1st Rocket Brigade and the 6th Airborne Brigade.

Rocket artillery systems have played a central role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, with HIMARS having achieved multiple notable successes including destroying critical infrastructure, launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, and other high value targets far behind enemy lines. One of the most significant successes achieved was a strike on January 1, 2023, which killed 89 Russian military personnel after hitting a temporary barracks in the disputed Donetsk region. HIMARS is highly valued for compressing long-range strike capabilities into a 6x6 truck-sized footprint, providing speed and high cross-country mobility to improve survivability, while also allowing it to be easily redeployed by air. The system can also serve as a ballistic missile launcher to fire ATACMS, which have been used to strike high value targets such as airfields in Russia at much longer ranges.

The Arctic remains vital for the Russian economy, accounting or approximately 20 percent of the country’s GDP, while also being vital for Russia’s maritime nuclear deterrent, with the large majority of its ballistic missile submarines being based in the region. The opening of the Northern Sea Route has also made the ability to disrupt civilian shipping in the region vital to any Western Bloc effort to impose a distant blockade on Russia or China. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev in December warned regarding the expansion of NATO members’ Arctic operations that NATO members bordering the Arctic have significantly accelerated the construction of icebreakers and ice-class ships, while developing a wide range of drone types intended specifically for combat in the region. “These actions prove that Russia is forming military instruments of deterrence in the Arctic. However, I’d like to note that we are not moving closer to their borders; they are moving closer to ours,” he noted.

The Iranian Defence Ministry previously ordered Russian S-300PMU-1s systems in 2007, before the deal was unilaterally terminated by the new administration of President Dmitry Medvedev under Western and Israeli pressure. At a time of increased tensions between Russia and the West in 2016, an agreement was reached to provide the more capable S-300PMU-2 system, which is a direct predecessor to the S-400 system that currently forms the backbone of the Russian air defence arsenal. The systems reportedly integrate 48N6DM surface-to-air missiles, which have particularly advanced anti-missile capabilities due to their sophisticated sensors and high speeds exceeding Mach 14, allowing them to engage targets at very high supersonic speeds including hypersonic speeds exceeding Mach 8. Their 250 kilometre engagement ranges allow them to provide a wide area defence capability.

The deployment of Iranian S-300PMU-2 systems to protect two major cities follows widespread reports from Western sources that all the systems in Iranian service were destroyed in a few hours during an Israeli attacks in October 2024. This was widely disputed by analysts at the time, with the fact that Israel’s F-35 fighters cannot fire air-to-surface missiles due to their lack of Block 4 software being one notable factor that made this possibility seem remote. Nevertheless, Iran’s total lack of modern fighter or interceptor aircraft to support its ground-based systems has raised questions regarding their viability in the event of a large scale U.S. assault. With Iranian air defences having largely been disabled from the ground by Western and Israeli backed paramilitaries during clashes in June 2025, their capabilities have yet to be tested in high intensity engagements.

In July 2025Deputy Operations Chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi confirmed that the country’s air defence systems damaged during hostilities with Israel and the United States from June 13-24 had all been replaced. "Some of our air defences were damaged, this is not something we can hide, but our colleagues have used domestic resources and replaced them with pre-arranged systems that were stored in suitable locations in order to keep the airspace secure," he stated. “We were able to cover the skies using existing and new systems, securing the airspace of our dear Iran… The enemy, despite its desperate efforts, failed to achieve its goals,” the admiral added. The reported replacement of lost and damaged air defence systems follows reports in earlier in the month from a number of regional sources that the Iranian Air Defence Forces were receiving Chinese-made long range air defence systems, which could provide a significantly superior capability to the S-300PMU-2.

Only two regiments’ worth of S-300PMU-2 systems are known to have been procured by Iran, although followup orders were reported in 2020 to have been placed for new missiles for the existing systems. The systems procured by Iran reportedly benefitted from a degree of customisation, and are known to use 96L6 target-acquisition radars, 30N6E2 target-engagement radars and 64N6E2 battle management radars. The 96L6 is a 3D acquisition radar that covers a wide range of altitudes, and is optimised for detecting low-flying targets such as unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles. Iran’s defence sector produces its own long range air defence systems, most prominently the Bavar 373, which began development in the early 2010s and has entered service in three major variants since 2016. The Iranian Defence Ministry’s decision to proceed with the procurement of Russian S-300PMU-2 air defence system in 2016, however, provided an indication that the Bavar 373 was not considered sufficient for the country’s long range air defence needs at the time. More capable variants of the indigenous system have since been brought into service however.

The capabilities of Iranian S-300 systems were previously expected to be enhanced considerably through their integration with new Su-35 long range air superiority fighters, which carry among the largest and most powerful radars of any fighter type in the world, and can thus serve as elevated sensors to improve ground-based systems’ situational awareness and reduce vulnerability to jamming. Although the Iranian Army has from January continued to receive new Mi-28 attack helicopters, however, there have been no signs of Su-35s arriving in the country. A significant shortcoming of the S-300PMU-2 is that NATO members have access to closely related systems, with Greek Air Force S-300PMU-1 systems having been used to train multiple NATO air forces and the Israeli Air Force, while Turkey, a longstanding adversary of Iran, more recently in 2019 acquired the S-400 system in 2019. The U.S. Marine Corps in November 2025 conducted exercises specifically aimed at training to tackle S-300PMU-2 systems.

The Angry Kitten began development in the early 2010s, and first entered service in 2017. It was designed to be modified and updated faster and more easily than preceding systems, allowing it to adapt in parallel with the threat ecosystem, which is particularly invaluable when countering adversaries with advanced electronic warfare countermeasures. Shortening the process of updating the system, including through greater automation, is particularly vital to respond to adversary countermeasures quickly. A notable feature of the Angry Kitten pod is its use of Digital Radio Frequency Memory(DRFM) technology, which allows radio frequency signals to be detected, ‘captured,’ manipulated and retransmitted. This allows the fighter integrating the pod to project signals from hostile radars, including radar seekers on missiles, back at adversary systems. Data collected using DRFM can subsequently be used to help improve and refine electronic warfare capabilities, making systems like the Angry Kitten invaluable for intelligence collection.

The F-16CJ differs from baseline F-16C fighters primarily due to its integration of the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System, a pod mounted on the side of the intake signed to passively locate hostile radar emitters and provide accurate targeting data to AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. Pilots can use the pod to build a realtime picture of adversary air defence systems’ radar coverage, providing the intelligence needed to engage priority emitters, and cue AGM-88 missiles using passive detection without activating the fighters’ own radars. Although this passive sensor capability remains more limited than those of the new F-35 and the Navy’s specialist EA-18G aircraft, it is still considered formidable. As the F-16C integrates an obsolete mechanically scanned array radar, which is not only relatively straightforward to jam, but also has a high signature meaning advisories can relatively easily detect the fighter carrying it, the use of targeting pods is particularly important.

The purpose of the F-16 operation remains uncertain, with one possibility being that the fighters were intended to probe Chinese defences. F-16s can be fitted with pods for photo, electronic, and other forms of intelligence collection for such operations. Some analysts have also speculated that the flight may have been intended to undermine the detente between Seoul and Beijing, with the U.S. deployment of THAAD missile systems in South Korea in late 2016 having succeeded in derailing an unprecedented detente between the two countries. The THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar provides coverage across much of Chinese territory, with a 3,000 kilometre range across a 120-degree field of view. South Korean security commentator and retired navy captain Yoon Sukjoon accordingly referred to the system as “part of the U.S.’ global anti-China united front. It’s become a strategic tool for containing China from one of the closest countries and one of the most trustworthy allies of the U.S.,” highlighting the value of basing rights in South Korea for the United States’ position against China.

Unconfirmed reports from a number of Chinese sources indicate that PLA Air Force J-16 long range fighters were responsible for intercepting and turning back the F-16s. The J-16 and F-16 form the backbones of the respective Chinese and U.S. fleets, with the former having over double the range, a far higher flight performance, and carrying a radar over four times as large as the F-16, which is comparable in its sophistication to the AN/APG-83 carried by the latest F-16 Block 70 variants. With more than 450 J-16 fighters estimated to be in service, they have been involved in multiple engagements with U.S. and allied aircraft, including an engagement with some of the U.S. Air Force’s scarce F-22 air superiority fighters some time in 2024, which was reported in October 2025.

In April 2025 the U.S. Air Force announced plans to significantly increase its forward fighter presence in South Korea, surging the presence of F-16s at Osan Air Base by 155 percent. The U.S. fighter fleet in the country is divided between Osan Air Base, located just 80 kilometres from the inter-Korean demilitarised zone, and Kusnan Air Base located further south.The U.S. Air Force has refrained from permanently stationing more capable fighters such as the F-35A, F-15E or F-22 in South Korea, with the high vulnerability of bases across the peninsula to North Korean missile and artillery strikes leaving aircraft there at risk. China and North Korea remain treaty allies, with Beijing having indicated that it would intervene to support its neighbour should it come under a Western attack. While the possibility of the United States attacking North Korea has diminished considerably from 2017, as the country demonstrated a capability to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes on the U.S. mainland, U.S. bases in South Korea still have considerable strategic value in the ongoing conflict between Beijing and Washington.

The deployment of F-22s to the Middle East closely coincides with the arrival of the U.S. Navy supercarrier USS Gerald Ford and its strike group in the Eastern Mediterranean, with range of operations against Iran, after the warship was diverted to support the military buildup. While aircraft carriers are protected by the AEGIS systems of accompanying Arleigh Burke class destroyers, of which 16 are reported to now be in the Middle East, major bases have been fortified against Iranian missiles attacks with deployments of Patriot and THAAD missile defence systems. The viability of these air defences against Iranian missile attacks has been seriously questioned, however.

The F-22 was developed as a dedicated air-dominance platform, combining a kinematic performance that far exceeds those of other Western fighter types, with advanced stealth capabilities. Although the fighter first flew in 1990, it only entered service in December 2005 due to major development delays, with its avionics by then already considered out of date. Using an ageing radar and data links, the F-22’s avionics are today very far from cutting edge, leaving it at a disadvantage against even some of the more advanced ‘4+ generation’ fighters such as the J-16 in the Pacific. Nevertheless, Iran’s total lack of modern fighter aircraft, and fielding of a predominantly Vietnam War era fleet comprised primarily of F-4 and F-5 fighters, still leaves its fleet at an overwhelming disadvantage against the F-22 or any other post-Cold War fighter type. With the F-22 scheduled for an early retirement, and having never seen air-to-air combat against manned targets, an air campaign against Iran may come to represent the only high intensity combat the type is ever involved in.

Iranian Deputy Defence Minister Brigadier General Mehdi Farahi in November 2023 confirmed plans to introduce the Mi-28 and the Su-35 air superiority fighter into service, with the service entry of the Su-35 expected to significantly strengthen Iranian air defences, providing highly complementary capabilities to the current ground-based air defence network. With the Su-35s having yet to arrive in the country, however, Iran has since January faced a major buildup of U.S. forces in the Middle East. While the Mi-28 is considered among the world’s most capable attack helicopter types, the expected heavily reliance on aviation and missile assets for a potential U.S. attack on Iran will likely limit its utility. With Western-backed paramilitary units in Iran have extensively targeted the country’s critical infrastructure and its air defence systems, however, which was acheived Western and Israeli supplied weaponry, the Mi-28 could provide an invaluable rapid response capability against such attacks within Iran. The aircraft may also prove valuable for anti-drone duties, particularly after U.S. forces made an unprecedented use of loitering munitions during attacks on Venezuela on January 3.

The Iranian attack helicopter fleet has long been considered underwhelming in its capabilities, and suffered overwhelming losses in the Iran-Iraq War when engaging the Iraqi Army’s Soviet-supplied Mi-24 attack helicopters in large scale air battles. The procurement of the Mi-28 could represent a turning point in this regard, with Iranian forces having gained experience operating alongside the new helicopters against various Islamist terror groups, both in Iraq with support of Iraqi Army Mi-28s in the 2010s, and in Syria where Russia deployed Mi-28s to support counterinsurgency efforts. The latest variant of the Mi-28, the Mi-28NM, was first combat tested in Syria from 2016, with its performance in the theatre thought to have been a major factor influencing the Russian Defence Ministry to sign contracts for the supply of 98 more aircraft by 2027.

The Mi-28’s design has pioneered outstandingly high levels of crew protection, with its titanium cockpit protected by armoured glass and ceramic plates capable of withstanding hits from 20mm rounds. The helicopters are exceptionally agile despite their heavy armour, capable of a roll angle of up to 70 degrees, compared to just 45-60 degrees for the preceding Mi-24. The Mi-28’s ability to handle a vertical load factor of 2.8G, compared to just 1.8G for the Mi-24, also allows for tighter turns, with the aircraft’s unique light performance characteristics allowing it to perform aerobatic manoeuvres like loops, and to fly in ways that confuse air defence systems, such as flying sideways and backwards at high speed. Integrating the LMUR anti-tank missile, the helicopters can engage targets at safe distances of up to 25 kilometres away.

Warden announced that the B-21 program is transitioning towards serial production, with multiple aircraft already in testing. She added that performance in modelling has exceeded expectations, and expressed optimism that a formal agreement could be reached before the end of the current fiscal quarter, which she noted would be a practical step to raise output. Significant uncertainties have remained regarding the full number of B-21s which will be procured, with the Air Force having committed to a minimum of 100 aircraft, while various analysts and think tanks have since the late 2010s published arguments that a fleet of over 200, and in many cases as high as 300, is necessary.A report from U.S. Air Force Academy Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in early February warned that a force of 100 B-21s would be sufficient only for one-off missions into a peer adversary’s airspace, but would be insufficient to sustain pressure in a broader conflict, forming only “a raid force, not a campaign force,” which would require a fleet of 300 o the new bombers.

In parallel to the B-21 program, China has continued with the development of its first intercontinental range stealth bomber, with images in early January showing what appear to be twin internal weapons bays. The unmanned aircraft was first seen in satellite footage in mid-June, 2025, with images released on October 19 for the first time showing the aircraft in flight. Major advances in stealth technologies seen across multiple Chinese programs such as the GJ-11 unmanned fighter and J-20A fifth generation fighter indicate that the new bomber will be at least a peer level competitor to the B-21 in terms of its radar evading capabilities. Like the B-21, China’s stealth bomber is expected to have multiple roles including air-to-air combat, reconnaissance, and supporting communications for far sea operations. The Chinese aircraft is significantly larger, however, with a comparable wingspan to the B-2 and an expected intercontinental range and a greater weapons carrying capacity. The B-21’s development as a much smaller aircraft than the B-2 is thought to have been considered necessary to reduce both procurement and operational costs, with the B-2 having been considered unaffordable for large scale procurements due primarily to major overruns in its operational costs.

The need to accelerate production of the B-21 has recently been highlighted by tensions between the United States and Iran, with the small B-2 fleet being unable to sustain a continued series of strikes despite being kept at unusually high readiness rates with additional funding. The U.S. Air Force in July confirmed that Northrop Grumman’s aircraft plant in Palmdale, California, would be able to accommodate an expanded scale of production for pre-production variants of the new bomber. The 2026 budget request for the B-21 program had by that time risen to reach $10.3 billion. Having faced significant delays in development, the B-21 is currently expected to enter service in the early 2030s.

As plans to introduce the B-21 into service have been pushed back, the ageing Vietnam War era B-52H that forms the backbone of the American bomber fleet hasseen plans to modernise it under the B-52J program delayed very considerably, with serious cost overruns having fuelled speculation that numbers intended for modernisation could be deeply cut. A reduced B-52 fleet would further increase pressure on the B-21 fleet, and likely strengthen calls for an exceptionally large production run. Only two bomber types are currently in production worldwide, namely the Russian Tu-160 and the Chinese H-6, with Russia having fallen significantly behind China and the United States in developing a next generation bomber.

The F-16CJ can use the HTS pod to build a real-time picture of hostile radar coverage, providing the intelligence needed to engage priority emitters with anti-radiation missiles. The AN/ASQ-213 also allows pilots to cue their AGM-88 missiles using passive detection, without activating the fighters’ own radars. The fighters also integrate electronic warfare pods to provide greater survivability by interfering with adversaries’ radar guidance. This remains a relatively basic modification, unlike the EA-18G, an electronic warfare derivative of the F-18F fighter which integrates an extensive passive sensor array throughout its airframe among other major design changes. The F-16CJ is currently being phased out of service, with the type’s highest priority deployment under the 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base in Japan being brought to an end as the aircraft are replaced with F-35A fighters.

Alongside the F-16CJ, the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps has deployed F-35 fifth generation fighters which are integrate sizeable arrays of passive sensors that can be used to gather valuable intelligence on enemy radars, and deploy powerful electronic warfare suites to disrupt radar targeting and detection efforts. With the F-35 continuing to lack Block 4 software, however, they remain unable to employ AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles to home in on adversary air defence systems’ radar emissions, ensuring that the F-16Cj retains an important role in the Air Force. The Navy’s EA-18G Growlers, however, are expected a more central role, with the service having at the end of January made a rare deployment of six EA-18Gs to a base on land, namely to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, while also deploying EA-18Gs on the aircraft carriers USS Abraham Lincoln an USS Gerald Ford in the region.

The F-16 is one of the shortest ranged fighter types in service in the world, with the U.S. Air Force having deployed considerable numbers of KC-135 tankers to the Middle East to extend the ranges of its aviation assets. Air defence suppression assets are considered particularly critical for a potential war with Iran, as while the country has not invested in procuring modern combat aircraft, and fields an obsolete predominantly Vietnam War era fighter fleet, its ground-based air defence network has proven to be highly capable. The network is built around multiple long range systems including multiple variants of the indigenous Bavar 373 and Khordad 15, as well as the Russian S-300PMU-2, the Soviet S-200D which has been domestically modernised, and according to some reports new Chinese systems delivered in 2025, possibly the HQ-9B. These are supported by multiple short and medium range systems such as the 3rd of Khordad and Tor.

The procurement of 32 F-35s is one of a wide range of investments made by the Polish Defence Ministry to modernise the country’s forces, with the Ministry in August 2025 having signed a $3.8 billion contract to modernise 48 F-16C/D Block 52+ fighters to the F-16V, which will revolutionise their combat capabilities and bring their avionics to a comparable standard to those of the F-35. The Ministry in 2022 ordered 48 South Korean FA-50 lightweight fighters, which have similarly advanced avionics, to expand its fleet at a lower cost. The F-35 is expected to serve as a force multiplier for these fourth generation aircraft, with its more powerful sensors and more advance data links allowing it to very significantly increase the situational awareness of the wider fleet, while its advanced air defence suppression capabilities could allow it to ‘kick down the door’ into well protected airspace in Belarus or Russia.

Poland’s most influential military thinkers, such as President of Academy24, General (ret.) Jaroslaw Gromadzinski and former Chief of the General Staff Rajmund Andrzejczak, have widely advocated a major shift in the country’s defence posture aimed specifically at preparing for war with Russia, and establishing a much expanded capability to launch large scale strikes on vital strategic targets in the country. Although the Polish Air Force’s capabilities are being revolutionised, the country’s ground force transformation has stood out as by far the most significant among European NATO members. 366 Abrams tanks have been ordered from the United States, as well as 360 South Korean K2 tanks out of a planned total procurement of 1000, representing one of the fastest buildups of armour seen anywhere in the world.

Outstandingly large orders South Korean K9 howitzers and Chunmoo rocket artillery systems are further rapidly expanding the Polish Army’s combat potential complementing improvements to air power. It is expected that the Polish Army will play an outsized role in any NATO war effort against Russia, while the relatively small fighter fleet will rely more heavily on support from other NATO members. Polish contractor personnel have already been playing a disproportionately significant role in the Russian-Ukrainian War on the frontlines, with units such as the Polish Volunteer Corps made up of personnel from the country that are officially on leave to allow them to deploy to the active war zone. A presence of thousands and by some estimated over 10,000 personnel has been sustained on and around the Ukrainian frontlines.

The crossing of a significant milestone preparing for F-35 operations from bases in Poland closely follows a statement by Polish President Karol Navrocki emphasising that his country should start developing nuclear weapons, specifying that a future nuclear arsenal would be aimed at Russia. This follows multiple reported requests by Polish officials to enter into a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States, under which the Polish Air Force would be given wartime access to American warheads that would be stored on the country’s territory. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, which all have nuclear sharing agreements with the United States, have all placed orders for F-35A fighters to serve as the primary delivery platforms for American B61-12 nuclear bombs, raising a significant possibility that Polish F-35As are also envisaged to eventually have a nuclear strike role.

Alongside a wide range of ground vehicles, the Khrizantema-M is reportedly intended to equip Mi-28 attack helicopters, which have played a central role in countering Ukrainian armour during four years of hostilities. The Mi-28’s design pioneered very high levels of crew protection, with its titanium cockpit protected by armoured glass and ceramic plates capable of withstanding hits from 20mm rounds. Despite its heavy armour, the helicopters are exceptionally agile, capable of a roll angle of up to 70 degrees, compared to just 45-60 degrees for the preceding Soviet Mi-24 they were designed to succeed. The Mi-28’s ability to handle a vertical load factor of 2.8G, compared to just 1.8G for the Mi-24, allows for tighter turns. These totally unique flight performance characteristics allow the Mi-28 it to perform aerobatic manoeuvres like loops, and to fly in ways that confuse air defence systems, such as flying sideways and backwards at high speed.

Alongside the Ka-52 developed for the Navy, the Mi-28 is one of the newest clean sheet attack helicopter designs in the world, with the Mi-24, Mi-35, and NATO’s top attack helicopter the Apache all dating back to the Cold War era in their service. Despite being more heavily armoured than the Apache, the Mi-28 carries a larger armaments suite and is considerably faster and more manoeuvrable. It can carry up to 16 anti-tank missiles, and integrates a millimeter-wave radar atop the rotor mast, similar to the Apache's Longbow, enabling it to detect and track targets in all weather conditions. Secondary sensors include Forward-Looking Infrared and low-light TV systems and a laser rangefinder. Alongside intensive combat testing in the Ukrainian theatre, the aircraft have also supported counterinsurgency operations in Syria, and in Iraqi Armed Forces hands in Iraq.

Footage released by the Russian Defence Ministry has shown nighttime operations by Mi-28 attack helicopters targeting Ukrainian and allied forces multiple times, including at times using thermal sensors to detect and fire on both infantry and armoured units, and use of the 9K121 Vikhr anti-tank missiles. New variants of the Vikhr missiles can reportedly penetrate 750mm of armour, while each helicopter can carry up to 16 of the missiles. The helicopters have otherwise primarily been seen employing 80mm and 122mm rockets and 9M120 Ataka and LMUR anti-tank guided missiles in Ukraine, and have been involved in attacks on Ukrainian strongholds along the frontlines in disputed regions. While Russia was previously the only country to have developed clean sheet new types heavyweight attack helicopter since the end of the Cold War, the standing of the Mi-28 and Ka-52 is expected to face a challenge, as China prepares to introduce its promising new Z-21 into service possibly before the end of the decade.

Germany’s political leadership had previously long opposed the possibility of procuring the F-35, due to the perceived risks of overreliance on the United States and a need to protect local industry. The procurement of the first 35 fighters was approved only in December 2022, following the coming power of the Olaf Scholtz administration, and in the aftermath of the outbreak of full scale hostilities between Russia and Ukraine earlier that year. The aircraft were previously expected to be relied on primarily for nuclear delivery roles under Germany’s nuclear sharing agreement with the United States, with expanded procurements beyond 35 aircraft indicating plans for a much expanded role in the fleet. Reports that an expansion of F-35 orders was expected to proceed first emerged in July, but were denied by multiple high level sources at the time. The Defence Ministry was then reported in October to be planning to expand F-35A procurements by just 15 aircraft under a $2.9 billion deal.

A leading factor reported to be increasing German interest in the F-35 is the current state o the Future Combat Air System program, which has continued to face growing difficulties, raising serious questions regarding whether it is at all viable. It was reported in September 2025 that officials at the German Defence Ministry were considering options to leave the program entirely, while in December the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence indicated openness to Germany jointing the Global Combat Air Program, which is intended to develop next generation fighter with Japan and Italy. The vast discrepancy between European technologies and industrial capabilities, and those of the industry leaders China and the United States, however, has meant that even when European stateswork closely together, they are not expected to be able to produce fully peer level fighters.

The FCAS program is not expected to produce a fighter for over two decades, with Dassault CEO Eric Trappier having observed as early as 2021 that “[The target of] 2040 is already missed, because we already stall, and the discussions of the next phase will surely also be long... so we rather aim for the 2050s.” These delays are expected to significantly increase the appeal of the F-35 to countries that had planned to procure the pan-European aircraft, including Germany and Spain, while France’s reluctance to procure the F-35 has left it at risk of becoming the world’s very last nuclear weapons state to field post-fourth generation fighters. Although having fallen far behind China and the United States, Russia remains comfortably ahead of Europe in bringing advanced fifth generation fighters into service, with a particularly large batch of Su-57 fighters with new enhanced capabilities reported on February 9 to have been delivered. As the Russian aircraft continues to be modernised, the growing numbers in service risk leaving European fleets of fourth generation fighters at a steep disadvantage.

The Type 15 is approximately 40 percent lighter than China’s heavyweight Type 99 main battle tank, and accommodates a significantly smaller 105mm main gun. The tank relies on specialised munition types such as laser guided anti tank missiles and kinetic energy penetrators to threaten modern armour and compensate for the size of its armament, with Bangladeshi sources reporting that its advanced penetrative rounds can frontally penetrate the armour of much larger tank types such as the Russian T-90. The Type 15 is prized for its ability to operate effectively in mountainous regions, such as in western China where it provides a particularly important advantage over neighbouring India which lacks any similar mountain-friendly tanks. The tank has a particularly advanced hydro-pneumatic suspension system which dynamically adjusts ground clearance to maximise manoeuvrability and combat efficacy in rough terrain.

A next generation lightweight battle tank which appears to have been developed as a direct successor to the Type 15 was first seen in June 2024, and was confirmed to have already reached a prototype and trial stage. It is expected to introduce a range of revolutionary new features never before seen on operational armoured vehicles, including reduction of crew requirements to just two personnel through very high levels of automation. Artificial intelligence is expected to play a major role in reducing crew requirements, which in turn can facilitate a more compact design and greater levels of armour protection on the vehicle relative to its weight. China’s tank industry has increasingly widely been assessed to be the world leader in the performance of its products, with a major turning point being the unveiling of the Type 100 main battle tank, which was confirmed in September 2025 to have entered service as the first in the world of a new generation. The new lightweight tank is expected to have many of the same features as the Type 100, including a side by side crew seating arrangement in the centre of the vehicle for a more efficient design with greater crew survivability.

In August 2025 the VT-4 main battle tank appeared for the first time appeared in Bangladesh Army camouflage, fuelling speculation that a contract for the sale of the vehicles had already been signed. The tank was a modernised variant integrating the new GL-5 hard-kill active protection system, which has not been procured by other clients. Developed in parallel to the Type 15 as a heavier counterpart, the VT-4 is produced solely for export, and has been acquired in significant numbers by Pakistan and Thailand while also being evaluated by Algeria. The Type 15 and VT-4 are between them expected to replace the over 100 Bangladesh Army Type 59 tanks, which were produced in China during the Cold War as enhanced derivatives of the Soviet T-55 design.

The J-11B is a much improved derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker heavyweight fighter, and entered service in 2009 with new engines, a much higher use of composite materials, and more modern avionics. While the baseline J-11B saw production concluded in 2018, the J-11BS twin seat variant continued production in the following years, and can serves as both a trainer and as a command and control aircraft. J-11s operated by the Navy are lightly modified, and are designated J-11BH, with the twin seat naval variant designated J-11BSH. The Su-27 entered service as the longest ranged fighter type in the USSR, comfortably exceeding the endurance of any U.S. Air Force or allied fighter, with the J-11B combining this range with enhanced avionics that have made it optimal for extended maritime operations.

The PLA Navy Southern Theatre Command was the first to receive new enhanced variants of the J-11B, the J-11BGH, in 2021, which was developed by integrating ‘4+ generation’ avionics, including a modern active electronically scanned array radar, onto the J-11BH. These upgrades revolutionised the aircraft’s combat potential, and allowed it to integrate new armaments developed for the J-20 fifth generation fighter, most notably the PL-15 radar guided and PL-10 infrared guided air-to-air missiles which have throughout the last decade been considered leading contenders for the titles of the most capable in the world. The J-11B’s development played a key role in bringing China’s fighter industry forward in the 2000s, and while far from world leading, it served as a key stepping stone allowing the country to produce and operationalise some of the world’s most capable ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation fighter types from the mid-2010s, after bridging key technological gaps with the United States.

Although the J-11B has been largely overshadowed by newer fighter types, it continues to play a very significant role in service, with the aircraft’s modernisation indicating that they are intended to continue to operate for many years to come. China today fields more heavyweight long range fighters than Russia and NATO combined, with the J-11’s large production run at well over 300 fighters having played a key role in this. The J-11B was succeeded in production at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s facilities by the J-16, which is a further heavily enhanced variant of the Su-27 that integrates a wide range of technologies developed for the J-20 fifth generation fighter.

The J-16 has been produced on a significantly larger scale still, with numbers in service approaching 450 fighters, although the aircraft are operated exclusively by the Air Force with none yet serving in the Navy. The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation is currently developing one of the world’s first sixth generation fighters, which was first seen in flight testing in December 2024, with its first fifth generation fighter, the J-35, having been confirmed in 2025 to have entered service in both the Navy and the Air Force. With China set to lead the world by over half a decade in fielding sixth generation fighters, and expanding its fifth generation fleet far faster than any other country, the J-11B is today operating in a service with capabilities and an international standing that are unrecognisable from those when it first entered service in the early 2010s.

Identifying the issue of a lack of training among Ukrainian personnel for F-16 operations, U.S. Air Force General James Hecker, who heads U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), NATO's Allied Air Command, and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), observed as early as 2023: “They're young pilots that barely have any hours at all. So they're not currently fighting the war… And then they're going to get a little bit more training on propellers, and then go down to France and fly in the [Dornier Alpha Jets] for a little bit, that all is going to take time… And that's probably not going to happen before the end of the year. So that takes a while to make that happen. So that's why it's going to be at least until next year until you see F-16s in Ukraine.” He concluded that Ukraine was unlikely to have enough pilots able to fly F-16s in combat at anywhere for several years, stating: “You can get proficient on some weapons systems fairly quickly. It takes a while to build a couple of squadrons of F-16s and to get their readiness high enough and their proficiency high enough. This could be four or five years down the road.”

The deployment of U.S. and Dutch pilots was reportedly made in response to significant losses suffered by Ukrainain F-16 units to accidents during air defence missions, with four losses having been confirmed while unconfirmed reports have indicated further incidents have occurred. This made it appear vital to transition F-16s to be flown by more experienced pilots, who reportedly are officially no longer part of their original militaries, and work as civilian contractors without military ranks and outside the Ukrainian chain of command. This remains in line with the model widely reported to be used by NATO member states to make a wide range of personnel contributions to the Ukrainian war effort. As observed by Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz, citing Polish officers: “we worked out a formula for our presence in Ukraine … we were simply sent on paid leave. Politicians pretended not to see this.”

The deployment of Western contractors to operate complex equipment in the Ukrainain theatre has been widely reported, and has reportedly been vital to allowing assets such as MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems and M1A1 Abrams tanks to be used in combat far more quickly than would have been the case if training of local crews had been required. In January 2023 the U.S. Congressional Research Service warned that there was “a lot of learning to do before Ukraine will have a functioning Patriot system on the ground,” with the training of local repair crews alone expected to take approximately 53 weeks. The deployment of Patriot systems for combat operations just four months later thus fuelled widespread speculation that they were very likely manned by foreign contractors from NATO member states. Alongside contractors, Western active duty personnel, including special forces, have also played important roles in allowing Ukraine to operate complex equipment, with German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz having in January 2024 confirmed longstanding suspicions that British special forces on the ground in Ukraine were providing support to facilitating launches of Storm Shadow cruise missiles against Russian targets.

Commenting on the importance of specialist Western contractor for the operation of complex equipment in the Ukrainian theatre, Russian state media observed following a strike on the headquarters of predominantly French European contractors in January 2024 that these personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts.” With the strike having caused at least 80 casualties, 60 or more of which were deaths, their neutralisation was reported to have “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them. The Ukrainain Armed Forces’ heavy reliance on Western specialists to operate complex equipment represents part of a broader trend towards contractors playing a central role in the war effort, including for less skilled roles, with frontline combat units increasingly being manned by contractors from Poland, Colombia, and multiple other Latin American states.

The F-35C and the EA-18G are considered highly complementary assets that are both heavily optimised for tacking advanced ground-based air defence networks like that deployed to defend Iranian airspace. Both aircraft integrate sizeable arrays of passive sensors that can be used to gather valuable intelligence on enemy radars, and deploy powerful electronic warfare suites to disrupt radar targeting and detection efforts. The EA-18G has a more formidable electronic warfare capability, and deploys a wide range of specialist jamming pods as its primary armament, which can provide protection to accompanying aircraft against radars in a broad range of radar frequencies, while the F-35 benefits from advanced radar evading stealth capabilities that significantly increase its own survivability.

Iran’s long range air defence network is primarily built around the Bavar 373 air defence system, with the latest variant of the system unveiled in 2024 reportedly able to detect up to 300 targets simultaneously while tracking up to 60. it has a 300 kilometre engagement range. The system’s capabilities were reportedly a significant factor in the Iranian Defence Ministry’s decision not to procure Russian S-400 systems, which were previously under consideration. The systems’ capabilities remain highly uncertain, with the majority reportedly having been disabled on the ground by Western and Israeli backed paramilitary groups in June 2025, which used drones and Spike missiles to take out key radars, command posts, and launchers. It thus remains highly uncertain how U.S. aircraft will fair against Iranian air defences should the latter be fully functioning.Unconfirmed reports of deliveries of Chinese air defence systems to Iran in mid-late 2025 have further increased this uncertainty.

Commenting on the shift in the United Kingdom’s military focus, former British Army Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford observed: “When ministers speak of strengthening deterrence and protecting critical national infrastructure, they are acknowledging a shift that has been building for some time. The strategic contest with Russia has moved northwards. Pretending otherwise would be complacent.” “Doubling Britain’s presence in Norway is therefore sensible. Our Royal Marines possess genuine cold-weather expertise. Norway has long been a key training partner,” he noted, adding that “With Sweden and Finland now NATO members, the northern flank has been transformed strategically. Integration and coordination are no longer optional; they are essential.” He stressed that readiness for expanded Arctic operations were particularly critical as “new shipping routes and resource opportunities are emerging” as polar ice recedes.

Beyond its resource wealth, the Arctic is vital for Russia’s maritime nuclear deterrent, with the large majority of its ballistic missile submarines being based in the region. The opening of the Northern Sea Route has also made the ability to disrupt civilian shipping in the region vital to any Western Bloc effort to impose a distant blockade on Russia or China, complementing the deployment of NATO members’ forces across the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Russian officials have increasingly warned that expanding Western force deployments across its trade routes, particularly in the Arctic and Baltic, appear intended to provide a chokehold for offshore blockade operations.

As part of the broader escalation in the United Kingdom and other NATO members’ involvement in the Arctic, Exercise Cold Response 26 will formally commence in March, with Western Bloc states have already begun to deploy forces to the region in preparation. As one of the Western Bloc’s largest Arctic training events in years, the exercise was designed to test NATO’s ability to operate and fight in extreme Arctic conditions, and will include over 25,000 military personnel from 12 countries operating under NATO command structures. Senior Russian officers have expressed significant concern at the expansion of NATO forces in the Arctic, with Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev having warned in December 2025 that NATO members bordering the Arctic had significantly accelerated the construction of icebreakers and ice-class ships, while developing a wide range of drone types intended specifically for combat in the region. “These actions prove that Russia is forming military instruments of deterrence in the Arctic. However, I’d like to note that we are not moving closer to their borders; they are moving closer to ours,” he noted.

Ahead of expanded multinational exercises, the British Royal Marines in the second week of February began to conduct intensive live fire mission rehearsals in Northern Norway, with 1,500 British “elite commandos” reported by Royal Navy to be have been deployed within the Arctic Circle. Marines operated to the mountains near the village of Moen close to 300 kilometres inside the Arctic Circle to fire 81mm mortars as part of these exercises. The exercises were reported intended to build up to their participation in Cold Response 26. Commenting on the expansion of the British presence in the region, Defence Minister John Healey observed: “Demands on defence are rising, and Russia poses the greatest threat to Arctic and High North security that we have seen since the Cold War. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old Cold War bases.”

Highlighting the need to respond to what he referred to as the United States’ clear "gunboat diplomacy" targeting civilian shipping, noting precedents of such operations targeting Venezuela and Iran, Patrushev noted that Russia's updated naval shipbuilding programme to 2050 would be submitted for approval soon. Warning of a further threat from NATO maritime activities, he also warned that alliance members were planning options to blockade the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. "Any attempt at a naval blockade of our country is completely illegal from the standpoint of international law, and the concept of a 'shadow fleet', which EU representatives brandish at every turn, is a legal fiction,” he observed "By implementing their naval blockade plans, the Europeans are deliberately pursuing a scenario of military escalation, testing the limits of our patience and provoking active retaliatory measures… If a peaceful resolution to this situation fails, the blockade will be broken and eliminated by the Navy,” he added.

Patrushev’s statement closely follows a warning from Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov that NATO members are planning to impose a maritime blockade of the country, with Western plans aimed at “restricting freedom of navigation and violates international law norms.” Operations would involve “putting the Baltic-Arctic region on a barrack-like footing” through expanded military operations and exercises, with NATO members also developing plans for “a partial or complete naval blockade.” The ambassador warned that Western plans to use force to restrict Russian access to international waters represented a direct threat to the country’s national security, and would force Moscow to take countermeasures.

Significant questions remain regarding the viability of deploying the Russian Navy to guard maritime trade routes, as while the Soviet Union had by the 1980s built up one of the world’s two premier blue water fleets, and one with a fast improving international standing, post-Soviet Russia has not laid down a single destroyer or cruiser for its fleet since the superpower’s disintegration in 1991. Although the Navy fields highly capable frigates and corvettes, these remain limited in their ranges, and when operating further from Russian territory are constrained by the small sizes of their sensor suites. The Russian Navy has been built primarily for coastal defence roles relying heavily on corvettes and coastal defence systems that deploy some of the world’s most capable cruise missile types. Major Western navies’ presences across major trade routes allow them to target Russian shipping far from the country’s territory, whether in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean, where establishing a continuous presence will likely be far from viable for the Russian Navy at least until the mid-2030s.

Reports on February 13 indicated that British Defence Secretary John Healey had met with his counterparts from Baltic and Nordic countries at the Munich Security Conference to discuss plans for illegal seizures of tankers that were transporting Russian oil for export in international waters. Such takeovers of oil tankers in international waters would be far from unprecedented, with the U.S. Armed Forces having initiated an unprecedented series of operationsfrom late 2025 to commandeer at least nine ships that have been transporting Venezuelan oil for export, as part of efforts to cripple the country’s economy. French forces, meanwhile, in January boarded the oil tanker Grinch in international waters, forcing its owner to pay a fine of several million euros and endure what French authorities referred to as “a costly three-week immobilisation,” with the ship released only on February 17.

Commenting on ongoing Western operations targeting civilian shipping, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently warned: “the U.S. objective – to dominate the world economy – is being realised using a fairly large number of coercive measures that are incompatible with fair competition.” To achieve this objective, he noted, the U.S. leadership “want to take control of all the routes for providing the world’s leading countries and all continents with energy resources.” “A ‘war’ against tankers in the open sea is being waged,” he added. There have been indications that NATO member states’ targeting of civilian shipping could go beyond oil shipments, and include the targeting of a wide range of civilian exports. In November 2025, for example, U.S. special forces boarded a cargo ship in the international waters in the Indian Ocean, securing, removing and destroying civilian goods that were being shipped from China to Iran, setting a significant precedent. The possibility of Western Bloc states using their naval presences for such purposes has been highlighted since the Pivot to Asia initiative in the early 2010s, with the U.S. Naval Institute in 2020 having proposed hiring mercenary privateers to target Chinese civilian shipping in a similar way as an option to escalate pressure.

The B-52 is particularly heavily relied on for nuclear delivery, with the newer B-2 Spirit bomber fielded in low numbers, having low availability rates, and lacking any remotely comparable beyond visual range weapons delivery capabilities, while its stealth features are considered increasingly out of date. The B-1B bomber fleet meanwhile has no nuclear delivery capability, with the majority of the aircraft having been withdrawn from service. The process of de-nuclearising a portion of the B-52 fleet involved “removing the nuclear code enabling switch and interconnection box, mounting a code enabling switch inhibitor plate, removing applicable cable connectors, [and] capping applicable wire bundles,” which is highly feasible the reverse. Doing so, however, would likely prompt the Russian Aerospace Forces to similarly enlarge its own nuclear-armed bomber fleet, with Russian officials having made clear that they will not move away from the limitations of New START unless the U.S. does so first.

The B-52’s capabilities are increasingly out of date, with its ageing radar considered relatively straightforward to jam, while efforts to modernise the fleet under the B-52J program suffering significant delays and cost overruns. The aircraft has formed the backbone of the U.S. strategic bomber fleet since the 1960s, and after playing a central role in the Vietnam War, has been heavily relied on for combat operations against Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq among other targets. The eight engine aircraft has been relied on for shows of force across the globe, from the Persian Gulf targeting Iran, to the Arctic targeting Russia, the South China Sea targeting China, and near the Korean Peninsula to target North Korea. The bombers have more recently been deployed to stage multiple shows of force in the the Caribbean from mid-October 2025 as part of a military buildup against Venezuela.

Developed by Valar Atomics, Ward250 uses helium coolant and graphite moderators, and uses tri-structural isotropic fuel at its core which consists of uranium kernels encased in ceramic layers. Its advanced features have led it to be considered a revolutionary next generation design. The use of TRISO nuclear fuels is expected to produce higher performance than would be offered by comparable amounts of traditional fissile material, with their use combined with helium-cooling, and graphite moderation, expected to “enable safer operations over past nuclear technologies and offer the ability to operate at higher temperatures than traditional plants,” according to the Utah San Rafael Energy Lab. Capable of reaching an output of just 100 kilowatts of thermal energy, the design is considered less efficient than larger reactors, but is optimal for military use including as a largely self-contained power source for key military facilities. Its cost viability for widespread deployment by the U.S. Armed Forces, however, has remained in serious question.

The Republic of China Air Force currently deploys one of the densest ground-based air defence networks in the world on Taiwan Island, which is rivalled only by those of Israel and North Korea, as part of an asymmetric strategy aimed at tackling the much larger and more advanced Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in which it remains in a state of civil war. PAC-3 MSE interceptors provide complementary capabilities to the Tien Kung III and Tien Kung IV systems, the latter which is specialised in ballistic missile defence roles. Unlike prior missile types developed for the Patriot system, the PAC-3 MSE employs hit-to-kill technology that destroys targets through direct kinetic impact, and as such does not carry a blast-fragmentation warhead.

Hit-to-kill interceptor were previously integrated onto both the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system and the multirole David’s Sling system, and require significantly higher precision levels, but allow for a lighter vehicle with a superior flight performance. The PAC-3 MSE can engage targets at altitudes up to 60 kilometres, although it is restricted to a range of just 120 kilometres. To place this in perspective, PLA HQ-9 air defence systems on the Chinese mainland have a 300 kilometre engagement range, while the the combat proven 40N6 missile in PLA service has a 400 kilometre range, and the new HQ-29 anti-ballistic missile system is estimated to have a 600 kilometre range. ThePAC-3 MSE was designed to be able to reach higher intercept altitudes to increase available reaction time and engagement space against tactical ballistic missiles. Its extreme cost, however, has raised serious questions regarding its cost effectiveness against the PLA, which has a far greater defence budget and quantities of ballistic missiles orders of magnitude greater than the Republic of China Air Force’s anti-missile arsenal.

The Patriot system has seen by far the most intensive combat use in its history in the Ukrainain theatre from May 2023,with its effectiveness having been widely questioned by both Western and Ukrainian officials, particularly during recent combat testing in Ukraine. Beyond Eastern Europe, the system was recently confirmed to have struggled to intercept a very small scale Iranian ballistic missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025, despite prior warning of the attack having been given, with U.S. officials havingconfirmedthis the following month only after satellite imagery showing damage to the facility underminedprior claimsof a total success.The U.S. Army in December 2025 confirmed plans to develop a new variant of the Patriot, which will gain a 360 degree targeting capability that Russian, Chinese and North Korean systems have long had. This appears poised to be the most revolutionary upgrade since the system first entered service in 1981, and has been widely assessed to be intended to address many of its recently demonstrated shortcomings.

It remains uncertain whether path to fielding nuclear weapons referred to by President Navrocki entailed entering a nuclear sharing agreement, becoming a threshold nuclear weapons state like Germany and Japan, or developing an independent nuclear arsenal like France. On April 1, 2025, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee Dan Caine stated that the United States was ready to consider entering into nuclear sharing agreements with more of the country’s NATO allies, fuelling speculation that deals with Poland and Finland may be under consideration. A sharing agreement with the United Kingdom to equip its planned F-35A fighters with B61-12 nuclear bombs was confirmed shortly afterwards. Nuclear sharing agreements have been controversial due their de facto creation of new nuclear weapons states, with Western analysts having widely highlighted that they violate Articles I and II of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The United States currently has active sharing agreements are currently in place with NATO members Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, with the air forces of these states all training to launch air strikes using B61-12 bombs. All nuclear sharing partners are clients for the F-35 fighter, with the exception of Turkey which is currently negotiating to return to the program. The Polish Air Force’s procurement of the F-35 has since the late 2010s fuelled significant speculation that this may have been intended to prepare its forces to enter a nuclear sharing agreement. The fighters are considered optimal aircraft for launching tactical nuclear attacks due to their advanced stealth capabilities, with the Royal Netherlands Air Force having in June 2024 become the first nuclear sharing partner to have them take over their nuclear strike roles, just three months after the U.S. Air Force did so in March that year.

In July 2025 one of Poland’s most influential military thinkers and president of Academy24, General (ret.) Jaroslaw Gromadzinski, advocated a major shift in the country’s defence posture aimed specifically at preparing for war with Russia. Gromadzinski argued that Poland needed to embrace an “active defence,” and be ready to operate “across the full operational depth of the opponent” by preparing to launch attacks across Russian territory. His insights echoed those made by former Polish chief of the General Staff Rajmund Andrzejczak in October 2024, who observed: “If they attack even an inch of Lithuanian territory, the response will come immediately. Not on the first day, but in the first minute. We will hit all strategic targets within a radius of 300km. We will attack St. Petersburg directly.” He further noted that Warsaw needed to “take the initiative” in deterring Moscow. “Russia must realise that an attack on Poland or the Baltic countries would also mean its end… That is the only way to deter the Kremlin from such aggression,” Andrzejczak elaborated. The obtaining of nuclear weapons would fit in with the broader consensus in Warsaw regarding the need to maximise the ability to cause devastation across Russia.

Poland has taken a particularly hard line against Moscow, with senior politicians calling for Russia’s balkanisation into separate states, while Prime Minister Mateus Morawiecki has equated moves towards dialogue with Moscow with “negotiating with Hitler, Stalin or Pol Pot,” claiming “you do not negotiate with criminals.” The country has been the leading source of foreign military contractors fighting Russia in Ukraine under units such as the Polish Volunteer Corps, with the Polish parliament earlier in February having moved to provide legal cover to such operations, indicating a possible escalation in their scale. Polish personnel on the ground operating from Ukraine have taken part in spearheading multiple assaults into Russian territory, including Belogrod and Kursk, while the country has remained a leading provider of armaments and funding to the war effort.

Tuinman’s statement has raised significant questions regarding the viability of F-35 operators gaining greater autonomy over their F-35 fleets, which could have a transformative impact on the program. The United States has imposed particularly strict restrictions on how its fighters can be operated, including from what military facilities and with what armaments, although restrictions have reportedly been more lenient for core NATO members. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Israel and Singapore have jointly achieved a degree of ‘jailbreaking’ for the F-16 fleets, allowing them to operated more autonomously and more deeply customised, which could be seen to set a precedent for clients for the F-35 doing the same. Nevertheless, the unprecedented complexity of the fifth generation fighter’s software makes this appear far from likely.

Observing the complexity of the F-35’s software, expert on the F-35 program Abraham Abrams noted in his recent bookF-35 Joint Strike Fighter: A Great and Terrible Program:

“The percentage of the F-35’s functionality that was provided by software was unprecedentedly high, and having been under 10 percent for the F-4A introduced in 1960, 35 percent for the F-15A/B introduced in 1975, 65 percent for B-2 bomber introduced in 1997, and 80 percent for the F-22 introduced in 2005, it reached a significantly higher unknown figure for the new aircraft. Software accordingly grew from 1,000 lines of code in the F-4A, to 1.7 million lines on the F-22, and 5.7 million on the F-35.”

With the development of the F-35’s software having been a leading cause of delays to the program, the feasibility of other operators with much small defence sectors being able to develop their own alternative software from outside the program thus appears to be limited.

No foreign operator of the F-35 has gained the ability to modify its code, with only the Israeli Air Force having the ability to ‘plug in’ indigenous software on top of the fighter’s existing software without making any modifications to it. Israeli efforts to negotiation fuller access to the fighter’s code to make modifications were consistently rebuffed by the United States. Not only does the development of an alternative to the F-35’s existing code appear highly unlikely, particularly by European states due to the limitations of their defence sectors, but doing so would violate the F-35’s terms of use, and likely lead to a cutting off of spare parts and support from the United States. Although European states have sought greater autonomy and reduced reliance on U.S. military equipment, the F-35 has consistently demonstrated a truly overwhelming performance advantage over European-origin fighter aircraft, with the drawbacks of relying on the U.S. likely to continue to be more than compensated for by the stealth fighter’s tremendous performance advantages.

Korchunov warned that Western plans to use force to restrict Russian access to international waters represented a direct threat to the country’s national security, and would force Moscow to take countermeasures. His statement follows a report on February 13 that British Defence Secretary John Healey had met with his counterparts from Baltic and Nordic countries at the Munich Security Conference to discuss plans for illegal seizures of Russia-linked oil tankers in international waters. Forced takeovers of oil tankers by Western Bloc states would be far from unprecedented, with the U.S. Armed Forces having initiated an unprecedented series of operations targeting tankers in international waters from late 2025, namely those shipping Venezuelan oil for export, with a primary focus on crippling the country’s economy. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard on February 9 targeted the oil tanker Aquila II in international waters in the Indian Ocean, which is at least the eighth vessel targeted for forceful seizure by U.S. forces.

Commenting on ongoing Western operations against the civilian shipping of targeted countries, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently warned: “the U.S. objective – to dominate the world economy – is being realised using a fairly large number of coercive measures that are incompatible with fair competition.” To achieve this objective, the U.S. leadership “want to take control of all the routes for providing the world’s leading countries and all continents with energy resources.” “A ‘war’ against tankers in the open sea is being waged,” he added. The rapid expansion of NATO force deployments in the Arctic, which have brought forces increasingly close to Russian territory, have widely been interpreted by analysts as being intended in part to ensure an ability to exercise a degree of control over the Northern Sea Route, a recently opened passage through the Russian Arctic that provides an alternative route for civilian trade, including oil shipments, away from Western-controlled waters.

The Northern Sea Route made headlines in October 2025 after the Chinese merchant fleet made its first ever container shipment to Europe through it, supported by Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet. This nearly halved the shipping time compared to southern routes passing through the Malacca Strait and Suez Canal. Attempts by Western Bloc forces to target shipping there would be in line with broader trends in their operations. The NATO member states’ targeting of civilian shipping is expected to go far beyond oil shipments, and include the targeting of a wide range of civilian exports. In November 2025, for example, U.S. special forces boarded a cargo ship in the international waters in the Indian Ocean, securing, removing and destroying civilian goods that were being shipped from China to Iran. As early as 2019 U.S. forces boarded and commandeered a North Korea coal export ship, the Wise Honest, which was subsequently sold and the funds appropriated by the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Naval Institute in 2020 proposed hiring mercenary privateers to target Chinese civilian shipping in a similar way as an option to escalate pressure.

The amnesty has fuelled speculation among analysts that it may be intended to help facilitate a further surge in Polish forces moving into the Ukrainian theatre, at a time when Ukraine’s personnel crisis has continued to worsen. Multiple reports from both Polish and Russian sources have pointed to Polish forces having long played a central role in the war effort on the ground in Ukraine. In December 2023 Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz revealed that he had been provided details by Polish officials on the country’s special forces operations in Ukraine from the war’s early stages in early 2022. Regarding efforts to provide deniability for their operations, a Polish officer informed him: “we worked out a formula for our presence in Ukraine … we were simply sent on paid leave. Politicians pretended not to see this.” Beyond special forces, the Polish Volunteer Corps has appeared to use the same model to provide cover for the mass deployment of Polish Armed Forces personnel, who are technically former personnel when entering the theatre, with their presence having for years been widely reported on multiple frontlines.

The Polish Volunteer Corps first gained significant prominence in May 2023, when they played a central role in assaults into Russia’s Belgorod region, with the Corps releasing an announcement and video evidence of their roles in these operations. The paramilitary units were specifically involved in an assault of Belgorod’s Grayvoron District on May 22, which was one of the initial major incursions launched from Ukrainian territory. Videos show Polish units using Ukrainian T-72B tanks and Mi-8 helicopters as well as U.S.-supplied Humvee armoured vehicles. Former senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defence U.S. Army Colonel (ret.) Douglas McGregor at the time reported the presence of an estimated 20,000 contractors from Poland, although numbers are reported to have increased significantly since then as the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ own personnel shortages have worsened.

At the centre of hostilities during the first 18 months of the conflict, Ukrainain positions in and around the city of Bakhmut were reportedly bolstered by outsized deployments of Polish personnel. The head of the Russian Wagner Group paramilitary force Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has overseen many of the operations in the area, reported in late April 2023 regarding the deployments of large numbers of Polish contractor forces: "Well-trained enemy units are now being tossed into Bakhmut. Polish speech all day long. While I used to say there were few mercenaries, now there’s a large number of them.” Polish forces’ familiarity with operations Soviet standard equipment is likely to have been particularly helpful, as such equipment has formed the bulk of Ukraine’s own arsenals. The Polish Armed Forces has been rapidly retiring Soviet equipment such as T-72 tanks from service to donate it to Ukraine, with a number of reports indicating that these donations are being made specifically to equip Polish contractor units operating in the Ukrainian theatre.

Ukrainian and Russian sources widely reported a significant presence of Polish forces during the assault into the Russian Kursk region from August 2024. Russian Army Major General Apty Alaudinov, deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ Main Military-Political Department, stated that a large number of French and Polish military contractors were encountered during operations. Serviceman from the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, Ruslan Poltoratsky recalled to this effect: “When we crossed the border with Russia, at first I thought there was some line noise. But then I distinguished what they were saying - they were speaking English, Polish, maybe even French. I did not understand anything, I said into the walkie-talkie - 'repeat, repeat,' hearing some gibberish.” "When they had already taken positions [in the Kursk Region], they also went on the air with their superiors, with ours as well, and I also heard them saying something in English and in some other language. Something about houses, chaos," he added. U.S. Forward Observations Group contractors also published images confirming their own participation in the Kursk offensive.

In June 2021 Russian reports highlighted that Polish, Colombian and other Latin American contractor personnel were playing a particularly important role in high intensity hostilities in the Sumy region, where Russian forces had recently made significant advances. In December 2025 former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov reported that an estimated 10,000 foreign contractor personnel have been killed in action since the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in February 2022. This figure may exclude active duty personnel such as British Royal Marines who have also been deployed for frontline operations.

Russian forces have consistently singled out foreign fighters for targeting, with a strike on a training camp near the central Ukrainian city of Kropivnitsky on July 21, 2025, confirmed to have caused over 100 casualties among foreign fighters, as corroborated by a surviving American fighter, who spoke to the New York Times. Previously on January 16, 2024, a Russian strike on a concentration of predominantly French European contractors caused at least 80 casualties, 60 or more of which were killed.Foreign contractor personnel have been valued not only for skilled manpower contributions, but also in some cases for their ability to operate complex equipment which it has not been not viable to train Ukrainain personnel to utilise sufficiently quickly.

Developed as an enhanced derivative of the Soviet Union’s top air superiority fighter the Su-27, the Su-35 integrates the Irbis-E X-waveband multi role passive electronically scanned array radar as its primary sensor, alongside a pair of N036B-1-01 L-band radars in its wing roots, while its airframe makes much higher use of composite materials and has a redesigned frontal profile that reduces its radar cross section. Its AL-41F-1S engines have comparable thrust levels and thrust/weight ratios to the F119 powering America’s first fifth generation fighter the F-22, facilitating a world leading flight performance and outstandingly long range. The Su-35 has gained far more air to air kills than any other post Cold War fighter type due to its central role in Russian operations in the Ukrainian theatre, including participating in major air battles with Ukrainian fourth generation fighter units where it has frequently achieved overwhelming victories. Despite its advanced capabilities, the Chinese PLA Air Force procured just a single regiments’ worth of the fighters with orders for just 24 having been made.

Preceding the Su-35, the Chinese PLA had procured over 100 Su-27 fighters from 1991, the majority of them under a license production deal, while also beginning to acquire the Su-30 from the year 2000 with 100 ordered. Advances in the local fighter aviation industry have significantly limited interest in procuring the newer Russian fighter type, and by the time it was ordered the country’s own indigenous ‘4+ generation’ derivative of the Su-27, the J-16, had already begun to be brought into service. The J-16 and its lighter counterpart the J-10C have proven capable of comfortably outperforming the Su-35 during exercises, while the entry into service of the J-20 fifth generation fighter from 2017 left the Su-35 significantly further behind. Chinese sources have been particularly critical of the Su-35’s data links and limited network-centric warfare capabilities, as well as the weakness of its radar compared to the similarly sized but more modern active electronically scanned array radar of the J-16, which is estimated to be the most powerful carried by any fighter type in the world.

The Su-35’s armaments significantly limit its viability as a high performing air superiority fighter in the fifth generation era, with the R-77-1 considered well behind the cutting edge, with comparable capabilities to the older Chinese PL-12 missile operationalised in the 2000s, far suppressed by the PL-15 that was brought into service in the mid-2010s. The American AIM-120D is also considered significantly superior, and entered service at around the same time that orders for the Su-35 were placed, while China has more recently operationalised the PL-16 and PL-17 with world leading capabilities. The Su-35’s visual range air-to-air performance is also particularly poor compared to its Chinese counterparts, with the R-73/74 missile, although having been world leading in the 1980s, today considered obsolete and at the opposite end of the spectrum of production missiles compared to the highly advanced Chinese PL-10.

The Su-35’s role in Chinese service remains limited, with the procurement thought to have served to facilitate the transfer of a number of technologies where Russia still retained a lead. The aircraft likely allowed the Chinese aviation industry and the PLA Air Force to ensure that Russian industry’s conservative progress in the 15 years after the Su-30’s development did not have much to offer. Su-35s are likely to have been relied on for dissimilar combat training, and possibly to allow pilots to familiarise themselves with thrust vectoring before Chinese fighters with such capabilities began to enter service. The possibility has been raised that the fighters could be made more viable through procurement of new missile types, most notably the R-37M, which is one of the longest ranged missile types in the world and would allow them to pose an asymmetric threat to Western Bloc support aircraft such as tankers and AEW&C systems in the Pacific.

As China’s J-20 fleet has become the world’s fastest growing and in many respects the most advanced of the fifth generation, while the country is poised to lead the world by over half a decade in fielding sixth generation fighters, the Su-35’s role is expected to become increasingly peripheral. The continued growth of the J-16 fleet has further limited the significance of the Su-35. The fact that China has not offered the J-16 or any other heavyweight long range fighters for export has been a primary factor allowing Russia to continue exports of the Su-35 to other clients, although the aircraft’s estimated lower cost than its Chinese counterparts may have also been a factor. Russia has taken steps to modernise the aircraft, and in July 2025 they were confirmed to have belatedly integrated the R-77M air-to-air missile, providing a performance comparable to those of Chinese and American missiles from a decade prior, although these upgrades have been far from sufficient to reverse the trend towards a fast widening capability gap.

While Turkey has played a primary role in the wider U.S. campaign against Iran through sustained attacks and support for jihadist paramilitary forces against Iran’s primary security partner Syria, resulting in the state’s collapse in December 2024 after close to 14 years of hostilities, it has also played a wider role beyond providing basing rights for U.S. and other Western forces. Following an Israeli attack on Iran in June 13, the Turkish Kurecik Radar Station in the country’s Malatya province played an important role in supporting Israeli missile defence efforts to block Iran’s retaliatory ballistic missile attacks. Iranian state media outlet Press TV cited officials stating on this basis that Turkey was “spying on Iran for Zionist interests.” The AN/TPY-2 radar systems at the facility in question were installed U.S. military personnel in the early 2010s, allowing it to open it 2012.

The Turkish government confirmed that radar data from the Kurecik base is shared with the other NATO members, and was “established in line with Turkey’s national security and interests and is intended to ensure the protection of the NATO allies,” meaning data could be used to protect U.S. and other Western forces at bases across the Middle East, including U.S. Armed Forces units in Israel. Beyond the AN/TPY-2 system, however, Turkey has also operationalised one of the most potent missile defence systems in the Middle East, the Russian S-400, which appears poised to play a key role in possible hostilities. Turkish officials’ arguments regarding the need to procure the S-400 have specifically cited the requirement for an advanced missile defence capability against Iran, with the system’s sensor suite is also capable of providing early warning and targeting data from far beyond Turkey’s borders.

The S-400’s 91N6E “Big Bird” 3D long-range surveillance & target acquisition radar provides the a panoramic surveillance capability for wide-area airspace scanning and target tracking, with a range of up to 600 kilometres, allowing it to ‘peer’ deep into Iran. The system can track hundreds of targets simultaneously, and operates in multiple bands with electronic protection/jamming resistance. This is complemented by the 96L6, an additional 3D acquisition radar covering a wide altitude range, which is optimised for detecting low-flying targets such as unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles, filling gaps in coverage from the main radar. These radar systems can provide invaluable early warning against Iranian missile strikes, potentially allowing U.S. and Israeli aircraft to launch precision strikes on the locations of Iranian missile launches at much earlier stages, while cueing Western and Israeli missile defence assets across the region.

The possibly of the S-400 system being utilised in roles beyond missile early warning remains significant in the event of a high intensity conflict, with Turkey’s treaty alliance with the United States and longstanding strategic partnership with Israel meaning it may be relied on for support. The S-400’s 40N6 missiles have demonstrated the capability to intercept hypersonic ballistic targets at speeds of up to Mach 8, and at ranges of up to 400 kilometres, which is a capability unmatched by Western and Israeli systems. This could be used to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles to protect U.S. and other allied facilities. The support the Untied States has been able to draw on from a wide range of regional security partners to achieve its strategic goals, where Iran after the toppling of the Syrian state has remained isolated, has placed Washington in a highly advantageous position to pursue its war effort, with Turkey’s role having been particularly central. With Russia having provided Turkey with full autonomy in utilising the S-400, which was customised to be able to integrate with NATO-standard networks, the system is poised to play a major role in broader allied missile defence efforts in the region.

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved work to proceed on the AMCA program in May 2025, with the Defence Ministry referring to this as providing "a significant push towards enhancing India's indigenous defence capabilities and fostering a robust domestic aerospace industrial ecosystem.” The program has been under development for close to a decade, with the state owned aerospace and defence company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited having begun the detailed design phase in February 2019. Consistent delays affecting even far less ambitious or complex programs, most notably the Tejas lightweight fourth generation fighter, have resulted in highly pessimistic projections regarding the viability of the AMCA program producing a viable fifth generation frontline fighter within the next 15 years.

Former financial advisor to the Indian finance ministry Amit Cowshish in 2022 projected based on the precedent set by the Tejas that “AMCA will take much longer to develop than is being currently projected.” The limited scale of research and development in India, and the less that cutting edge degree of sophistication of the country’s industrial base, are among the primary factors fuelling pessimistic projections regarding the ambitious program’s viability. Although the Tejas made its first flight in January 2021 following decades under development, the first aircraft were only accepted into service 18 years later in February 2019. A heavy reliance on Israeli avionics and U.S. engines has resulted in a cost of approximately $72 million per aircraft as of 2025, comparing poorly to other more capable fighters types, such as the Su-30MKI which forms the backbone of the fleet, or the Russian Su-57 fifth generation fighter which is procured by the Russian Defence Ministry for just $35 per aircraft at times when the rouble is low against the U.S. dollar.

Delays to the AMCA program are expected to increase India’s reliance on the Su-57 to bring its fleet up to a fifth generation level, with Indian defence analysts having specifically pointed to the Russian fighter as a stopgap until the AMCA can produce a fighter ready for frontline service. Former Air Marshal Anil Chopra observed to this effect in February 2025 that although the AMCA was expected to reach prototype stage within 11 years: “Realistically – it may take more time... By 2035, China could have around 1,500 J-20s [fifth generation air superiority fighters] when India optimistically plans to induct the AMCA.” Chopra noted the existence of “a school of thought that India may need to acquire an interim imported fifth-generation aircraft,” while observing that the rival American F-35 was not considered a viable option for political reasons. The extreme levels of control and limitations on autonomy imposed by Washington are further factors that have ruled it out.

Summarising how the state of the AMCA program was closely related to the perceived need for the Su-57, Marshal Chopra observed: “India must invest more and take a task-force approach for developing the LCA Mk2 and AMCA, it needs an interim solution to make good numbers and reduce capability gap with China. Options are limited, and acquiring a few Su-57s remains a viable interim choice.” Three months after his assessment was made, the perceived serous underperformance of India’s Rafale fighters, which were the only new fighter type brought into service in the country in the preceding decades, against Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied J-10C fighters, was considered to have further increased the perceived urgency of quickly procuring the Su-57.

The Indian Defence Ministry was confirmed in late January to have reached an advanced technical stage in talks to produce the Su-57 under license, under a deal which reportedly will include a minimum of 140 aircraft. It remains highly possible that planned Su-57 procurements will increase gradually should the AMCA face a continued series of delays and performance issues as the Tejas did. This would hardly be unprecedented, with the Su-30MKI seeing more exports to India from 2002 than any other ‘4+ generation’ fighter did to any single client, with over 270 procured over time. The state of the Tejas program is considered to have been among the primary factors in the decision to place followup orders for further Su-30 fighters, although the industrial benefits of the license production deal, which included growing percentages of indigenous inputs over time, were also significant.

Delays to the AMCA program are expected to further increase the attractiveness of fielding a large Su-57 fleet, and should the fighter not enter service until the 2040s, which currently appears likely, then an Indian Su-57 fleet reaching close to 250 fighters remains highly possible. The Russian Defence Ministry has made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the aircraft’s source code as part of a license production deal, which will place Indian Su-57s entirely in a league of their own among fighters of their generation in their levels of customisability and the degree to which they they can integrate indigenous technologies. Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December alluded to the possibility of this reaching the stage of a fully joint program. Should a very high level of indigenisation of the Su-57 be achieved, including the integration of predominantly Indian-origin avionics and weaponry, it remains highly possible that the program will come to be seen as an alternative to the AMCA should the latter program face comparable difficulties to the Tejas.

Preceding its previous limited entry into hostilities against Iran on June 23, 2025, the U.S. Air Force made an unprecedented mass deployment of KC-135 and KC-46 tankers across the Atlantic from June 15. Western fighters on average have far shorter ranges than their Chinese or Russian counterparts, which has resulted in a very heavy reliance on aerial refuelling for operations against major state adversaries. The U.S. Air Force operates the world’s largest tanker fleet, which is vital allowing short range fighters such as the F-16 and F-35 to conduct operations in larger theatres such as the Pacific, the Arctic and the Middle East. This is particularly important for stealth fighters such as the F-35 and F-22, which cannot carry external fuel tanks without comprising their reduced radar cross section profiles, with both fighter types having less than hal the range on internal fuel as the Su-35 fighters scheduled to be received by the Iranian Air Force.

The surge in the size of the tanker fleet at Al Udeid Air Base reflects part of a broader redeployment of aerial refuelling assets to Europe and the Middle East, which is itself part of a much larger military buildup being staged against Iran. The overthrow of the Syrian government in December 2024 by Western, Turkish, Qatari and Israeli backed Islamist paramilitary groups was considered key to reshaping the theatre in the Middle East to achieve the long term Western Bloc objective of toppling the Iranian government, which would remove a primary challenge to Western interests in the region. This would also allow Iran to serve as a staging ground for future power projection efforts into Central Asia. The advanced capabilities of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal, which was partially demonstrated during hostilities in June, are considered a a primary factor deterring a full scale assault. The demonstrated ability of Western and Israeli sponsored paramilitary groups to continue to launch attacks within Iran, however, has continued to be major point of vulnerability.

The U.S. Air Force’s reliance on the KC-135 has remained particularly high due tomajor issueswith the new KC-46 tanker program, including a number of persistent high-level technical deficiencies such as the the malfunctioning of its remote vision system and its refuelling boom, and a history of fuel system leaks, which have led the Air Force to suspend procurements in the past. The KC-46’smission capable rates have also remained outstandingly low.In parallel to the surge in the tanker presence, the U.S. Armed Forces have pre-positioned vast quantities of assets in the Middle East, with Al Udeid Air Base and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base serving as two primary nodes in this buildup. The ability of the Patriot system to provide sufficient protection to Al Udeid Air Base has been brought to serious question, particularly when considering the demonstrated limitations of the system against even limited attacks in the past.

The B-2 was first tested in combat during NATO’s air assault on Yugoslavia in 1999, including flying a single CIA mission to bomb the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7 of that year. The aircraft were first used to penetrate heavily defended airspace in the late hours of June 21, when seven B-2s targeted Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer using GBU-57 penetrative bombs. The B-2 is the only aircraft in the world capable of deploying the bomb, which is entirely in a league of its own among non-nuclear weapons in terms of its penetrative capabilities. Iranian air defences had by that time been severely depleted by attacks by Western- and Israeli-backed paramilitary groups on the ground, which used drones and Spike missiles to take out radars, command posts and missile launchers.

The age of the B-2 has raised questions regarding its survivability in heavily defended airspace. Commenting on the means used to defend the aircraft during operations in Iranian airspace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Dan Caine reported: “As the Operation Midnight Hammer Strike package entered Iranian airspace, the U.S. employed several deception tactics, including decoys, as the fourth-and fifth-generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface-to-air missile threats.” B-2s took off from Whiteman Air Force Base with a flight plan that indicated Guam was their destination, apparently to reduce the possibility of Iran preparing what defences it had remaining for their arrival.

The small size of the U.S. stealth bomber fleet has seriously limited the Air Force’s ability to conduct penetration strikes, and fuelled calls for the B-21 bomber currently under development to succeed the B-2 to see a production run of closer to 300 aircraft. The affordability of this remains in serious question. A report from U.S. Air Force Academy Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in early February highlighted that even 100-200 B-21 bombers would be insufficient to sustain pressure in a broader conflict with a peer level adversary such as China, forming only “a raid force, not a campaign force.” The issue of the small size of the B-2 fleet is compounded by the aircraft’s extreme maintenance requirements, which has made it difficult to sustain high or even medium level availability rates. This has limited the fleet to conducting isolated strikes against Iranian targets, rather than playing a larger role in a sustained longer term air campaign.

The B-2’s viability is expected to be brought to further question as Iran strengthens its air defences, including with the expected operationalisation of its first post-Cold War fighters, Russian Su-35s, before the end of the year. The Su-35’s ability to network with ground-based assets, integration of one of the world’s largest radars fielded by a combat aircraft, and use of secondary L-band radars, is expected to significantly strengthen the Iranian air defence networks’ ability to detect, track and engage stealth aircraft, in particular older ones like the B-2. The B-21 not only has significantly superior stealth capabilities to the B-2, but is also considered more maintenance friendly and more affordable for large scale procurements, which could allow it to significantly strengthen U.S. Air Force options for penetration strikes. As a much smaller and shorter ranged aircraft, however, it is restricted to a more limited payload and will be far more reliant on tanker support for long range operations. In parallel to the B-21’s development, China is developing its own intercontinental range stealth bomber, which is currently in flight testing and is significantly larger than the B-21.

In response to limited U.S. Air Force and Navy strikes on the Iranian Natanz and Fordow nuclear facilities on June 22, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps launched a small scale missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on June 23. Although U.S. defence officials initially praised the success of U.S. Army and Qatari Air Force Patriot air defence systems in protecting the facility, it was later conceded by Pentagon sources that despite Iran having used less advanced Fateh-313 missiles, and having given the U.S. Armed Forces prior warning of the strike, Patriot systems were not fully successful. “One Iranian ballistic missile impacted Al Udeid Air Base June 23 while the remainder of the missiles were intercepted by U.S. and Qatari air defence systems,” Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell confirmed in mid-July. This followed the release of satellite footage which appeared to show the destruction of a radome housing the modernisation enterprise terminal communications suite, which had a value of approximately $15 million.

Where the THAAD system is well optimised to intercepting intermediate range ballistic missile attacks like those which could be launched against U.S. bases in Jordan, and strategic targets across Israel where a separate battery is also deployed, the Patriot is better suited to intercepting short and medium range attacks like those which could be launched against bases targets in Qatar. Despite 45 years of incremental modernisation work, the effectiveness of the Patriot has been widely questioned by both Western and Ukrainian officials, particularly during recent combat testing in Ukraine which has been by far the most intensive in the system’s history. The U.S. Army in December 2025 confirmed plans to develop a new variant of the Patriot, which appears poised to be the most revolutionary upgrade since the system first entered service in 1981, and has been widely assessed to be intended to address many of its recently demonstrated shortcomings. This enhanced variant, which will gain a 360 degree targeting capability that Russian, Chinese and North Korean systems have long had, is not expected to enter service until the mid-2030s.

The U.S. Army has heavily depleted its stockpiles of surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot system, which in July 2025 were confirmed to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. This depletion was assessed by a number of Western sources to have been a primary factor in the Trump administration’s decision to suspend supplies to Ukraine at the time. Each PAC-3 MSE interceptor costs approximately $3.9 million, several times the cost of low value Iranian ballistic missiles like the Fateh-313 which are estimated to cost well under $500,000. This has made it vital for the U.S. Armed Forces to neutralise the bulk of the Iranian missile arsenal on the ground, as intercepting any significant portion of missiles launched would be both unaffordable, and beyond the current capacities of its missile defence arsenal.

While the Indian Air Force’s only other high profile new combat asset procured in the last decade, the Rafale fighter, was widely considered to have seriously underperformed in engagements in May, Indian sources have widely praised the performance of the S-400. Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 13 singled out the system’s performance when commenting on the war effort, stressing: “platforms like the S-400 have given unprecedented strength to the country.” Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh three months later in early August observed: “The S-400 system which we had recently bought has been a game changer… The kill range of that system kept their aircraft away from the maximum distance at which they could employ their long-range air-to-ground weapons, like those long-range glide bombs that they have.”

The order of 288 additional surface-to-air missiles for the S-400 system may help the Indian Air Force realise three major objectives. These include replenishing missiles expended during hostilities with Pakistan, increasing the numbers of more costly 40N6 missiles in service now that their combat capabilities have been verified, and potentially updating battalions deployed in particularly high priority locations with newer variants of existing missile types that were first ordered in 2018. The large scale of the S-400 program has meant that updates are continuously being applied to the system, including to its electronic warfare countermeasures and the guidance capabilities of its missiles, with procurements of newly produced missiles allowing Indian units to benefit from the latest technological advances.

The potency of the Indian S-400 network is likely to be further strengthened as other complementary assets developed for long range air defence duties are expected to be procured. Indian media outlets in early December confirmed that the Defence Ministry was scheduled to begin formal discussions regarding the procurement of the S-500 long range air defence system, which is the world’s first mobile surface-to-air missile system with the ability to shoot down satellites or intercontinental range ballistic missiles. The S-500’s powerful sensors are expected to significantly increase the situational awareness of S-400 systems deployed in the same regions, while the system also integrates the same 40N6 missiles as well as even longer ranged missile types.

In January 2026 it was confirmed that talks for the sale of at least 140 Su-57 fighters to India under a major license production deal had reached a “deep technical stage.” This followed multiple reports over the preceding year that such talks were taking place, with the fighters expected to provide an invaluable boost to situational awareness serving as elevated sensor platforms. Each Su-57 fighter integrates five active electronically scanned array radars, with a next generation primary radar announced in 2025 to be under development. Alongside the S-500 and Su-57, it was confirmed in September 2025 that the Defence Ministry had initiated talks for the procurement of additional S-400 systems beyond the five battalions already ordered, with local media outlets reporting the following month that the Ministry was planning to proceed with placing orders.

It remains uncertain whether the Iranian Armed Forces’ own reconnaissance assets had provided an indication of THAAD deployments in Jordan, whether they were informed by China, or whether they discovered the deployment only after commercial satellite images were provided. The possibility has been raised that China has sought to signal to the United States and its strategic partners that it will provide intelligence support for Iranian retaliatory strikes, thus strengthening the country’s deterrence capabilities and potentially helping to deter a U.S.-led attack. Improvements in orbital reconnaissance has made even some of the most sensitive above ground deployments openly visible, although extreme measures, such as the jamming of satellites, have at times been taken, with an example being Israel’s jamming of satellite coverage of its airbases following Iranian missile attacks to prevent battle damage assessments from being carried out.

The U.S. Army currently deploys just eight THAAD batteries, and a very limited arsenal of surface-to-air interceptors, which makes the deployment of a battery to Jordan, following a prior deployment of at least one battery to Israel from October 2024, highly significant. The system saw its first high intensity combat test from June 13-25, 2025, when used to blunt Iranian retaliatory strikes on Israel, following Israel’s initiation of a major air assault against Iran in on June 13. The U.S. Army expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system to intercept Iranian ballistic missile attacks, representing over 25 percent of the Army’s total arsenal deployed around the world. Each THAAD interceptor launch costs approximately $15.5 million, with the defence of Israeli airspace using these systems for 11 days is conservatively estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion. This is estimated to be just a fraction of the sums spent on missile defence, with Israel utilising its own multi-layered anti-missile network, while U.S. Navy destroyers expended significant quantities of SM-3 and SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles.

Despite the extreme cost of utilising the system, the effectiveness of THAAD has been brought to serious question, with its ability to protect Israeli territory proving to be limited as Iranian strikes caused extreme damage to military and strategic targets across the country. President Donald Trump observed days after the end of hostilities: “Especially those last couple of days, Israel was hit really hard. Those ballistic missiles, boy they took out a lot of buildings,” with other sources on both sides widely reaching similar conclusions. Iran in June made limited use of its new Fattah ballistic missile, which is its first to integrate a hypersonic glide vehicle, and caused considerable concern among the Israeli military leadership, fuelling calls for a deep revision of Israel’s missile defence plans. THAAD is not expected to be capable of intercepting such attacks, which compounds the issue of the system’s high vulnerability to being overwhelmed. The possibility of the Fattah and other advanced missiles being used to strike THAAD batteries on the ground, and thus destroying a very high value target while serving as a force multiplier for the remainder of the arsenal, remains significant.

The targeting of Venezuelan shipping included the commandeering of the tanker the Centuries owned by the China-based firm VSatau Tijana Oil Trading in late December, which had not been placed on any sanctions list. Beyond the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, operations against civilian tankers have also extended to the international waters of the Atlantic, with U.S. Navy and Coast Guard units on January 7 having boarded and took over the oil tanker Marinera in the Atlantic Ocean, after a pursuit that lasted over 14 days. Although these operations have been widely criticised as illegal, U.S. officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal recently confirmed that a similar campaign targeting Iranian oil exports is reported to currently be under consideration. Multiple NATO members have launched similar attacks targeting tankers carrying Russian oil in international waters, albeit at lower levels of intensity.

Commenting on ongoing Western operations against civilian shipping in international waters, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently warned: “the U.S. objective – to dominate the world economy – is being realised using a fairly large number of coercive measures that are incompatible with fair competition.” To achieve this objective, the U.S. leadership “want to take control of all the routes for providing the world’s leading countries and all continents with energy resources.” “A ‘war’ against tankers in the open sea is being waged,” he added. Although operations are primarily focused on oil shipments, they have also targeted other forms of civilian shipping, with a notable example being the boarding of a cargo ship transporting Chinese industrial goods to Iran in international waters in November 2025, which were then destroyed by U.S. forces. The U.S. Marine Corps in January initiated large scale training exercises for similar boarding operations targeting civilian vessels in international waters. The targeting of civilian shipping is expected to become increasingly frequent as Western Bloc states seek to constrain the international trade of their adversaries.

Updates to the Su-57 have also reportedly improved its ability to counter advanced air defence systems, with CEO of the state defence conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, reporting that the aircraft "have become even more potent and dangerous" and can be used "against even the most advanced enemy air defence systems." Chemezov previously in November 2025elaboratedon plans to continue to modernise the Su-57, stressing that it “is still being refined," while “work is underway toward a comprehensive modernisation that will encompass its components, electronics, and weaponry.” He highlighted at the time that it had “effectively demonstrated its capabilities in new tactical roles and confirmed the robustness of its stealth features” during high intensity combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre.

Although it remains uncertain how many of Su-57s have been delivered over the past year, Russian state media has referred to the latest delivery as “a large new batch.” With no prior deliveries reported for over six months, this may indicate that a backlog of fighters build up as aircraft intended for delivery were brought up to the latest standard before being delivered in a single large batch. In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway for the deliveries of Su-57 fifth generation fighters at an accelerated rate, following the opening of new facilities in August for their production, with this potentially already being reflected in the expanded sizes of new batches.

The Su-57 is currently one of just five fifth generation fighter types in service worldwide, alongside the Chinese J-20 and J-35, and the American F-22 and F-35. The F-22 has not been produced since 2011, and first flew in 1990, with growing obsolescence issues hindering its performance even compared to many newer fourth generation fighter types such as the F-15EX. The Su-57’s avionics are considered significantly more advanced than those of the F-22, but less so than those of the F-35 and modern Chinese fighters. The fighter’s range is over to double those of the F-22 and F-35, but shorter than the new J-20A, while the range of the J-35 is unknown. The Russian fighter’s manoeuvrability levels are significantly superior to those of any fighter type in the Western world, although potentially inferior to the new J-20A.

Although the Su-57 has been produced on a smaller scale, it has been combat tested much more intensively in high intensity scenarios than other fighter types of its generation. Combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre have included air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions.With the J-20 and F-22 not having been offered for export, while the J-35 only entered service in 2025, the Su-57 and the F-35 are the only fifth generation fighters to have been exported, with the first of the Russian fighters confirmed in November 2025 to have entered service in the Algerian Air Force. The Indian Defence Ministry is currently holding talks to procure in large numbers of the aircraft under a license production deal, which reportedly will include a minimum of 140 aircraft.

While the Type 055 class destroyer integrates 112 vertical launch cells, these carry a wide range of missile types including land attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and multiple surface-to-air missile types. If operating alone against much larger forces, their multi-layered air defences are potentially vulnerable to being overwhelmed by sheer volumes of enemy aircraft and missiles. Type 051C class ships can thus potentially provide support for air defence duties, lending greater volumes of missiles, while the Type 055’s significantly larger and more advanced sensor suite can be used to share data both to increase situational awareness and to provide targeting data. Type 055 destroyers integrate dual band radar systems similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer, which provide over the horizon tracking capabilities widely considered the most advanced of any surface combatant in the world.

Each Type 055 class destroyer integrates four Type 346A active electronically scanned array radars for guidance of long ranged surface-to-air missiles, including 300 kilometre range missiles from its own HHQ-9 system. These can potentially be used to provide significantly superior guidance for Type 051C class ships which are less prone to jamming. The pairing of older specialised air defence destroyers with modern multirole destroyers is far from unprecedented, with the Navy in late January having deployed the Type 052C air defence destroyer Xi'an to accompany the Type 052D destroyer Zibo for operations near Japanese territory at a time of high tensions.

The Type 052C also integrates 48 vertical launch cells, but deploys the newer and more advanced HHQ-9 long range surface-to-air missiles rather than the Russian S-300FM, as well as more modern sensors. It has been widely speculated that the second Type 051C class destroyer, the Shenyang, which is currently under refurbishment, will integrate a single use canister launch system based on that of the Type 052C class, allowing for the integration of the HHQ-9 system to provide more up to date support for air defence duties. Following reports from a number of U.S. sources that China is developing the world’s longest ranged surface-to-air missiles, with the ability to engage targets up to 2000 kilometres away, it has been speculated by a number of analysts that destroyers like the Type 055 class will be the first in the world to field such a capability around the mid-2030s, revolutionising their ability to provide area defence.

The AN/APG-85 was marketed as being capable of “defeating all current & projected air & surface threats,” with its operationalisation of a Gallium Nitride based system providing one option to significantly ease conflict between signal strength and power usage, and thus more effectively lock on to stealth targets. The timing of the release of footage of J-20s with a new radar nose cone, as the U.S. Air Force has faced a scandal for being forced to put weights in the noses of its F-35s due to difficulties integrating the AN/APG-85, may have been intended to show up the U.S. Armed Forces. The significantly larger size of the AN/APG-85 compared to the AN/APG-81 has required the development of a new forward fuselage for the F-35, resulting in considerable delays to its integration. The F-35 is currently considered the only peer level rival to the J-20 and its lighter counterpart the J-35 in terms of its sophistication and advanced capabilities, although the American aircraft is significantly lighter, carries a smaller radar, and is much more restricted in its range and flight performance.

The J-20A has revised airframe design from baseline fighter, with the most conspicuous difference being its redesigned rear canopy which reduces aerodynamic drag, enhances its efficiency in supersonic flight, and is thought to significantly further improve its stealth capabilities. The new variant’s most notable known improvement is the integration of the WS-15 next generation engine, with the first footage of a serial production fighter with the new powerplant having been published in late December 2025. In January footage released by the fighter’s primary developer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, and for the first time showed several of the J-20A undergoing flight tests.

The F-35 program has suffered from significant performance issues due to the limited power and cooling capacity provided by its F135 engines, which have restricted its ability to incorporate energy-intensive new subsystems. Two ambitious programs to develop engines with greater potentials for the fighter, including the F136 and the Adaptive Engine Transition Program, were both cancelled in 2011 and 2023 respectively. The J-20, by contrast, has transitioned from a stopgap AL-31FM2 procured from Russia for the first 40 units, to the much more capable indigenous WS-10C, and most recently the next generation WS-15, which is estimated to provide the fighter with significantly more thrust and power for onboard systems than any other fighter type. This is expected to allow the J-20 to continue to integrate new subsystems, including new generations of radars, far more smoothly.

The ability to integrate new radars is critical for premier Chinese and U.S. fighter types, as the two countries continue to rapidly improve their aircraft’s electronic warfare and stealth capabilities. A more advanced radar provides a greater potential for jamming, but most importantly provides both lower vulnerability to enemy jamming, and a greater capability to detect, track, and form weapons locks against adversary stealth aircraft. The J-20 is inherently at an advantage in this regard as its nose cone can accommodate a much larger radar than the F-35, meaning the F-35 would need a significant technological lead in the radar it integrates to provide comparable capabilities.

Chinese fighters have also long retained an advantage due to the integration of active electronically scanned array radars onto their air-to-air missiles, including the PL-15, PL-16 and PL-17, where the U.S. AIM-120 does not integrate a similarly advanced radar. The development of the AIM-260 air-to-air missile, which is expected to integrate a similarly advanced radar, has faced continued delays, with the J-20 program having been a considered a primary factor stimulating its development. Trends towards a Chinese advantage in the capabilities of its fighter radars reflect broader trends in the Chinese and U.S. combat aviation sectors, as Chinese sixth generation fighters are expected to enter service more than half a decade ahead of rival fighters under development in the U.S., with the American F-47 intended to make its first flight only in 2028, while three separate Chinese sixth generation fighter flights already made their first flights in late 2024 and early 2025.

The current review of Canada’s full F-35A order, which was previously planned at 88 fighters, was initiated in 2025 under Prime Minister Mark Carney following trade and security tensions with the United States. Carney in January stressed that forceful U.S. threats to annex Greenland and Canada itself signalled end of the rules-based international order, indicting a willingness to protect Greenland against a possible U.S. invasion. Tensions were also fuelled by the imposition of tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminium, and automotive exports to the United States. Domestic polling commissioned by Ekos Politics has indicated that 72 percent of Canadians supported incorporating the Gripen into the Royal Canadian Air Force, with offers to domestically co-produce the less popular fighter expected to create thousands of domestic jobs and strengthen the national aerospace industrial base.

Despite the political and economic advantages of the Gripen, internal Canadian Defence Ministry reports obtained by Radio Canada in December 2025 confirmed that the F-35 was assessed to be overwhelmingly superior to rival fighter types in the Future Fighter Capability Project tender. The aircraft scored 57.1 out of 60 points, a 95 percent score, while the Gripen E/F achieved just 19.8 points, a 33 percent score, with their performances diverging particularly sharply once rated operational criteria were applied. Such results were far from unexpected, with the F-35 having been favoured by similarly overwhelming margins in recent tenders in Belgium, Finland and Switzerland, and having consistently won every tender in which it has completed against European aircraft. The F-35’s capabilities are considered in a league of its own in the Western world as the only fifth generation fighter type in production, with even the preceding F-22 fifth generation fighter being far behind in terms of its network-centric capabilities, active and passive sensors, electronic warfare suite, and stealth capabilities.

The FA-50 is limited in its ability to serve as an effective drone controller by the small size and limited situational awareness provided by its radar, and well as by its limited range and lack of stealth capabilities. Its twin seat configuration, which is a legacy of its origins as a trainer developed under the T-50 program, nevertheless allows it to accommodate a drone controller behind the pilot in the second seat. This is considered highly advantageous, with the Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighter program having brought a twin seat variant, the J-20S, into service specifically for this purpose, making it the only operational twin seat fighter in the world. Sixth generation fighter programs are expected to predominantly develop twin seaters for much the same reason.

In the Republic of Korea Air Force, twin seat variants of the KF-21, which has been referred to as a ‘5- generation’ fighter straddling the line between fourth and fifth generation capabilities, is expected to serve as the primary drone control platform, and is the only post-fourth generation fighter program outside China to have flown a twin seat variant. Nevertheless, the FA-50’s significantly lower cost makes marketing the much lighter aircraft with similar manned-unmanned teaming capabilities potentially highly beneficial for defence exports. Korea Aerospace Industries has continued to conduct autonomous flight tests of the Adaptable Aerial Platform using an artificial intelligence pilot system, with this real flight experimentation expected to further its appeal. It remains highly possible that South Korean unmanned aircraft could also be marketed as ‘wingmen’ to operators of other NATO-standard aircraft such as the F-35, F-15 and F-16.

Russian strikes have targeted key energy and transport infrastructure multiple times, including that used by the Ukrainain Armed Forces, and by civilians, in respective tactical and strategic level attacks. Such strikes have at times caused serious power shortages in major cities, raising the possibility of a need for full evacuation if sustained. As early as November 20002 the New York Times reported that the capital Kiev may need to be evacuated completely due to a looming collapse of infrastructure. Director of security for the Kiev municipal government Roman Tkachuk stated to this effect in an interview at the time: “we understand that if Russia continues such attacks, we [Kiev] may lose our entire electricity system… If there’s no power, there will be no water and no sewage. That’s why currently the government and city administration are taking all possible measures to protect our power supply system.” By that time 40 percent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed. Russia appears to have been deterred from maintaining a high tempo of such strikes on critical infrastructure, despite the expansion of its capabilities to do so.

A notable example of a strike on key transport infrastructure was the use of Iskander-M ballistic missile systems to destroy a Ukrainian train in the village of Budy in the contested Kharkiv region, destroying several railway cars and nearby infrastructure. This was one of the first times that the system was reported to have been used to employ employing new ‘double strike’ tactics, with a pause after the first strike allowing personnel from the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Emergency Service to move into the area to assess the damage, after which a second Iskander-M launch was be timed to maximise casualties. The rapid expansion of production of missiles for the Iskander-M systems, which are produced in multiple sub-variants, has allowed the system to play an increasingly central role in operations and to be utilised in a range of new ways such aslaunching ‘double strikes.’

A leading example of a strike on personnel concentrations reported in early November was a strike targeting some of the most high value personnel from elite Ukrainain Armed Forces units at an awards ceremony. The strike was confirmed by Ukraine’s Operational Task Force East, with personnel from the 35th Separate Marine Brigade including elite drone operators, confirmed to have been among those killed. Dmytro Sviatnenko, a Ukrainian journalist, reported that the personnel “were gathered on the parade ground to be awarded. They gathered the best. The best pilots and infantrymen of the brigade. In order of command. In open terrain. Ballistics flew in. The story of negligence repeated itself.”

The Ukrainain Armed Forces’ extreme casualties have resulted in severe personnel shortages, with a digital card index from Ukraine’s Chief of Staff in August 2025 having provided details on dead or missing personnel, and showing that the Forces had lost more than 1.7 million personnel, including both those killed and missing, since February 2022. Although strikes on Ukrainian personnel concentrations have been common, foreign fighters, like the “foreign mercenaries” referred to in the recent Russian Defence Ministry statement, have been particularly singled out for targeting. On July 21, 2025, a Russian strike on a training camp near the central Ukrainian city of Kropivnitsky caused over 100 casualties among foreign fighters, who were gathered for lunch. An American fighter, who spoke to the New York Times on condition of anonymity, reported that combatants from the United States, Denmark, Colombia, and Taiwan were among those hit.

The July 2025 strike was far from unprecedented, and 18 months prior in January 2024 a strike on the headquarters of predominantly French European contractors caused at least 80 casualties, 60 or more of which were deaths. These personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts,” according to Russian state media reports, with their neutralisation having “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them. A greater reliance on foreign contractors, particularly those from Poland and Latin America, has provided a key means of compensating for Ukrainian personnel shortages.